REPORT RESUMES

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A CONFERENCE WAS HELD TO IDENTIFY AND STIMULATE EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH IN SOCIAL STUDIES. DURING A 3-DAY PERIOD, SIX FORMAL PAPERS WERE PRESENTED AND DISCUSSED, AND RESEARCH DESIGN SPECIALISTS DISCUSSED THE METHODOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN CONDUCTING THE RESEARCH IDENTIFIED. THESE WORKING PAPERS WERE INCLUDED IN THE REPORT. CERTAIN PROBLEM AREAS WERE IDENTIFIED AND OUTLINED IN FIVE GENERAL CATEGORIES--(1) MAJOR EXPECTATIONS, (2) FACTORS OF LEARNING, (3) SUBJECT MATTER, (4) THE CLIMATE OF EDUCATIVE PROCESS FUNCTIONS, AND (5) TEACHER FACTORS. (RS)

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CONFERENCE ON NEEDED RESEARCH IN THE TEACHING OF THE SOCIAL STUDIES

Sagamore Conference Center of Syracuse University

October 3-5, 1963

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PREFACE

Currently numerous efforts are being made to revise the teaching of the social studies in the elementary and secondary schools. Two years ago the American Council of Learned Societies published a volume[1] including chapters on the contributions of several disciplines to the social studies program. A number of scholarly associations including the American Anthropological Association, the American Sociological Association, the American Economic Association, the American Historical Association and a group representing the several associations of geographers, have established committees, commissions or projects on the teaching of the social studies. There is also a number of projects such as those in St. Louis, Missouri and Newton, Massachusetts which are either privately or foundation financed. In addition, curriculum revision is being undertaken in a large number of school systems throughout the country. While many of these activities are well conceived and promise to contribute to our knowledge of effective practices, much of what is being done is without sufficient base in research findings.

It appears evident that at this period when it is generally conceded that the social studies program is in need of major revision, efforts should be made to overcome the lag between what we know now from social science research and what we teach, to identify needed areas of research, and to stimulate research in critical areas. There is need to pull together the findings of relevant research that has already been completed, to identify those areas where additional research is needed, and to stimulate research in these areas.

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[1] The Social Studies and the Social Sciences, Sponsored by the American Council of Learned Societies and the National Council for the Social Studies (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962).

In recognition of this need, the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs and the School of Education at Syracuse University were invited to sponsor a conference on Needed Research in the Teaching of the Social Studies under the auspices of the Cooperative Research Branch of the United States Office of Education. This conference was held October 3-5, 1963 at the Sagamore Conference Center, a continuing education facility of Syracuse University located in the Adirondack Mountains. In the pages which follow, the proceedings of this conference are reported.

The purpose of this report is to make as much as possible of the conference proceedings available to all interested parties, and by so doing, foster the objectives of the conference on a broader scale. These objectives are 1) to identify relevant studies which are in progress or which have been completed and to examine their implications for social studies teaching, 2) to identify needed areas of research in the teaching of the social studies, and 3) to stimulate research through identification of needed areas of research, through discussion of research design and through the preparation and distribution of this report on the conference.

The organization of the report is as follows: Part I, Conference Highlights, is intended to provide an overview of the conference by concentrating on the central issues of the conference and directing the casual reader to the more detailed treatment given in later sections. Part II is composed of the six formal papers presented at the conference, each of which is followed by a brief discussion summary. Part III, on research design, presents papers which developed out of the conference on the problems of research design in the field.

In the preparation of this report, the common hazards of the editor were magnified by the fact that much of the material requiring selection and synthesis was delivered orally. Time limitations, moreover, have not permitted submission of this manuscript to each of the participants before publication. The editor must naturally assume responsibility for all inaccuracies and for the selection and organization of material included.

The contributions of speakers, participants, representatives of the United States Office of Education and of scholarly organizations are gratefully acknowledged. Without the generous cooperation of a number of the Syracuse University faculty and staff the success of the conference and preparation of this report would not have been possible. Special indebtedness is acknowledged to Merrill Hartshorn, Executive Secretary of the National Council for the Social Studies, and to Howard Cummings of the United States Office of Education for their valuable assistance in planning the conference.

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PART I

CONFERENCE HIGHLIGHTS

DEFINING RESEARCH

One of the continuing issues throughout the conference centered on the attempt to come to a common understanding with respect to the character, scope, and methods of "research." Though sometimes beclouded by semantics, the exchanges reflected a wide divergence of understanding as to the characteristics of research and to the application and contextual meaning of the term. In the course of the conference the semantic problem was resolved: all of the conferees gained in their tolerance for the diverse uses of the term "research." In addition to this modest accomplishment, the conference provided a setting in which the varieties of research could be aired and a tentative delineation of the scope and methods of each could be agreed upon for the purposes of bringing research *per se* to bear upon the improvement of the social studies program. What is reflected here, therefore, is not to be understood as a consensus or resolution of the differences which persist among scholars regarding the nature and common definition of research. It is rather a statement of the nature of the agreement reached by the conferees which shows how progress in social studies education may be facilitated.

The wide range of problems which impinge upon the teaching of social studies is reflected by the structure and programming of the conference. Each of the six sessions which made up the program was devoted to a set of related problems and each session called forth a more or less representative response as to how we ought to go about solving them. Thus, for example, Frankel's talk on values in social studies education was concerned with philosophical inquiry defined as "a disciplined dialogue with oneself and others."

He stressed the usefulness and in some cases the necessity of unabashed, a priori inquiry that will serve to clarify judgmental questions that no amount of empirical inquiry will solve. McKeachie focused on what he called "middle-level research" as the most fruitful avenue of psychological studies. This research would be characterized by experimentation based on the solid foundations of behavior theory. Other speakers, notably Haefner and Havighurst, saw a great need for simple "survey-diagnostic" and "status and associational" studies to answer the questions which arise in their respective areas of inquiry. Tumin, in pointing out that the methods of social science are part of the substantive social sciences, implied that research needs be broadly conceived to include both "deciding about" social studies objectives and "finding out about" the various contributing factors. In concurring, Odegard indicated that since facts have value and values are facts, inquiry into the relation of social science to public policy must draw from and utilize the research appropriate both to values and to facts. In the policy sciences, the two are intricately and eternally entwined.

The conceptions of research implicit in each of these positions were dramatically polarized during the sessions devoted to research design when Collier, Krathwohl, and Stanley all indicated that their concern was solely in designing research and not in providing the hypotheses to be researched. The hypotheses must come from those who are in the social studies field and are therefore cognizant of what needs to be known. Moreover, research methodologists are not prone to provide principles or criteria which could be applied to questions related to the goals of the social studies or the priorities in needed research.

It is abundantly clear that there is great danger in depending upon one or even two of the several conceptions of research for the illumination of what is needed to decide and find out about the revision of the social studies curriculum. The danger of inaction derives from this dilemma: while we are anxious to utilize our findings in the revision of the social studies curriculum, we are equally compelled to know all we can know with as great a certainty as possible before we act. The latter demand for all its obvious virtues may, if too closely adhered to, be productive of a paralysis: we are easily persuaded that we do not know enough and conclude from this that we ought not act on "imperfect knowledge." The broader conception of research precludes the danger without subverting the former demand. We must get outside the traditional formalities of education in order to understand the society, its manpower needs, the needs for retraining of workers, and to try to see what society will be like twenty years hence. On vital issues of educational policy it may not be possible to wait for the results of detailed research.

In light of this diversity in the conceptions of research and the contributions each has to make to the cooperative endeavor, the conference was in agreement that the more inclusive conception of research needs be adopted. It is worth repeating that this consensus does not represent a theoretical resolution of the definition of research. It reflects the common and cooperative understanding of the practicality of project social studies. This solution has an important residue: we may adopt a broad conception of research and endorse a whole spectrum of types of inquiry, but we must at the same time make explicit the proper domain of the several types and their relationship.

The following diagram, prepared by a conference subcommittee, traces the broad lines of the interdependence of modes of inquiry on the basis of developmental aspects of the project. The stages of inquiry, or the relatedness of the modes of inquiry vis à vis method is suggested by the spectrum from top to bottom. In this respect, however, the schematic delineation has its obvious limitations.

General Societal Task	Social Studies Curriculum and Instruction Task	Appropriate Inquiry and Research Task
Value formulation innovation	Educational goals as derived from societal goals.	Philosophic inquiry Humanistic search Creation
Model building	Curriculum design: arrangement of educational goals into patterns.	Conceptual analysis Logical synthesis Associational studies
Developmental	Instructional materials; Preparation of pupil materials and teacher guides.	Survey diagnostics "Middle-level" "Experimentation"
Application	Testing and feedback with all variables (pupils, methods, materials, school climates, etc.)	Experiments

It is apparent that the coordination of such a wide range of inquiry may be one of the more pressing demands of social studies revision. In planning new social studies approaches it is important that an inventory of significant innovation be maintained in order to minimize the traditional lag between the appearance of valuable new ideas and their general acceptance. The coordination of this research is also made imperative by the fact that if the coming decades are marked by the expected fruition of educational studies, we must be in a position to evaluate the studies and make use of them. The solution of this problem of coordinating research, like the problem of defining research, demands a cooperative and practical solution. Such a clearinghouse, whatever its ultimate form may be, must adopt the broader conception of "research" and thereby take full advantage of relevant studies.

VALUES IN EDUCATION

The three positions quoted below are indicative of a significant difference of opinion among conference personnel on the role of the social studies in relation to the development of attitudes, beliefs, and values. Opinions ranged from the indoctrination of beliefs, attitudes, and values, to the position that the one value to which we are (or should be) committed is that of scientific method.

Hanna

> We are at a stage in our history where science and technology have forced us to form larger communities of men. We have been forced to invent new social technologies to operate in this larger area. Each time society enters a transition period, social invention is needed to take care of technology in the larger community. We in our time have need for more social invention, more creative effort. We need research to discover the commonality of values, and education to reinforce those values which have been built up in our society over a long period of time, and we need research on which to develop and base new attitudes and loyalties for this generation.

Frankel

> As teachers and citizens we have an obligation to meet the legitimate demands of our society that certain general attitudes be generated. As long as

> there is any element of authority in the classroom, it is disingenous to say that we merely invite students to make up their own minds. We are not doing just that and we ought to face it.

Metcalf

> Any attempt to inculcate any set of values invariably calls for distortion of knowledge. One is not free to choose freedom unless he is free to compare freedom with its alternative.

A conference highlight was reached in the address of Charles Frankel who raised three basic questions in this area: 1) What is the relationship of social studies to values? Are the social studies dependent upon a value system, committed to a value system, or are they neutral? 2) What is the practical role of the social sciences in the education of the young, particularly with regard to the transmission of certain social values? 3) What is the relationship of the social studies as inquiries into the sore spots of our society, and the other quite legitimate goal of American schools, which is to help students to live together, to learn mutual respect for one another and the like? That is, what is the goal of the American schools as a socializer?

Frankel suggested that preliminary to any rationally devised program of research aimed at improvement of the teaching of the social studies we are required as citizens and as teachers to be clearer than we are now about our own attitudes, beliefs, and values. To deal successfully with these questions it is first necessary to pin down some fundamental principles and to make certain basic moral decisions. This would suggest not only "scientific" inquiry, but self interrogation, a "disciplined dialogue with oneself and others," an effort to find out just what the principles are to which we, as teachers of the social studies, are willing to commit ourselves. Among the perplexing questions raised were:

> What is our purpose in conducting new research in social attitudes, beliefs, and values?
>
> What sort of information do we want?
>
> Should we stress the contrasts between principles men profess and the principles evident in their conduct?
>
> Do we wish merely to discover the values, beliefs, and attitudes we hold, or do we have an obligation to make inquiries about values, beliefs, and attitudes as they "ought" to be?
>
> Do teachers simply have the obligation of transmitting the values of society?
>
> How far do we really wish to go in studying beliefs, attitudes, and values in the context of alternatives?
>
> Are we prepared to accept sweetly diluted discussions of difficult social problems, or are we going to insist that the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth be taught?
>
> Do not schools have a legitimate mission of promoting a common sense of citizenship among their students?
>
> Does not a school have an obligation to pass on a certain attitude to the young?
>
> Is it appropriate to induce belief on their part in the strength and rightness of the society to which they belong?

It may be useful to return to Frankel's three basic issues, although it is admittedly hazardous to summarize too briefly his views on these issues. As to whether the social studies are dependent upon a value system, committed to a value system, or neutral, he suggested that if the social studies are not value free they have no claim to being neurtal or objective. If, on the other hand, they are value free, are they not irresponsible? Students have simply not been introduced to the concept of social study unless they clearly grasp the idea that nothing is sacred, even their own ideas.

His second basic issue concerned the role of the social studies in the education of the young, in regard to the transmission of certain social values and certain political values. Here Frankel noted that the school system is, of course, committed to the transmission of certain desirable attitudes for the young. Moral and social attitudes are indeed transmitted by the very cultural atmosphere of the school. Social studies cannot be looked to as the sole or even principal transmitters of the values of the community which are thought desirable. The social studies do, however, incorporate certain special values such as the attempt to be objective, to look at oneself in one's own group dispassionately, to recognize how stubborn are diversities between different individuals and different groups, to distrust simple formulas in study of human affairs. He suggested particular attention to the field of constitutional government and particularly the American Bill of Rights.

Frankel's third issue concerned the paradox between the role of the school as committed to the transmission of certain legitimate goals of the school system as a socializer, and the function of the social studies as inquirer into the sore spots of our society. There is a certain antagonism between the goals of the social studies and the goals of the school in the formation of a single national community in which people have learned tolerance, mutual respect, and fidelity to democratic process. The more vigorous and candid the teaching of social studies becomes, the more likely we are to deal with subjects which are diverse and explosive when presented in a classroom. There is an obvious difference between teaching students what is so, and inviting them to discover what is so by examination of evidence. There is an equally obvious difference in atmosphere in schools in which it is permissible to say that the teacher is wrong or at any rate unconvincing, and schools in which it is not.

The consensus on this basic issue seemed to be that we are simply not teaching the social studies unless the attitudes, beliefs, and values in a community, including the attitudes, beliefs, and values of the teacher and students are held up to critical examination. Frankel cautioned against the introduction of too complex controversial issues too early in the school curriculum. He cited visits to sixth grade classrooms where questions of race relations were being studied. Generally discussion was limited to platitudes, which was doubly wrong because too much was left unsaid and students were led to believe that an exchange of such platitudes is synonymous with social inquiry.

It is probable that had the opportunity arisen to reach consensus among the participants, Frankel's position would have been supported in that: 1) society has a right to expect that certain social attitudes be generated, 2) social science, like biology, physics, and chemistry involves value questions, and 3) the social scientist has an obligation to point out what the value implications are, and what alternative policies might be, but not to label alternatives as good or bad.

Lawrence Metcalf prepared a summary statement at the conclusion of the conference on this aspect, from which the following is quoted:

> Whenever we teach an understanding of society there is a tendency sometimes to omit those facts or understandings which might undermine the values we would like to teach. These omissions often result in social misunderstanding. The teacher therefore feels caught up in a dilemma: shall he teach an understanding of social reality regardless of the effort on values, or shall he tailor his handling of context according to the norms he wishes to inculcate. The first course of action is often rejected on the ground that immature learners will acquire 'wrong' values and a cynical outlook on life. The second alternative is often rejected on the ground that it amounts to the kind of distortion and social education in every totalitarian and monolithic society.
>
> One form of knowledge about values has to do with the consequences of acting upon certain values. Is a society that values equality before the law a better society than one which does not? This question cannot be answered without some knowledge of consequences. What would be the consequences for the human condition of building a society in which the law treated individuals differentially depending on the race, religion, nationality, or social class of individuals. Again, a knowledge of such consequences can be garnered from the subject matter of history and social science. Consequences represent one necessary step toward making clear the meaning of free choice. One is not free to choose freedom unless he can compare freedom with its alternatives.
>
> We need in value education the kind of policy that frees the learner for making his own value choices. He will make these choices in some way but a free society cannot survive the chance guesses of confused minds. Freedom to choose means knowledge of what one is choosing, its alternatives, and its consequences. In anthropology this kind of study is called the comparative study of cultures. It involves this and much more--for example, a comparative study of choices within a culture.
>
> In our culture many individuals make choices without an adequate knowledge of what their choices entail. What should be our attitude toward socialized medicine, to mention only one of the alternatives

> that confront us, and have our social studies educators helped us to make this kind of choice? It would help if individuals knew the meaning of socialized medicine and its consequences as revealed by scholarly studies in England, Wales, Sweden, New Zealand and other places. True, this kind of statement cannot guarantee that students will either oppose or support socialized medicine. But it is the only treatment of value that is consistent with a valuing of knowledge, scientific method, and freedom.

TEACHING SOCIAL SCIENCE AS METHOD

Melvin Tumin developed the theme that as one teaches social science he unavoidably teaches method at every point along the line, questions of methodological consideration being of the highest relevance. We, therefore, say that one does not teach social science as method on the one hand, or as substance on the other, but that one teaches social science by starting with problems of human behavior which, in turn, provide ample opportunity for showing how and where value judgments occur.

Feldmesser stated that scientific method has four roles to play.

> Scientific method has four roles to play in the teaching of the social studies: 1) It is one part of the content of social studies. In addition to learning 'facts' about history and society, students should learn how historical and social facts are discovered, i.e., what the methods of the social sciences are. Indeed, in view of the hopelessness of teaching all of the factual content which may be relevant to the world in which the student will live as an adult, it could even be argued that learning the methods of social science is more important than the learning of any particular facts. 2) It is probably the case that the scientific method needs to be incorporated into the procedures of teaching the social studies. Though this is subject to

experimental verification, I believe that students learn as much--perhaps more--from the implicit behavioral example of their teachers (all of their teachers, and other school personnel as well) as they do from explicit instructional materials. 3) Scientific method is not only a way of working, an 'existent thing'; it is also a value. In a democratic society, students should be encouraged to make a commitment to rational judgments on social issues, i.e., to judgments based upon evidence and the canons of logic. It is also a part of both the scientific and the democratic attitudes that all propositions are subject to critical inquiry. 4) As a corollary of the preceding, the employment of scientific method is a defense for the teacher and educator in dealing with the controversial issues that must and should enter into the teaching of the social studies. To those who protest the examination of cherished beliefs and values in the classroom, the teacher can respond that, in doing so, he is simply conforming to the democratic ethic, in the same way that long-held beliefs in physics or biology are subjected to tests of evidence and logic.

The fear is sometimes expressed that, in approaching social problems in a scientific way, students will be exposed to and so possibly learn the 'wrong' values. This risk must, however, be balanced against another and perhaps graver risk: that if the teacher manipulates his material so as to conceal or gloss over some facts, in order to induce acceptance of the 'right' values, students will then view the social studies as sheer hypocrisy. The result may be a kind of cynicism toward and alienation from society or its institutions which is certainly one 'wrong' value. For example, if totalitarianism is taught as simply an 'evil,' rather than as an objective concept with discoverable consequences, the student's later discovery that totalitarianism has certain advantages may undermine whatever he has learned. A willingness to examine institutions objectively,--i.e., in accord with the scientific method--is a safeguard against such boomerang effects.

It is essential that we institutionalize a set of mind that includes: 1) a recognition that human affairs are endlessly problematic, 2) a realization that humans must, nevertheless, take stands and move forward on policy decisions, 3) a provisionality and caution in the defense of stands taken on the basis of imperfect information, 4) a continuing support for the always needed research into always present and emerging problems, and 5) a constant vigilance over our assumptions and the so-called "facts" we accept.

Such a mind-set is rarely to be found, and in any specific or particular social situation one finds precious little respect for scientific methods, especially when applied to human social affairs. This is true among university colleagues, uninformed laymen, practicing journalists, and governmental officials. Men tend to believe that which most accords with their own preferences and prejudice. "Selective perception is the rule of observation. Self-confirmation of stereotypes is the rule of method." Consider the current state of thought regarding race differences or the differences between men and women; one may infer from current institutional practices and the attitudes implicitly supporting these practices, that fiction is preferred to fact, common nonsense to common sense, and majority opinion to scientific documentation. Thus, there is a need for a major campaign in behalf of increased training in, and respect for, scientific method in social affairs.

The Structure and Function of Human Society

It is indispensable that every child shall understand the structure and functions of human society. One can put this in terms of exploring why we humans behave the way we do; why we worship one God, many or no gods; why families are formed and dissolved, extended and contracted; why there is war, unemployment, depression, prosperity, poverty, and affluence; why power and its manipulation is such a salient feature of organized social effort; why some men obey the law and others do not.

The kinds of explanations, and hence, understanding of human behavior are set rather early in life. Once set, it is most difficult to upset them. These early and deeply-set explanatory principles serve as indices of thought about subsequent social problems.

The question of how best to explain human similarities and differences is really an issue of how to think about human behavior, and that in turn directs our attention to the question of how to find out whether what we think is true or not true. What is the evidence on its behalf? What would we need to know if we wanted to be sure we were correct or wrong? The substantive question about proper explanations of human behavior feeds directly, and immediately, into the methodological problems of how to find out.

Perhaps the foremost problem is that of getting across a solid appreciation of how difficult it is to get to know anything with any degree of assurance of its truth. Everywhere it is assumed that systematic reliable knowledge is easy to come by. In fact, such knowledge even about the most apparently simple dimensions or aspects of human behavior is painfully hard to come by. Perhaps it would be useful to require everyone concerned to try to answer any one single problem about human affairs by producing data that are satisfactory. Neither school children nor anyone else can get an appreciation of this kind by turning to textbooks or encyclopedias for information. If in the courses for physical science it has been proven possible to have children perform simple experiments in order to come closer to the method of science, it may also be possible in social science. Even simple exercises in systematic observation would do a lot more to bring home to children what is involved in social science than they can get from being sent to the library to index the warehouse of codified information.

The Value of Critical Doubt

The cultivation of the state of mind implied in the words "critical doubt" is indispensable for the general education of anyone in a free society. It is complicated by the fact that teachers are charged with the inculcation of basic values. Nevertheless it is essential that we institutionalize a critical turn of mind and exert pressure toward objective and dispassionate search for evidence. Among the characteristics of thinking to be developed are the importance of objective inquiry, respect for evidence, regulation of multiple causation of behavior and multiple consequences of behavior, the importance of tradition, and the notion of the temporariness of social institutions.

The Employment of Method

During the period since the last major overhaul of the social studies curriculum in 1916, the major influence has been the trend to introduce ideas from the social sciences without supporting content with method. Even in history offerings, which dominate the curriculum, historical method has been seriously de-emphasized. The teaching of history and literature can offer much of what we wish to accomplish. DeToqueville's History of the French Revolution and Beard's Economic Backgrounds of Jeffersonian Democracy may be effective documents in the study of human behavior, as may Thucydides' description of the plague and its effect upon the value structure of the community. The methodology implicit in these works may, with profit, be brought to the surface to illustrate the manner in which method supports content.

SOCIAL STUDIES AND PUBLIC POLICY

Closely related to the discussion on values, beliefs, and attitudes, was the consideration of the role of the social sciences in sensitizing students to questions of public policy. Odegard in his paper on this issue referred to the imperative need for reconciling the demands of objective and rigorous scientific method with the discovery and diagnosis of political problems. He pointed out a number of problems currently plaguing the academic profession: 1) specialization or the progressive narrowing of our field of vision, 2) the fact-value syndrome and its accompanying passion for a value-free posture, 3) the widespread retreat from politics and policy to an almost obsessive preoccupation with process, techniques, and methodology, and 4) communication among the specialists themselves, and between the specialist and the citizen, has become increasingly difficult but increasingly urgent.

Odegard further suggested that one reason for the fact-value problem is the generally vague and unsatisfactory norms or standards by which policies are tested and/or evaluated. We speak of abnormal or deviant behavior, but standards by which such behavior are measured are highly ambiguous. How do we know that justice has been done in a particular case? What do we mean by justice? Lacking substantive norms we take refuge in process or procedure. The policy scientist may thus abdicate from participation in decision making at the policy level. If he is engaged in teaching and research, he tends to move away from any effort to sensitize his students on policy issues, and drift instead into endless accumulation of data.

> In his quest for certainty he joins a headlong retreat from politics and politicians into some never land that is value free.

The point was also noted that policy oriented research offers a more fruitful channel for breaking down intra- and inter-disciplinary barriers and for diminishing the communications gap, than does research which has a purely methodological orientation. Further, policy oriented research is fully compatible with pure science and with the most rigorous demands of scientific method. There are, however, hazards in policy research not found in research on problems more remote from the human condition. Unconscious motives, stereotypes, wishful thinking, and rationalization, are more likely to occur in policy oriented research than in the so-called pure, theoretical, or purely methodological variety.

In commenting upon the fact-value issue, Odegard stated that

> The Kiplingesque aphorism that 'East is East and West is West and never the twain shall meet' has been revised to read, 'Fact is Fact and Value is Value, and never the twain shall meet.' No informed person today seriously believes the former aphorism but scientific, quasi-scientific, or pseudo-scientific literature is full of articles by social or behavioral scientists who prefer to believe the revised version.

> It is not true to say that modern behavioral science must be indifferent to values and policies. Indeed, its own major premise is that human behavior is goal-directed or goal-oriented, and that men in striving for these basic goals choose among alternative modes of thought and behavior. It is in helping people to make these choices, not as sheep but as men, not blindly in response to subliminal stimuli or visceral incitation, but consciously and rationally, that behavioral science can make its best contribution. To sensitize students to policy issues is therefore a major responsibility of teachers and educational administrators.

Stephen Bailey in reacting to Odegard's views pointed out that there are activities in the social science field which are capable of analysis, and in which the consequences of policy decisions are capable of a high degree of predictability. One of the needs of social science is to make students aware of the areas where social science has matured to the point that that kind of analysis and predictability is possible on policy decisions. There are in our society a series of goals which constitute the basic aspirations of the society. It is the function of social science and the social studies to investigate the areas where we have recently reaffirmed the goals upon which society is agreed, and to clarify by more careful delineation and definition what is meant by these goals. Thus, we are committed to the reaffirmation of societal goals to the attempt to define new goals more precisely, and to content analysis of social wants involving the consequences of policy decisions.

Tumin observed that, as social scientists, we frequently overplay our hands. In making policy decisions, the political scientist, or sociologist, or economist, has to face judgment as to alternative policies which have nothing to do with expertness in social science.

Metcalf again reminded the group of the danger of bringing values into social science. He pointed out that the value of a value-free science is precisely in the fact that it is value free. Therefore, one can rest judgment upon it without believing that he is simply approving someone's values, rather than dealing with issues of fact.

TEACHER EDUCATION

Havighurst pointed out that the success of plans now under way for up-grading the curricula in social studies depends heavily upon the training in service and before service and the recruiting and selection of the right people as teachers. He proposed a major stock-taking among the social studies teachers of today and tomorrow. Social studies teachers are probably a more diversified group than any other subject matter group in the teaching profession. The job of being a social studies teacher is not hedged in by many rules regarding preparation, and the gates of entry into the job are many.

There is need for systematic knowledge about social studies teachers. Who are they? What are their attitudes toward social change, the processes of local and state politics, the functions of government in the economy, and so on? What kinds of university training do they have? What is their conception of the appropriate roles of a teacher? What are their social class backgrounds? How many of these are upward mobil in terms of social status? What proportion of them have grown up in big cities?

Research Now in Progress

Havighurst reported upon research on teachers recently completed or now in progress at the National Education Association, the University of North Carolina, the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago and in four university studies of Mental Health in Teacher Education at the University of Texas, San Francisco State College and Bank Street College in New York City.

The report of Carson McGuire on the study at the University of Texas listed four "personality factors" which describe young people now preparing to become teachers. These are:

1. Creatively-intelligent autonomy vs. dull, unthinking dependence.
2. Emotional-judgmental restraint vs. unprincipled impulsiveness.
3. Relaxed, outgoing optimism vs. anxious, preoccupied pessimism.
4. Affectionate, warm feelings about self and others vs. cold, hostile feelings.

In this study they have identified six areas of competence upon which teachers can be measured or rated. They are:

1. Personal integrity-perceptiveness of self and others; adequacy, self-confidence, potency; knowing "Who am I" and "Where I am going";
2. Pupil relationships--capacity to relate to young people easily, perceptively, while retaining one's integrity;

3. Classroom management--demonstrated ability to manage a classroom, to operate as an authoritative rather than as an authoritarian figure;
4. Academic competence--adequacy of subject-matter background (skills and knowledge), mastery of structure and principles and ability to use and communicate them in the classroom;
5. Teaching style--capacity to stimulate learning, to communicate knowledge and generate understanding, sensitivity to students, creativity of the teaching guiding role that has been established;
6. Professional identification--factors which impel a person to become a teacher, ranging from "felt deficiencies" to intrinsic satisfactions which separate the "caretaker" from the dedicated teacher.

Such studies of teacher characteristics have been related to success in practice teaching, and in a more limited way, to success in actual classroom teaching. It must be admitted that there is a good deal of dissatisfaction among educational researchers with the state of current research on teacher characteristics in relation to teaching competence.[1] Some researchers prefer to study "school climates" in relation to teaching success.

Havighurst reported there is a good deal of dissatisfaction among educational researchers with the state of current research on teacher characteristics in relation to teaching competence and suggested that some researchers prefer to study school climates in relation to teaching success. Meadows pointed to the fact that research in industry and business in the last few years has shifted from inventory of personality traits to analysis of the creative process itself, the interactional and organizational setting in industry which will encourage the emergent kind of product in the industrial setting. Feldmesser observed that the character of the total environment is important in forming the kinds of attitudes Havighurst reported: such questions as how teachers are selected, what are the relationships among the teachers and between the teachers and other personnel, what is the policy of the school in the community. He pointed out that research tends to show that what comes out of a situation is more a characteristic of the nature of the situation than of the personalities of the people participating. Lonsdale referred to the work of Stern having to do with the organizational climate which indicates factors of needs and press and differing intellectual climate as some of the important variables in higher education.

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[1] N. L. Gage (ed.), Handbook of Research on Teaching (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1963), chaps. 6, 9, 11, 14.

What Should Social Studies Teachers Know?

Of course the teachers should know social science. We need research to discover not only the breadth and depth of the teacher's knowledge of social science, but also the quality of his grasp of objective and scientific methods of inquiry in his field.

In addition to his knowledge of social science the teacher should have competent understanding of:

The learner--the principles of personality development and of cognitive development, the development tasks of children and adolescents, peer culture of middle childhood and adolescence.

The school -- the school as a social system including adult-adult relations, adult-child relation, and the child-child relation.

The society as related to the school--education and social class, stratification, mobility, urban sociology, major social forces that shape and will shape the energies and concerns of men for the next two decades.

The teacher --roles in school and community, roles and role conflict, understanding of the profession of teaching.

Research on Teacher Personality

Havighurst suggested that the most effective teachers have certain identifiable and definable personality characteristics. Social studies teachers should have somewhat different personality characteristics for work with different types or age levels of boys and girls.

The post-war period with its economic growth and prosperity, its urbanization and suburbanization has brought a major youth problem with a sharply increased rate of juvenile delinquency, sharply increased rate of unemployment among males aged 16-21, and serious situations in grades 7-10 of schools serving working class youth, where a substantial number impatiently await arrival of legal school-leaving age. Many of the curriculum materials useful for such pupils come from social studies areas, especially geography, history and local community sociology and economics.

A teacher must have urban personality characteristics to deal with such pupils. Systematic research on the personalities and on the conceptions of a teacher's role that are held by teachers who are successful with the group of youth would be useful.

Alienated youth were defined as those who lack feelings of loyalty or commitment to their society and its laws and rules. They may be lawbreakers, or they may be apathetic non-supporters of a democratic society and its ways. They are likely to be self-centered looking for private satisfactions that concern themselves only or a small group of like-minded friends. A characteristic of all alienated youth is lack of faith in the society combined with lack of faith in oneself. In modern urban society these youths are increasingly exposed to experiences with unpleasant elements of modern life at earlier ages. For those youths seeking a sense of identity and striving to earn self-esteem, the junior high school age may be a time when a boy or girl needs the support of teachers and club leaders and older friends who are themselves positive persons, with ample faith in themselves and in their society. After the young person gets over the watershed of adolescence, after he has achieved his own self-esteem and a considerable amount of social fidelity, he may profit from teachers who are themselves more introverted, self-doubting and skeptical about the society and its myths. That is, it may be better for teachers of history and social science to be a more analytical and critical group, if they teach in senior high school and college. For the junior high school the best teachers may be outgoing, positive and confident people, no less intelligent but somewhat less critical than those who teach older students.

PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS

In calling attention to the importance of relating the technical work of the experimental psychologist to the knowledge and experience of the classroom teacher, McKeachie recognized the general need for middle-level research. Middle-level research was defined as

> . . . research based on behavior theory but carried out on human subjects in natural educational settings or in laboratory settings permitting study of complex interacting variables.

Such an approach will serve to bridge the gap between the psychology of learning and memory, and the concrete educational situation. The development of this general idea took four directions.

First, there is the question as to what areas of learning theory are worth applying to the specific case of learning social studies. This question must be put in terms of a researchable problem within learning theory itself rather than depending upon community expectations. McKeachie's paper set the terms of this issue by outlining several areas of psychological research which have a developing literature and which seem to hold particular significance for the social studies. These included reference to research in individual differences, personality, intelligence, motivation, conceptual learning and teaching techniques of analysis and synthesis. Certain characteristics of the social studies, as for example its multiplication of methods, indicates the need for more specialized research in one of the general areas, in this case, that of concept formation. The identification and determination of these interrelations is the major first step in the needed research in the field. When many such relationships suggest themselves, the formulation of research tasks to be useful must be systematic and with unity of purpose.

Second, there is the need to examine the differences in approach and theory between the classic studies by Piaget and the more recently popularized hypothesis put forward by Jerome Bruner. The difference of emphasis between the two theorists has important implications for the teaching of social studies. Piaget's studies suggested that the development of children's thinking follows a discernable pattern in which the maturation process affects cognitive functioning. Bruner, on the other hand, hypothesized that it is possible to teach any subject effectively and honestly to a child regardless of his stage of development. One pressing need, therefore, is for the clarification of the two theories and their relative implications for the social studies.

The relation between the development of cognitive and normative concepts in children is one area which ought to receive the attention of social studies curriculum organizers. The ease of communication relative to each and the receptivity of the student to certain levels of abstraction are important to the social studies. The design of the curriculum should reflect research results concerning stages of growth and their relation to the conceptual abilities of the students. Attention in the social studies must be directed toward both the normative and cognitive concepts as both relate to social science information.

Third, there is the need to further illuminate the "natural" conceptual scheme of the child in such a way as to allow the teacher

> . . . to look into the conceptual scheme the child has, and use it as a framework for the development of new concepts or for the expansion and differentiation of relevant concepts he already has.

This diagnosis will be helpful both as an element in the process of learning and as a way of nurturing curiosity and stimulating motivation to learn about society.

There is considerable portent for social studies curriculum in recent studies which conceive stimulus as a tenuous balance between the novel and the familiar. The application of this approach to the learning of social science poses an intriguing problem in need of study. It was agreed, however, that even the prima facie survey of the possibilities of application were highly suggestive of the need to revise the approach to the teaching of social studies. Present research indicates, for example, that the experience of individual discovery greatly enhances the motivation to learn. It is difficult, however, to see how the social sciences counterpart to a natural science laboratory experience would be developed in an elementary school curriculum.

The fourth direction of the conference's thinking reflected back on related areas of inquiry and needed research. It was pointed out that none of the proposed curriculum designs for social studies can be justified wholly on psychological grounds. The theoretical justification must be enhanced and directed by intensive experimentation and teaching experience. It is in these areas that the psychology of learning can be supplemented and incorporated in middle-level research.

Other areas which impinge on the psychological approach in this way were brought forward for consideration. The social and psychological climate of individual communities and schools are highly significant factors in the total teaching-learning process and have special relevance for the social studies. Any merely psychological research into learning must take these factors into consideration as they relate to the perpetuation or hindrance of social studies objectives.

The limitation on direct experience approaches were pointed out with the added note that in many cases even vicarious experience (as for example through reading) were not at the disposal of the teacher. Such instances place added responsibility on the teacher as the main source of "experience."

Problems in the measurement of such concepts as curiosity and creativity also call for research. The relationship of learning to creativity is an important one and is especially relevant to a social studies curriculum which would, presumably, place some emphasis on individual discovery and problem-solving.

The need for research on psychological factors in learning challenges both the educator and the experimental psychologist. The irony that studies of learning have never been specifically oriented to learning in the social sciences adds to the challenge. This area is beginning to receive the attention of many psychologists interested in the classroom and there is much in their findings that should and must encourage further research.

ORGANIZATION OF SUBJECT MATTER

> In my judgment, too much of our research effort has been placed on curriculur organization instead of on the more fundamental areas of the expectation of social studies instruction. At the same time, the past five or ten years have seen the beginnings of research which is more basic and of greater long-run significance. At the present time, however, it is still sporadic and somewhat helter skelter, lacking sharp focus and coherence, and it varies greatly in soundness of approach, adequacy of research design, and quality of conclusions.

In the foregoing statement, Haefner thus joined with Frankel, Tumin, and other conference participants in emphasizing the need for inquiry into the goals of social studies instruction. Haefner asked, "What expectations do you have about the outcomes of social studies instruction?" He pointed out that the expectations vary widely between different individuals and groups, and he referred to the broad categories listed by Herrick and Tyler as:

1. the expectations that social studies instruction will cultivate the intellect;
2. the expectation that social studies instruc- will lead the learner toward self-improvement;
3. the development of responsible human beings and citizens, with emphasis upon that knowledge and those characteristics most conducive to self government;

4. the expectations that social studies instruction will serve as one impetus toward, and tool for, the reconstruction of society;
5. the expectations that social studies instrucwill inculcate and indoctrinate specific attitudes, values, and beliefs.[1]

Haefner also called attention to the need for cohesive principles to bring some kind of order and sequence to the diverse subject matter of the social sciences, the fulfillment of which might serve in selecting content for instruction in the social studies. He suggested, again from Herrick and Tyler:

1. the principle of chronological development;
2. the principle of logical development;
3. the principle of conceptual difficulty;
4. the principle of geographical expansion of the learner's experiences;
5. the principle of the behavioral development of the learner.

In the discussion of the search for cohesive principles, the following patterns of organization of subject matter were set forth by James.

> The social studies cover a wide range of human knowledge. Inevitably they are subdivided into smaller and more manageable pieces. One problem that extends even beyond the range of the social studies asks what subdivision of the concepts of the social studies is most easily used and defended.
>
> The 18th century philospher, Imanuel Kant, pointed out that there are just three ways of organizing all human knowledge. Things can be

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[1] Virgil E Herrick and Ralph W. Tyler, "Toward Improved Curriculum Theory," Supplementary Educational Monographs, No. 71, University of Chicago, March, 1960.

arranged in the order of their occurrence and related sequences of events can be identified. This is the chronological concept. Or things can be put together that occur in a real association in the same segment of earth-space, and the things that interact on each other to produce spatial integration can be identified. This is the chorological concept. Or things that are related because they are the result of the same processes can be grouped together, and the ideal operation of specific processes 'where other things are equal' can be described. This is the substantive concept.

Among the social sciences the disciplines that make use of the substantive concept are engaged in examining the processes that determine human behavior. Commonly these processes are described in 'economics, social and political.' But clearly these processes are so intimately interrelated that a considerable degree of coherence can be found in the so-called behavioral sciences.

The traditional core of the social studies has been provided by history, which is built around the chronological concept. 'Historical method' refers to the procedures found acceptable in establishing the reliability of the record of events and in identifying those threads of related events which it is the special responsibility of the historical school to unravel.

The third of the organizing principles is that of chorology, a special integration. This is the traditional organizing principle of geography. In simplest terms the purpose of chorological study is to identify causes and consequences of differences among places on the face of the earth. Places are distinguished by contrasted associations of things and events. Events that are examined by the behavioral sciences, when other things are equal, may also be examined by chorological science where each process is modified by contact with the other processes associated in the same area. Geography in serving the chorological concept makes these chief contributions: (1) it provides a different perspectus on the conditions and problems of

> mankind by placing these in a context of area; (2) it teaches skills in the use of major and quantitative techniques as devices for describing patterns of association and covariance; and (3) it develops a conceptual framework for understanding the arrangement of things on the earth, including not only man and his activities, but also the natural surroundings of man in human habitat.
>
> In the development of the social studies curricula it was recognized at the conference that to adopt any of these organizing concepts would diminish the whole impact of such studies, and that ways should be sought to make the most effective use possible of all three. The data of social science are common to all social science disciplines, but the concepts of organization cannot be combined because they are mutually exclusive. The solution is to use each of these organizing principles in sequence, thus providing the greatest possible perspectus in social problems and conditions.

Expectations and cohesive principles have received relatively little research attention. Of all school subjects, probably the least crystallized arrangement of materials and subject matter occurs in the social studies. No single approach, perspective, or way of working, has traditional sanction or accepted patterns except, perhaps, the chronological sequence in teaching history. Even in this area, chronology has been challenged by both topical arrangements and a reverse order of chronology which trace contemporary tendencies to their origins in history.

Several researchable questions arise concerning the organization of the elements of the social studies. Haefner listed a number of such questions which are included in the body of his paper (see pp. 160-64).

Tumin called for research into the content of social studies education as it is now being conducted, with as much information as we can get about the aims toward which this education is being directed. He stressed that the first major research need is an exploration of the present intention of social science education and the extent to which, and the ways in which, the stated intentions are now being served by education as it is now conducted at various levels in the primary and secondary schools. Taking inventory of ends and means, in short, is our first major research task and it is a horrendously difficult one, but urgently beyond cavil. Simultaneously, and enjoying equally high priority, is the necessity to secure a far better set of understandings than now exist as to what would constitute an adequate program of social studies instruction in the schools.

Two somewhat more detailed issues relating to the social studies curriculum arose several times during the three day conference. The first of these questions related to the proper role of the social studies in the elementary school. Frankel proposed that a necessary step would be the development of a theoretical structure which would permit cumulative sequential experience in the social studies, comparable to that found in mathematics and certain other subjects. To that end efforts should be made to identify key concepts such as class, money, and power, and present these so that students move progressively from concept to concept with cumulative progress. Further discussion on this point related to Bruner's belief that in teaching the structure of the disciplines it is possible to teach any concepts at any grade level, in contrast with Piaget's theory of levels of conceptual development. Metcalf, for example, observed that some types of experiences introduced in the primary grades may actually obstruct the teaching of propositional thinking in later grade levels. Continuing discussion also centered around the scheme of the organization of experiences and content in the social studies in concentric arrangement, beginning in the early grades with the child's immediate environment and gradually expanding his horizons. Frankel offered the thought that an appropriate technique of early education in the social studies might be to present students with ideas remote in time and space--dimensions of thought which they had never before had an opportunity to ponder.

At the conclusion of the conference, Robinson submitted a report on discussion relative to the need for differentiated curricula:

> The purpose of developing differentiated curricula is to use them to achieve the desired goals of the social studies with dissimilar groups of students who may include the slow learner, the fast learner, the culturally deprived child, and alienated youth.
>
> In the last mentioned group as defined by Robert Havighurst, are found those children of the lower working class who may drop out of school to seek work as a means of identifying themselves in the adult society. A smaller segment of the alienated group according to Havighurst belongs to the middle class and is endowed with certain material advantages. He states that a reason for their alienation from society is the precocious sophistication which they experience below age sixteen. They learn many of the negative realities and the complexity of adult life which create within them self-doubt and doubt about society. At approximately age fifteen this type of youngster tends to lose the self-esteem which has been bestowed on him by his family and comes to the point where he must achieve his own self-esteem. This is a most

difficult time for him of adjustment to school life. Here the role of the teacher can be most significant especially that of the junior high school teacher of English and of social studies to help the student cross this line by undergirding his faith in society and by helping him to identify himself with adults who themselves exemplify the positive social values.

After the differentiated curricula have been put to use with the various groups of youth mentioned and described above, they should be tested for their effectiveness in the realization of the best goals of society. These goals may have been arrived at through the cooperative efforts of the professional and lay community.

A possible area suggested for research and inquiry may be what should be the organization of content of the differentiated curricula in the realization of the goals of society?

Priorities of Needed Research

The concluding sessions of the conference were devoted to small group discussions which focused on two main topics. The first of these dealt with the matter of problems of research design; the second turned to the identification of those areas which were believed to offer the greatest promise for profitable research in the future. In connection with this last endeavor it appeared to be the general consensus that certain problem areas were sufficiently identifiable to warrant their consideration on a priority basis as appropriate areas for needed research. These subject areas were outlined as falling in five general categories, as follows: 1) the major expectations hoped for from the social studies, 2) psychological factors of learning, 3) selection, organization, and presentation of subject matter content, 4) the intellectual and emotional climate in which the educative process functions, and 5) teacher personality factors and their relationship to instructional competency.

The following topical outline sets forth the major thoughts and questions which came up in connection with needed research related to each of the five problem areas.

1. Major Expectations From the Social Studies

The prior question was, of course, what shall be taught? Facts? Methods? Values? Beliefs? Can, indeed, these be separated, except in degree of emphasis?

What about the demands of society? How does this factor reflect upon both the content and the teaching of social studies?

Should social studies teaching inculcate the traditions of democracy? If so, which "traditions"--liberal, conservative, or "neutral"?

Or, is it wisest to expect from social studies only that there should result a general cultivation of the intellect, from which hopefully other benefits will ultimately ensue?

What is the relationship between understanding and commitment to action?

In the brief discussions which attended these and similar issues, it was evident that opinions varied widely within the group on any particular question. However, it was equally apparent that such conviction as was expressed rested in the final analysis on opinion. Hence, it is clear that this is an area where research is needed to provide a sounder basis for future consideration of just what are the expectations of the social studies.

2. Psychological Factors of Learning

Discussion in this area centered first on the contrary assertions, one of which holds that learning must proceed in accord with a maturation process deemed to govern student capacity, the other which sees the possibility of introducing meaningful concepts very early in the learning process. Here again it is clear that research is needed to illuminate the unanswered questions which inhere in the conflict suggested by the "maturation v. any level" approach. Even then, the exploration of the basic issue will only highlight the need for yet more research to determine precisely the stages at which senses of space, direction and distance, time and sequence, and multiple causation, can be related to social studies and be employed in the conceptualization process so essential to the meaningfulness of ideas.

It was also agreed that the climate of the school was a key psychological factor in learning. Thus, the question arose whether the school climate is the prime determinant regarding the kinds of learning which develop? In fact, what variables make up the climate of the school? How are they to be identified and classified? Can the factors be changed, or manipulated to bring about desired changes?

In the area of psychological factors questions arose concerning relationships between the cognitive and the effective domain of knowledge. Do people who know more have attitudes different from those who know less? What is the most effective way to change attitudes? How early are basic attitudes formed? And how permanent are they?

In addition to the climate of the school as a factor in learning, the point was also noted that the total social-psychological climate impinges directly upon the learning process. Hence, what are the variables which constitute this larger setting? How are they to be manipulated? And, in particular, how changeable are they with respect to views of citizenship?

3. Selection, Organization, and Presentation of Subject Matter Content

Among the host of topics in this area which were considered appropriate and necessary objects of further research were such items as:

What are the organizing principles in social science?

The discipline versus the interdiscipline approach. Can one more effectively communicate the substance, aims and purposes of the social studies than the other? And, if a formula exists, is it applicable at all grade levels?

What kinds of objectives are best achieved by different kinds of organization of social science?

Can things be learned best if they are presented in a sequential arrangement? This question involves the concepts common to the social sciences. Hence, the question arises, can the overlap of the various disciplines be both identified and integrated? What kinds of subject matter best stimulate curiosity? And at what levels of learning?

Is it desirable to follow the cyclical arrangement in teaching United States history at those different grade levels?

What aspects of social science can be taught best through each of the different methodologies and/or media? Can knowledge be organized in one form for all social studies and then be individualized by method, or are different organizations required? Is programmed instruction, using a cyclical approach, sufficient to keep pace with the developing sophistication which the student undergoes as his range of experience is extended?

The role of reading materials was regarded as an area meriting research. The question of paperbacks versus "regular" texts was considered to offer fertile ground for study. It was also considered necessary to inquire into the value of multiple reading sources as contrasted with the single volume comprehensive (collection) source. And if preferences seem indicated, are these applicable at all grade levels?

4. Intellectual and Emotional Climate in Which the Educational Process Functions

It is probably safe to say that this subject offers the greatest opportunity and at the same time the most difficult challenge to the prospective researcher in the entire field of social studies. The reason for this was made quite clear in the reference which linked the mind (intellect) to the emotions (attitudes) as these were influenced by the surroundings which fostered their development as the maturation process did its work. It thus becomes manifest that the forces influential in shaping the intellectual and emotional outlook of the student are basic to all that is related to this outlook.

Among the challenging questions which this topic evoked, none seems more vital than those dealing with beliefs, attitudes and values. Just what is the relationship among these in a student population which is socially stratified? How do various approaches to learning tend to foster beliefs, attitudes and values? Does this suggest a relationship between these variable and different instructional methods and materials? How is understanding and commitment and action to be related to these elements of learning?

5. Teacher Personality Factors and Their Relationship to Instructional Competency

The role of the teacher was, of course, a topic which aroused lengthy discussion. Here again it became apparent from the nature of the questions which were raised that the role of the teacher suggests a wide variety of subjects which require research if they are to be answered.

How does the social studies teacher's background and training influence the values, beliefs and attitudes which are brought into the classroom? Do social studies teachers teach "objectively"? Should they? Can they?

How important are personality factors in determining teaching effectiveness?

Three questions arise in relation to the priorities. How do we set priorities on research needs in social studies education? What priorities are there among areas and problems needing research (in social studies education)? Is it the unique function of the school to develop the student intellectually in conflict with a function of developing attitudes?

As a partial but incomplete answer to the above there was a degree of consensus among participants that communication among agencies, both scholarly and pedagogical, be improved to implement investigations now going on and to foster further research and agreement on needs in research. This communication could conceivably contribute to improvement in teacher training and to improvement in updated curricula, methods, and materials for use in public schools.

Another suggestion made during the course of the conference discussions was to the effect that the establishment of a national center as a clearing house, coordinator, and initiator of research and development would be of inestimable value to everyone interested in the improvement of social studies teaching in the elementary and secondary schools of the United States.

PART II

PROCEEDINGS

NEEDED RESEARCH ON SOCIAL ATTITUDES, BELIEFS, VALUES

Charles Frankel
Columbia University

My discussion will fall into three parts. In the last part, I shall make some specific suggestions concerning areas where, I think, additional research into social attitudes, beliefs and values might contribute to the improvement of the teaching of the social studies. But in the first two parts, I want to do something else which, I think, is a necessary preliminary.

In the first part of my remarks, I want to put a rather large bundle of questions before you. They are not questions that are normally asked, or, at any rate, asked out loud, but I think they enter the minds of most of us who have anything to do with the social studies. They have to do with certain ambiguities in our attitudes, and certain intellectual and moral hesitations--ambiguities and hesitations about the character of the social studies and their function in the education of the young. These questions are in essence philosophical and moral. They require us, as citizens, as teachers, and as students of society, to be clearer than we now are about our own attitudes, beliefs, and values with regard to the social studies. To deal with these questions successfully, we have to pin down our fundamental principles and make certain basic moral decisions. I believe that the airing of these questions is an indispensable preliminary to any rationally devised program of research aimed at the improvement of teaching in the social studies. To my mind, the greatest weaknesses in the teaching of the social studies in the United States today are due to indifference to these issues or to fear of them, and to a willingness to give fuzzy and compromised answers to them.

In the second part of my remarks, therefore, I should like to indicate two or three of the basic intellectual issues which, to my mind, are buried in these questions. In the very limited time available to me, I shall not have a chance to do more than sketch my own approach to these issues, and to mention briefly my principal reasons for adopting this approach. But I shall feel that I have done my job if the significance and the interest of these issues has been made clearer. The word "research," like most other sacred words, has come to be used to cover an extraordinary range of ill-assorted activities these days. I do not wish to add to the confusion by suggesting that the word "research" be applied to the more careful exploration and analysis of the issues of which I shall speak. The activity that is involved is not empirical inquiry, but self-interrogation, a disciplined dialogue with oneself and others, an effort to find out, by following an argument, just what the principles are to which we are willing to commit ourselves. I am not sure that we shall all come to the same answers, but I am persuaded that the teaching of the social studies will be much improved if teachers and scholars have the habit of such inquiry, and are more steadily aware, in consequence, of some of the intellectual and moral perils and possibilities of their trade.

1.

Let us start out, then, by looking at some of the embarrassing questions which we normally prefer to answer, as it were, by innuendo. Consider the question that has been put before us as the first theme of this conference. It is that of determining what research it would be useful to conduct into social attitudes, beliefs, and values so that the schools of the United States could do a better job in teaching the social studies. The moment this question is stated, I suggest, it becomes plain that it contains a hornet's nest of ambiguities, and that it is not one question but two dozen questions.

What is the purpose, for example, of conducting new research into social attitudes, beliefs, and values? Let us assume that we want this information in order to incorporate it into the courses we offer. But what sort of information is it, then, that we want? Do we simply wish information about the attitudes which people, say in Boston or Birmingham, happen to hold? Or do we wish to inquire as well into the causes and consequences of their holding these attitudes? And since we have begun to raise such sticky questions, do we also wish to know--and to report to our students--whether the beliefs on which these attitudes rely are true or false?

Moreover, what people say is one thing, what they actually do is another. Research into social attitudes, beliefs, and values is naive and incomplete unless the attention that is paid to verbal responses and official utterances is supplemented by the investigation of actual institutions and habits of behavior. Do we wish the kind of research, then, which invites attention to the contrast between the principles that men profess and the principles or un-principles that are operative in their conduct? Should research and teaching in the social sciences stress such contrasts or avoid them? And what attitude should be taken toward them? Are we quite sure that we should invariably condemn a social practice when it violates a professed principle? May not the practice sometimes be preferable to the principle?

Indeed, as these questions suggest, is it our purpose in speaking of "needed research," simply to discover what beliefs, attitudes, and values people actually hold, or do we not also have an obligation to make inquiries about the beliefs, attitudes, and values they ought to hold? But where a subject of this sort is concerned, how does one do "research" or come to an impartial answer? Is it the kind of question with respect to which the social studies have anything conclusive--or even relevant--to say? Or shall we take it that the answer to the question concerning the beliefs and values that people ought to hold is already foreclosed? Do teachers and students of society simply have the obligation to propagate the values of their society? Unfortunately, even this morally convenient solution has its practical difficulties. Quite apart from the question as to why we should take the reigning conventions to be sacrosanct, how do we find out, in the absence of a Big Brother who lays down the law, just what the values of our diversified and kaleidoscopically changing society are?

There are still other ambiguities in the phrase "research into social attitudes, beliefs, and values." Is it possible to understand any given set of social attitudes without also looking at alternatives, real or imagined, to them? However jaundiced one's view of the actual accomplishments of the social studies may be, no one will deny, I presume, that they aim to increase the student's understanding of his own and other societies. Normally speaking, however, the first step in coming to understand a subject is to recognize that there is something there to be understood, some puzzle to be unlocked, some oddity to be explained. In the case of understanding one's own society, this is particularly difficult. The student can normally be brought to this recognition only if his emotions can be disengaged from what is familiar to him, and his mind brought to dwell on the shocking fact that there are alternatives--quite viable and plausible alternatives--to the arrangements under which he lives. Otherwise, he is likely to go through life, as most of us do, in the innocent and happy condition of the lady who brushed her teeth in champagne every morning, and, when asked why she did so, replied, "Doesn't everybody?"

But particularly when we are talking about the education of the young and of early adolescents, how far do we really wish to go in studying social beliefs and attitudes in a context of alternatives to them? If we are going to mention the value which most Americans place on private property, ought we at the same time to discuss--dispassionately--the opinions that members of the Chinese Communist Party hold on this subject? If we are going to discuss sexual attitudes, how much attention should we give to attitudes that prevail in Latin countries, or among adolescents themselves? And what shall we say about the relation between inherited moral beliefs about extra-marital sexual relations and the new conditions, that will in all probability exist very soon, when a cheap oral contraceptive will have been created? Should the schools dodge this subject? If they should, what happens to the claim that the schools must prepare young people for effective lives in their community? Or is this sort of talk, which is the commonplace of every educational meeting, mere fakery, and do we in fact prefer to feed our students on pablum?

Nor should it be imagined, while we are dealing with these embarrassing subjects, that conservatives will simply take one point of view and liberals another. I do not, for example, think it is possible to engage in a genuinely serious discussion of racial attitudes in the United States without making it plain to students that very large numbers of white people in other countries look upon the attitudes of even moderate Americans toward intermarriage between the races with disbelief and dismay, and that they feel the same amusement and contempt toward us that we Americans might feel if we met a large group of educated and prosperous people who solemnly informed us that tomatoes were poisonous. But I think that in a serious discussion it also should be said that these quite different attitudes toward race relations belong to people who do not inhabit a biracial society; and it has to be pointed out, too, that the United States is the only instance of a society in which an attempt at forming a single national community of citizens is being made while still hopefully maintaining the notion that two different and distinguishable races will continue to exist. All these bits of information are necessary, it seems to me, to gain perspective on the problem of race relations in the United States. None of them are facts which it is easy to state without making subsequent discussion emotionally difficult. Are we prepared to accept sweetly diluted discussions of difficult social problems in grade schools and high schools, or are we going to insist, in sublime indifference to all the frailties of human flesh, our own included, that the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth is going to be told our children, and in the classrooms of our public schools? Is this an unfair statement of the alternatives? If it is not, why should we not admit when we are licked, and not teach the social studies at all?

I raise these questions to make more than the obvious point that it takes courage to teach the social studies honestly. I raise them to suggest to you that there is also an intellectual problem, a genuine set of dilemmas, concerning what it is intelligent and morally right to teach our children in the name of the social studies. For there may be an antagonism between the goals of the social studies and other quite legitimate goals of a school system. One of these goals, for instance, is the formation of a single national community in which people have learned tolerance, mutual respect, and fidelity to the democratic etiquette. And as an everyday matter, it is at least possible that the democratic etiquette--and perhaps any workable etiquette--depends upon the ability not to say all that one knows, or, at any rate, to say what one knows unclearly and tactfully. The subjects which polite people avoid discussing in public, as we know, are those subjects where the truth is likely to sound impolite.

This is a problem which I do not think can be easily avoided in most classrooms in elementary or secondary schools. There is a commonplace assumption that students need only to be exposed to the social facts, to the truth, to the spirit of tolerance, and intolerance disappears and love triumphs. This seems to me a dangerous illusion. Yet the effort to sustain that illusion is often behind the choices that are made concerning the attitudes, beliefs and values we wish to study or present to our students. In looking at the attitudes of people in Boston or Birmingham, for example, we plainly have to decide whether we mean Boston Brahmins or Boston Irish or both, or Birmingham whites or Birmingham Negroes or both, and whether we want their opinions about sin, about the post office, about the Catholic Church, or about the desegregation of the school in their immediate neighborhood. Honest inquiry and honest teaching are likely to reveal that there are some important differences of opinion between these different groups; and it is also likely to indicate that these differences cannot be resolved simply by saying that everybody is equally right, or even that everybody is entitled to his opinion. The more vigorous the social studies are, the more likely they are to deal with divisive subjects of this sort. Are we prepared to say that this raises no question except the question whether we have the courage of our convictions? Do not schools also have the quite legitimate mission of promoting a sense of common citizenship among their students?

Nor are these the only questions which lie in our path like scorpions waiting to sting. In teaching the social studies we are teaching human beings about themselves, and the secret has long since leaked out that there are all sorts of obstacles which human beings themselves set up in order to

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prevent themselves from making any progress in this field. These obstacles are both institutional and psychological, and they are formidable, particularly because they do more than simply prevent the acquisition and dissemination of objective knowledge. They also subtly penetrate the process of inquiry itself, dictating the questions that are asked, the answers that are accepted as satisfactory, and the very notion of what it means to be objective in the discussion of human affairs. Accordingly, when we speak of "needed research on social attitudes, beliefs and values," do we mean only research whose results will eventually be included in the courses offered in schools, or do we mean research into attitudes, beliefs, and values that prevent the social studies from being taught as effectively as we should hope?

And, finally, how effectively should we hope that these studies be taught? Must we not at least face this question, which is normally raised only by people we prefer to dismiss as "reactionaries," and then only when their guard is down? Does not a school system have an obligation to transmit certain attitudes to the young, including, not least, a belief in the strength and rightness of the society to which they belong? Do the social studies, insofar as they are scholarly disciplines and not exercises in piety, shake such attitudes? For they must at least raise the suspicion that all may not be well and that, even in this best of all possible worlds, a great many things are not what they are cracked up to be. Socrates, it is worth recalling, never quite answered the charge that he taught impiety to the young. He said that that was not his intention, which is rather different.

Nor is there too much help, I think, in taking refuge in the much worked-over distinction between education (usually prefaced by the word "genuine") and indoctrination. There is, of course, an obvious difference between telling a student what is so and inviting him to discover what is so by a free examination of evidence; and there is also an obvious difference in atmosphere between schools in which it is permissible to say that the teacher is wrong--or, at any rate, unconvincing--and schools in which this is not considered proper. But while these distinctions are important, they hold only up to a point; we are talking about differences in degree. The teacher, whatever methods he employs, remains a representative and symbol of social authority; he carries the social system on his back, so far as the student is concerned. If he tells the student to decide things for himself, the student has implicitly been told--and he may not like it--what his duty is. Permissiveness is a way of exercising authority, and in some people's hands it is authoritarian. It is not a way of eliminating authority. So, in the end, there is a certain pressure upon the student, even in democratic schools, to think that some things are so and that some aren't. I shall be convinced that students have been "educated" rather than "indoctrinated" in their social opinions--which means, I presume, that they have come to their opinions purely by examining the evidence in the cool light of reason--when I discover more teachers who have come to their opinions in this way.

2.

Now all these questions seem to me to suggest certain philosophical and moral dilemmas. The first of these is the relation of the social studies to value questions. If the social studies are not value-free, then what claim do they have to be neutral or objective? If, on the other hand, they are value-free, are they not also irresponsible?

As you know, this is a much debated question, and a voluminous literature dealing with it exists. Most discussions swing between two positions. The first is that the social studies, since they are studies of human beings by human beings, must inevitably be shot through with value-commitments which make them simply the servants of some political or social outlook. Now I would myself agree that the social studies do very often simply reflect reigning values--or fashions--among social scientists; and these values or fashions often reflect attitudes, values, and conventions of the larger community. Still, even granting this point, I do not see that this makes it impossible for the social studies to be objective. Whatever the values may be that happen to motivate an inquiry, it is still the case that the answers the inquiry obtains, if properly formulated, are capable of being called "true" or "false" on impersonal grounds. It is or is not the case that, in a given society, pure scientific work commands lower monetary rewards than applied science; it is or is not the case that the number of years spent in school is directly correlated to the intensity of participation in politics.

As must be plain, I do not have the space here to discuss all the aspects of this question. It has been discussed by a great many people, living and dead. I sometimes doubt that anything new can be said on the subject, but I have no doubt whatsoever that disagreements will continue.[1] But if I may cut a long story short, at the price of some dogmatism, I would say that the fundamental fallacy in the position that the social sciences are inevitably committed to some value position is that this assumes that such a position is itself not subject to correction and criticism in the course of carrying on an inquiry. Let us grant that every inquiry rests on certain assumptions; and let us grant, too, that some of these "assumptions" are value-judgments. Still and all, it is a commonplace of responsible inquiry that the assumptions with which an inquiry begins are often revised and corrected in the light of the problems that turn up.

In this respect, the view that the social studies are and must be the servants of values that we fix in advance seems to me to be the cousin of the view that the social studies are and must be indifferent to questions of value. Both reduce the social studies to the position of mere instruments in the attainment of goals which have themselves been selected without the discipline of rational inquiry. It seems to me correct to say that facts are facts whether or not we like them; that it is possible to state the facts so that all competent observers can judge the truth of such statements, regardless of the values of these observers; and that it is the purpose of the social studies to conduct inquiries in precisely this spirit. But this does not mean that the social studies cannot or should not make inquiries about values too. The social studies do not become irresponsible when they avoid complex and controverted questions about values because they fear being forced to take sides. Taking sides is one of the things that the truth sometimes does.

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[1] My own views have been stated, in briefest form, in "Philosophy and the Social Sciences," reprinted in Charles E. Boewe and Roy F. Nichols (eds.), Both Human and Humane (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960).

In sum, it seems to me that one major task of the social studies is the examination and appraisal of the actual causes and consequences of given value-systems, so that the price of maintaining these value-systems can be responsibly assessed. And this, it seems to me, may help us to see in somewhat clearer perspective another of the major issues implicit in the questions I have raised. This is the question concerning the role of the social studies with regard to the transmission of the values of the surrounding society, and in the education of the young. Here, it seems to me, we face a paradox to which I have already alluded. First, we are simply not teaching the social studies as a discipline, or as an intellectual value in themselves, unless the attitudes, beliefs and values of the surrounding community, including the attitudes, beliefs and values of the teachers and students, are also held up to critical examination. For students have not been initiated into the concept of social study unless they grasp the idea that nothing is sacred, not even their own ideas. That's one part of the dilemma. The other part of the dilemma is that the school system is, of course, committed to the transmission to the young of desirable attitudes, and, in dealing with very young students particularly, this means a whole variety of psychological and social problems, not to mention the psychological and social problems presented by the young students' parents. Is there any way of solving this problem?

The suggestion I would make, for the purposes of our discussion this morning, has three parts. First, it is important to remember that moral and social attitudes are in general transmitted by the entire atmosphere of the school. No particular course of studies has the sole responsibility for transmitting a set of attitudes or values. This applies to higher education too, where I think it is a mistake to imagine that you learn ethics in philosophy or civics or the social sciences, but of course not possibly in chemistry. There is, I think, an unfortunate confusion in the public mind between courses in the social studies and courses in civics, and there is some encouragement of this confusion by many educators. Good citizenship is surely one of the things that one would hope students would learn in school. They might learn it in some other places too, but certainly one would hope that the schools would contribute; and I would agree that the social studies have an obligation in this respect, which is to convey to students necessary information for the informed and effective practice of citizenship. But the social studies cannot be viewed as the sole, or even the principal, transmitters of the values of the community.

The second part of my suggestion is this--to recognize that the social studies do, after all, incorporate certain special values of their own. These are intellectual values. The social studies embody, in very difficult and troublesome areas of inquiry, the attempt to be objective; to look at oneself or one's own group dispassionately; to recognize how stubborn the diversities between different individuals and between different groups are; to distrust simple formulas and simple solutions in the government of human affairs.

These are intellectual values; they are basically coherent with democratic values. They are not, indeed, only intellectual values. They are at the same time moral values. Such values can be caught in social studies courses; I'm not sure they can be taught, in the sense that they can be put into a doctrine, and that a student who has learned this doctrine will automatically be more virtuous.

However, a problem still remains. It is a fact that the social studies, particularly at the more advanced levels, will encourage some degree of doubt, some degree of skepticism, about sacred or quasi-sacred aspects of the status quo. With respect to this issue, a third point seems to me to be relevant. This is that the social studies by no means have a monopoly as factors making for skepticism. The conservative celebration of fixed and eternal truths can also produce skepticism. It can produce skepticism because it invites the students' attention to the extraordinary contrast between high-sounding abstractions and the facts which ordinary, intelligent students see around them. It is not the case that repetition of statements such as that the United States is a land of opportunity for all is a necessarily efficacious way to promote patriotism. Among the intelligent, it very frequently promotes the opposite. Even more to the point, however, is a fundamental moral question: What kind of democracy do we want? Democracy, to my mind, is not necessarily congruent with the ideal of liberal civilization. It is not necessarily incongruent with this ideal, despite what opponents of democracy through the ages have said, but it is by no means an invariable prelude to liberal achievement. It was a democracy that condemned Socrates. It was a democracy in New England that was responsible for witch-hunting. The question is whether we are committed to the ideal of liberal civilization--to the ideal of training our children to take a dispassionate and self-critical attitude toward themselves and their society, to the ideal of looking upon our society, for a moment at least, as we would look upon it if it were not our society. If we believe in this ideal, if it is a primary moral commitment, then the role of the social studies in the education of our children is a commanding one, and it can only be fulfilled if they are themselves exemplars of free and honest inquiry.

Once this broad ideal is stated, we have still to face the question regarding another important function of the school, particularly in the United States. This is to help form integrated democratic communities. The social studies are likely to cause at least a little trouble here. I have in mind, of course, the touchiness of students, teachers and parents with regard to many of the most important questions covered by the social studies. Two considerations seem to me to be relevant with regard to this issue. I shall state the first dogmatically, although it is only an hypothesis. It is that the discussion of controverted social issues at the sixth grade level lies beyond the intellectual reach as well as the capacity for balanced emotional response of most children at that age. Certain intellectual materials--mathematics, some aspects of the history of the past, certain types of literature and music--can be put before children in simple form without the simplifications adding up to falsehoods. I do not think this is the case where discussions, say, of communism, or of American racial problems, are concerned. At any rate, the suitability of such subjects as a regular part of the curriculum, for example, in the sixth grade, seems to me as questionable as the reading of, say, Stendhal's The Red and the Black or Pasternak's Doctor Zhivago in the sixth grade. It is sometimes necessary, of course, to discuss communism or the race problem in the early grades simply because the children raise the question, or because the relations among the children in the classroom require the airing of the issue. But then the issue should be faced in this practical and therapeutic context. It should not be introduced as a regular part of a social studies curriculum whose object is to indoctrinate students in the discipline and spirit of dispassionate social inquiry.

I recognize, to repeat, that I say this dogmatically. But I should like to see whether materials accurately and adequately presenting the issues of, say, the Communist movement in the U.S.A. and elsewhere can be prepared for the sixth grade, and used successfully there. That is the test. I am not myself optimistic about the outcome. And the problem is all the more serious because our presumed commitment to a democratic as against an authoritarian approach in the classroom will here be tested as perhaps nowhere else. Social circumstance, the weight of the mass media, and the facts and fantasies of everyday life all conspire to give premature discussion of so-called "controversial" issues an authoritarian character. The most careful and sensitively designed precautions have to be taken if this is not to be so. Moreover, it is always tempting, when discussing certain kinds of controversial issue, to leave much unsaid, or to retreat into higher generalities and platitudes, which are either internally inconsistent, or else reduce to the edifying thought, "Wouldn't it be loverly if . . .?"

We can thus encourage students, at a tender age, in the thought that the exchange of good-hearted platitudes is serious social inquiry. This is to do serious damage, I think, to the child's further intellectual development, and if that is the cost of the early discussion of controverted social issues in the classroom, it seems to me a heavy price, and perhaps a forbidding price to pay.

What, then, is the kind of thing that can be done, say, in the sixth grade? I speak with diffidence, but I would suggest another direction for curriculum-building, another goal or purpose for education in the social studies in the elementary grades. What could be done, I suggest, is to start to prepare students for the idea of the social studies, for the social studies as dissolvents of fixed attitudes. I believe that this involves giving students a background in the recognized disciplines, such as history, geography, or economics. But it also involves the selection of materials within these disciplines with a special end in view--the steady, cumulative habituation and preparation of the child, emotionally and intellectually for the intelligent and self-controlled discussion, in the final years of high school, of current and controverted social questions. As an example of what I have in mind, there are portions of Thucydides in which the conflict between rich and poor is treated with extreme force and lucidity, and where the idea of social class can begin to be grasped. Discussions, even in the early years of school, can be meaningful, I think, when pinned down to a text of this sort. And if children are equipped with such central concepts, if they have learned to use them in talking and thinking about other cultures and other times, they will be in a better position, I believe, to approach their own society, when the time is ripe, with that special attitude of combined curiosity, concern and detachment that marks the social studies when they are properly conducted. I should like to see a program of this sort tried; I don't know what the results would be, but I think we would learn a great deal from the effort.

3.

This brings me to the third part of my remarks. I have promised, and I must now diffidently fulfill the promise, to suggest where research would be useful in the improvement of education in the social studies.

My first suggestion will surprise no one. For a number of years now, some first-rate work has been going on in the United States in the empirical study of existing social attitudes and beliefs. This work is valuable in itself, and it also provides invaluable object-lessons in the difference between genuine knowledge and mere opinion about the social facts. Yet I do not believe that our social studies curricula have been systematically reviewed to see whether this valuable work can be reflected in what is taught to our secondary school students.

My second suggestion is to investigate the possibilities of new curricula built around and stressing the concepts of constitutional government and the American Bill of Rights. I take it that it is not controversial to say that the first ten amendments to the Constitution exist, and that young citizens of the United States should have this information; it should also be plain that the rights incorporated in these amendments cannot be understood simply by reading the language of these amendments. There is a body of judicial decision, there is a history of controversy and struggle, there are everyday dilemmas in democratic life, which democratic citizens have to be acquainted with if they are to conduct democratic government successfully. Yet we know that ignorance about the American Bill of Rights, and naivete as to the problems that are bound to exist in any democracy--and that do a democracy credit--are very widespread in the United States. They exist, indeed, among teachers of the social studies.

I would urge that considerable attention be given to this matter. It is, I believe, a job inviting cooperative work by law schools, political scientists, perhaps some philosophers, and by teachers in the secondary schools. And I would stress that this program has important intellectual advantages, quite apart from its direct relevance to the problems of a democratic society. It would encourage students at an early age to deal with ideas, with basic arguments over principles, with considerations of the relations between abstract rules and concrete situations. This discipline, to my mind, is indispensable to the development of minds capable of objective reflection on social issues.

As a brief footnote to this last remark, I would add that it might be worthwhile to encourage some of the members of my own guild--the professors of philosophy--to look into the suitability of classic materials in philosophy, particularly in political and social philosophy, for courses in the high schools. Many of the problems confronted in the study of politics or anthropology, for example, are explored in classic dialectical form by traditional philosophers; and some of the debates in the Platonic dialogues seem to me, in their elevation, freedom, and quality of imagination, to be particularly suited to students of fifteen or sixteen.

Finally, I come to a large set of problems--the problems that are raised when one asks the following question: What can be taught in the elementary grades so as to prepare students for the objective examination of attitudes, beliefs and values in the later grades? What subjects are most conducive to promoting the attitudes that we want in students, attitudes that will permit them to study the social sciences, that will permit the raising of explosive issues in class without causing either explosions or the enunciation of polite platitudes?

My hunch is that the social studies will be best taught if we can find some way to make them sequential courses. In mathematics, a student cannot go on to the next stage unless he has mastered the preliminary stage. I do not think this has been the case in the social studies, and it is not mainly the fault of the teachers. The social studies themselves have not developed the refined theoretic structure which permits their clear sequential organization. Nevertheless, it seems to me at least possible that there are certain key concepts in the social studies which tie large bodies of material together. Can these be presented to students in an intelligible and arresting way, so that as they move from one concept to another they will get the sense of cumulative progress and mastery? Perhaps there is mileage, for example, in the idea of social class, or the idea of political power. The question to ask, I suggest, in the making of curricula is just this: What can be done in the earlier years to prepare students to deal effectively with concepts like money or power in the later years?

As an illustration, there is the story of Cortez's invasion of Mexico, as told by one of the soldiers in his army, Bernal Diaz. Along with everyone else on the expedition, Diaz was revolted by the Aztec practice of human sacrifice. But he reports that the Aztecs suspected that the Conquistadores also had a religion based on human sacrifice, and in evidence pointed to the image of the Crucifix, which the Spanish carried into battle. Again, it is of particular interest that when the Aztecs fought a battle, they fought it, won it or lost it, and apparently thought that that was that. They did not get the idea, until very late, that a battle, for the Conquistadores, was not a discrete event, like a game, but a step in a campaign, and that the Conquistadores were there to destroy them and their war-making power. Now, in this latter case, there is a radical difference in the entire idea of war between the Aztecs and the Europeans. And in the former case, there is a religious difference, but there is also a similarity. And what seems to me to be useful about stories of this sort is that they may engage the child, and help him to begin to absorb the fact--the impossible fact--that the world is immensely varied, and that his own ways are as odd to others as their ways are to him. This is a first step in the education of children's attitudes for the effective study of the social sciences.

For some time, the basic approach to early instruction in the social sciences has been, I think, to tie the materials taught to the homely experience of the child in his familiar environment--the post office, the neighborhood construction project, and the like. But we might think it a function of the social studies, even and especially in the early grades, to present students with thoughts they never would have had before, to tell them fairy tales, as it were, and then to make it plain that these fairy tales are true. I do not think that this runs against the psychological grain of the young. The young love games, they love fairy tales; and there happen to be a lot of fairy tales that are true. The history of the Roman emperors, for example, is a fairy tale, an implausible one, and a true story. Until the child learns that what is extraordinary to him is ordinary someplace else, until he not merely learns that fact but lives easily with it, until it is an invitation to him to enjoy the difference, to explore it, and to find out how come, he has not caught the attitudes, the values, that make progress in the social studies likely. A fundamental area for investigation, it seems to me, lies in finding out what we can do to promote this attitude. Indeed, I am convinced that training in the social studies, whether in the first grade, high school, or college, always has as its main function the encouragement of this attitude. It is the attitude that marks the liberally educated man. We hold it, even the best of us, very precariously; we need all the education we can get--and education as subtly devised as possible--to have any assurance that we can keep this attitude going in the world, and transmit it to our children.

Discussion Summary

The discussion following presentation of Frankel's paper on values centered around four questions:

What Can be Taught in the Elementary Grades to Prepare Students for the Examination of Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values in the Later Grades?

Frankel

It was suggested that a necessary step would be the development of a theoretical structure which would permit cumulative sequential experience in the social studies comparable to that in mathematics and certain other subjects. To that end efforts should be made to identify key concepts such as class, money, power and present these so that students may move from concept to concept with cumulative progress. The example was used of illustrating the idea of power through study of Diaz' story of the invasion of Mexico, where the Aztecs fought against Cortez as though it were a contest but never fully realized that Cortez was there to destroy them. Such study might basically alter the common approach to the study of human society through applying the child's experience to the familiar surrounding environment. Rather it may mean that the function of early education in the social studies would be to present students with ideas remote in time and space which they never would have had before.

Can We Realistically Face Students with Alternative Values, Beliefs and Attitudes?

Hanna

While part of the Western World has a built-in structure of the democratic tradition, there is also diversity of values (monolithic versus pluralistic, autocratic versus democratic). The peculiar values in the Western World have been built in for a long time, and it is in part the task of education to reinforce these values. During the past century through courage and dedication much has been accomplished in the handling of controversial issues in science. We are at a stage in history where science and technology have forced us to form larger scale organizations and larger communities of men. As we enter such transition periods, men tend to flounder seriously among confused value structures. It becomes increasingly urgent that we invent new social technologies to operate in larger areas, and that we utilize research to discover the commonality of values in the society. As such commanlity may be disclosed, it becomes the function of education to reinforce existing values and to develop new attitudes, beliefs, and loyalties for this generation.

Frankel

In presenting alternatives the primary purpose should be to prepare students for confronting public issues in later life, rather than demonstrating the validity of any particular point of view. The basic purpose of presenting alternative values is intellectual, not civic. Basically the student should be confronted with other possible ways of ordering society, with attention to probable consequences of alternative choices.

The primary values to be developed are adherence to the scientific method, respect for evidence, concern for truth. In attempting to inculcate values teachers and curriculum makers run into difficulty in identifying which values are to be taught and how they are to be formulated. Further, any attempt to inculcate any set of values invariably calls for distortion of knowledge. In contrast the argument was advanced that we do not know how to teach social studies or any other field without letting students in on the fact that the teacher has some values.

How Do We Conceive of Change in Relation to the Role of Education?

Hanna

While change is a relatively new concept in human experience, it was pointed out that Lewis Mumford had identified three concepts of change. The first is that change is the result of teleological forces and is supernatural. Under this concept there is a great plan for the unfolding of the universe which is preordained and not revealed to man until it takes place. The second concept is that change is capricious, subject to fate, and not predictable. Under this concept the role of the school is to prepare students for change and to do what is possible to assist them to adjust to it. The third concept of change is that man is increasingly able to use human intelligence and will to decide what the possibilities of change are and to move in the direction of desired change. This third concept implies a different responsibility for education.

Is Social Science in a Special Category in Relation to Values?

Frankel

> We frequently behave and think as though the social sciences are faced with value alternatives which other disciplines are not. Yet this is not true. Biology, physics, and chemistry raise value questions. Scientists in these fields participate in policy decisions. Physicists discuss implications of nuclear fusion; biologists consider the implications of fluoridation of water supply. The burden of the discussion implied that the natural or physical scientist as well as the social scientist has an obligation to point out what the implications are, what the consequences of alternative policies might be, but not to say that either alternative is good or bad. In this respect the social scientist is in the same role as scholars in other areas of teaching, namely that the teaching of aspects of the scientific method as applied to human life is a definite responsibility. In this sense we are fixed to one value position, that of scientific method.

The position stated in the paragraph immediately above was not unanimous. There was an alternative position, namely that society has a right to expect that we teach the national heritage and that certain social attitudes be generated. Some participants suggested that we frankly state that we indoctrinate, admitting that there are honorable and dishonorable ways of behaving. A corollary to this argument implied that as long as there is any element of authority in the classroom it is disingenuous to say that we are merely inviting students to make up their own minds.

This discussion concluded with the notion that we have an obligation to train students in certain habits of mind and attitudes toward materials and subject matter. Our major task is to get students to master certain fundamental concepts in the social studies and to recognize the bearing of evidence on value judgments. In clarification of value systems, examples of how value systems are formed may be useful.

NEEDED RESEARCH ON THE TEACHING OF SOCIAL SCIENCE AS METHOD

Melvin Tumin
Princeton University

Whatever conclusions may seem unjustified at the end of any given research project, there is one that always is warranted, namely, that further research is needed. This is so not simply because all research is indecisive, but because every solution to existing problems automatically generates new problems that could not be perceived earlier.

Two important implications arise out of this fact. The first is that no one may seriously doubt that further research on the teaching of social science is needed. For, however much of such research has already been accomplished, our knowledge in this area is most imperfect.

The second implication is that we need to institutionalize a set of mind consonant with the fact that our knowledge is always imperfect.

Some of the ingredients of that set of mind are the following: 1) a recognition that human affairs are endlessly problematic; 2) a realization that humans must, nevertheless, take stands and move forward on policy decisions; 3) a provisionality and caution in our defense of stands taken on the basis of imperfect information; 4) a continuing support for the always needed additional research; 5) a constant vigilance about our methods of inquiry so that we ensure that what we say we know, we do, in fact, know as well as it can be known at the given moment.

My own limited experience with teaching social science courses persuades me that the set of mind sketched above is rarely to be found outside the circles of professional scientists. While in general science is something of a sacred cow in America, in any particular or specific situation one finds rather little respect for scientific methods, especially when applied to human social affairs.

The prevalence of an unscientific set of mind is, of course, only expectable. In our culture, as in all others, there is a more than ample stock of old wives tales, nursery school views of the world, and fundamentally fallacious, systems of explanations that are handed down, virtually intact, from parent to child, and often, therefore, from teacher to pupil. These are modified over time only slightly by the very, very slow introduction of new evidence, new perspectives and new demands for more rigorous thought.

Consider for a moment the current state of thought regarding race differences; differences between men and women; the origins and functions of temporary social arrangements, such as capitalism or communism, monogamy or polygamy; the sources of difference in school performance of children in different socio-economic strata; and the origins of delinquency and crime. While our data on the actual ranges of beliefs on these matters are by no means satisfactory, one may infer from the current customs in these matters that fiction is often preferred to fact, common nonsense to common sense, and majority sentiment to scientific documentation. Above all, it is evident that men tend to believe that which most accords with their own interests and prejudices. Selective perception is the rule of observation. Self-confirmation of stereotypes is the rule of method.

If these observations are correct, then there is obviously a need for a major campaign on behalf of increased training in and respect for scientific method in social affairs, simply because so many urgent problems are vitally affected by the absence of that training and respect, and because any attempt to introduce the relevant materials and procedures in the school systems is likely to encounter considerable resistance.

For, while few will deny the general contention that there is much room for improvement in these matters in the schools today, any specific proposal designed to achieve that improvement is likely to be seen as a threat to existing curricular comforts and conveniences. The introduction of new social science materials in the curriculum will probably require the displacement or at least modification of more traditional programs which have been baked solidly into the familiar pies of class plans and projects. Of course, it almost always takes more to justify a change than to continue doing the same, whatever the "same" happens to be. Those who advocate a change involving more and better social science in the classrooms ought, therefore, to be prepared to defend their advocacy in terms sufficiently cogent to stand a decent chance of overcoming the expectable resistance of those with proprietary interests in well-established curricular offerings.

It is in place, therefore, to suggest some such grounds on which the introduction of live social science into the curriculum of primary and secondary schools might be advanced. Put in simple terms, it is indispensable that every child--and hopefully, every adult--shall understand the structure and function of human society, for that society is the natural habitat of man. One can put this in terms of exploring why we humans behave the way we do: why we worship one, many or no gods; why families are formed and dissolved, extended and contracted; why we sometimes exert much conscientious effort at our tasks and why, at other times, we do as little as we possibly can; why children partly resemble adults in their behavior, but also often strongly resemble their age peers; why there is war, and unemployment, and depression, and prosperity, and poverty and affluence; why women play the variable roles we see them in, and men equally variable roles; why power and its manipulation is such a salient feature of organized social effort; why some men obey the law and others do not.

Underneath many of these problems runs the general question of the respective influences of heredity and environment in human behavior. Not only is this significant for its immediate topical relevance to today's situation of race relations, but its ramifications are as diverse as any single issue in human behavior. Everywhere one confronts firmly held, often unshakable, convictions regarding behavior. "People are that way by nature." "He got it from his father's side." "He's a member of that group, so what can you expect?" These "common sense" formulations reflect the extent to which explanations of why people behave the way they do are so often put in terms of biological inheritance, and hence, of course, so often seen as intractable and irrevocable. Differences between men and women, between dark and light skinned people, between Europeans and Americans, between Jews, Catholics, and Protestants, between wealthy and poor, between adults and children, between dumb and smart, fast and slow--all these are attributed to biological factors. In fact, of course, almost all of the behavioral similarities and differences one cares about--because they bring joy or sorrow--can relatively easily be shown to be a product primarily of social rather than biological inheritance. But the mode of thinking in hereditary terms has been so dominant a tradition that it has proven extremely difficult to insist that it is important first to examine the extent to which traditions and learning are responsible for behavior before throwing in the sponge and insisting we are dealing with people who are the way they are because that's the way they are by nature.

I lay particular stress on this problem for three reasons. The first is that the kinds of explanation and, hence, of understanding of human behavior that one comes to favor are set rather early in life. The second is that once they are set, it is most difficult to upset them. And the third is that these early and deeply-set explanatory principles serve as the main guide lines to thinking about all subsequent social problems. Everything else gets to be thought of, worried about and understood, so to speak, in terms of the general theories and explanatory principles that one acquired early in life. "How early, " can be answered by noting that virtually every child's most frequent question to his parents asks why someone or something is the way it is. The fact that curiosity regarding similarities and differences occurs so very early is often a cause of great perplexity for parents. But it is also a good reason to rejoice, since it means that primary school social science has an excellent natural resource on which to build--assuming, of course, that parents have not killed off childhood curiosity before the children get to school.

The question of how best to explain human similarities and differences is really an issue of how to think about human behavior--and that, in turn, immediately directs our attention to the question of how to find out whether what we think to be true is or is not true. What is the evidence on its behalf? What is the evidence for contrary points of view? What would we need to know if we wanted to be more sure we were correct or wrong? In short, the _substantive_ question about proper explanations of behavior feeds directly and immediately into the _methodological_ problem of how to find out.

These reflections lead me to suggest that one does not teach social science either as method or as something else. It seems to me one teaches _social science_, and, in the process, one unavoidably teaches method. That is, one raises issues and questions regarding social behavior. One then asks what one needs to know in order to be able to answer the questions. One then formulates hypotheses that direct one's attention to probably relevant factors. One then concerns oneself with the ways in which these hypotheses can most satisfactorily be tested. One then pursues these methods of inquiry, collects the relevant data, analyzes them, and asks what the data have to say about the hypotheses, and, in turn, what has emerged regarding the question with which one started.

At every point along the line in the consideration of any _substantive_ question, methodological considerations are of the highest relevance, and vice versa. Properly, therefore, we should be considering needed research in the teaching of social science, understanding thereby that we mean principles and methods closely intertwined at every stage in our deliberations.

What research is needed, then, in the teaching of social science in primary and secondary schools? The answers seem so obvious and simple, they must be false. But perhaps they are not. We need, obviously, to find out first--perhaps decide is the better word--what is now being offered as social science in the schools and what are the ends that these offerings are intended to serve. This we can do by a series of continuing inquiries among social studies teachers in schools throughout the land directed at the questions: What are you teaching--and why? What do you hope to accomplish? What is it you think this or that unit will help to achieve? Are these really the purposes you desire? Are there others, perhaps more suitable? What are the alternative ways in which these other purposes might be served?

We need, in short, research into the content of social science education as it is now being conducted, and into the aims toward which this education is being directed. Until that factual picture of ends and means is in front of us, we cannot decide whether what we think is important in social science is being taught and whether, what we think are the important ends of social science instruction are being served. Our first major research need, then, is an inventory of the present intentions of social science education and the extent to which and the ways in which the stated intentions are being served by such education, as it is now being conducted.

Equally urgent is the need to discuss and decide what would constitute an adequate program of social science instruction in the schools. Here, again, the focus is upon both ends and means. That is, our inquiry must seek to clarify both the ends we wish to accomplish through social science education and the methods and materials that would best serve these ends. One suspects there will be a considerable amount of disagreement on these matters among the concerned parties. But one is also assured there will be a considerable core of agreement as well.

One may also hope that the process of discovering what is variously desired for social science education by the numerous persons involved will, in some effective way, also be a process of reconciling competing notions. For, unless the discovery process does make provisions for sympathetic exchange and confrontation of disagreements, it will be very difficult to get any new program instituted. In the last analysis, unless those who are going to have to teach social science in the schools are generally agreed that what they are to teach is important, and are prepared to teach the materials in the most effective ways, all our decisions regarding important ends and means are likely to be of little value.

The inventory of what is now actually intended and done in the name of those intentions, can be laid against the inventory of what should be intended and done in the name of those intentions. In this way we shall be able most to profit from previous experience, most effectively to incorporate those elements of present day instruction that are judged valuable, and most easily to spot the shortcomings and deficiencies in present practices.

All these assertions may sound like so many banal pieties. Perhaps that is an accurate characterization. But consider the consequences of ignoring these pieties. Can anyone truly say that we have adequate knowledge of what is presently being done in the schools? Or of what these present practices are intended to serve? Or does anyone seriously think there is a useful agreed-upon inventory of desired ends and means for social science instruction? Surely, there has been some work done on all these aspects of the problem. But, again, it is important to reiterate that our knowledge is so imperfect we can scarcely recommend policy with any decent basis of sound information.

A third major piece of stock taking is required to round out the picture of ends and means: an inventory of what is currently being done by way of preparing teachers to practice in the classrooms those courses of action that would emerge as recommendations from the research just recommended. Once we have a fair approximation of what we would do if we could, and how we would do it, and have discovered the extent to which present practices correspond with these desiderata, we must inquire whether present courses of teacher preparation are adequately serving our agreed-upon ends and means. Then we shall be better able to recommend the courses of action required to fill the gap between the actual and the desired.

Recent experiences with new programs in school mathematics testifies to the importance of still another major research effort. This is an inquiry into the present state of knowledge and understanding of the modern social science among the adult numbers of the community. For, it is certain that if the best of modern social science is introduced into the classrooms, children will be bringing home to their parents certain basic ideas about why humans behave the way they do, and certain basic critical understandings of existing institutions that are sure to provoke serious disagreement and disaffection. A good deal of thinking is required, then, about the problem of how better to apprise parents of what is going on in the classrooms and how better to refurbish their own social science appreciations, to make them more consonant with what the last two or three decades of that science have revealed.

What is implied here is the need to investigate how various kinds of adult education programs might be organized, promoted and conducted so that parents are learning, along with their children, the best that social science has to offer. This can be done most effectively against a background of knowledge of what the present state of command over social science may be in any given community, and serious thought on the present state of adult education.

Are all these proposals romantic dreams? Of course. And that is just what they should be. We shall not be able to accomplish major portions of these proposals in the near future. They require extraordinary resources of mind and money, not to mention willingness. But they had better be held out as the goals toward which we are striving and against which we measure the fitness of every proposal. That they are desirable goals seems to me, of course, unquestionable. I am heartened, too, by the fact that it has seemed possible in the last decade to stir up considerable ferment in educational circles at every level by the conduct and publication of a few judiciously selected research inquiries. To be sure, many of the so-called new proposals that have emerged from these ferments have not been worth very much more than the paper on which they were written. But that is not the point. What is the point is that one can get a good deal of concern and action by publishing findings about American education that reveal fundamental problems besetting the schools, as they strive to implement and achieve the goals set for them by the community.

Now, there are some who may agree that these research proposals have some merit, but who also doubt that there is a sufficient body of systematic, codified social science knowledge that could be incorporated adequately in school programs of study, teacher training and adult education. About these doubts, two things must be said. First, we know a great deal more about human behavior, individual and collective, than most people imagine. Second, this knowledge is not yet organized or codified in such a way as to make it most amenable to effective incorporation in educational programs.

I see, therefore, as urgent a continuing series of conferences and study groups, including representatives of social science at every level of the school system whose purpose would be to develop a common core of materials that includes: 1) systematic propositions and their relationships, 2) the evidence in support of these propositions, 3) the unanswered or only partly answered problems that remain, 4) the leading hypotheses concerning these problems, 5) the methods of research that may yield more satisfactory answers, and 6) the vast arrays of as yet untested and/or untestable problems regarding human behavior that we can at this moment perceive.

If these conferences focus upon pressing social problems of the day, they will enjoy a topicality that may make them more alive to students and teachers alike.

Moreover, one can easily move in and out of the great range of social science problems starting almost anywhere. If, for instance, we were to begin with race relations, we would quickly move into general problems of heredity and environment; then back to specific problems of individual differences; then onto more general problems of democratic social organization of heterogeneously endowed and interested people; from there on to problems of motivation and their relevance for learning and for feelings of solidarity and loyalty; from there to problems of delinquency and crime and alienation in general; and through those, by a side path, into problems of affluence and unemployment, and on to war and revolution. Start anywhere in that matrix and, sooner or later, one's attention is brought to all the component and interconnected elements.

I for one am firmly convinced that our knowledge on these and other issues of human behavior that are pressing both theoretically and contemporaneously, can be codified and organized far more systematically than at present, and that this can be done in such a way that it can be translated into appropriate and meaningful curricular enterprises at every level of schooling. One doesn't have to look toward another enormous effort at encyclopedic inventory and codification in order to be able to do far more and far better than we now do. There is a great deal more that is known today about problems of human relations, and warfare, and unemployment, and crime, and the like, than is ever transmitted systematically and meaningfully in the schools at any level. We ought to move quickly to translate the best that is known into solid curricular offerings.

In all the foregoing, I have deliberately ignored questions of technique and instructional method, or of discovery of levels of readiness, or of what kinds of projects fit what kinds of texts, or of structure versus content, or of sequentiality. These issues are all implicit in what I have chosen to focus upon. I do not mean to put them aside as unimportant. But I do mean to urge that it is first and foremost important to discover what we wish to achieve through social science instruction; what existing means we have to achieve these ends; what means could we creatively contrive; how we can bring all relevant personnel into satisfactory liaison and communication on these matters; and how, therefore, we may better help the children of the United States to achieve a more profound understanding of who and where they are, and why, and what they can hope to do about enjoying more of what they find good, and about changing more of what they find undesirable and problematic in their lives.

If it could be assumed that a miracle had happened and that the needed research just specified had been accomplished, and all our questions answered, we would then be able to turn to some specific issues arising out of the notion of social science as method. Short of such miracles--and, by definition, miracles are rare and improbable--a good deal of important patchwork has to be done, and done in a hurry, in order to eliminate some of the more egregiously undesirable features of the present levels of understanding and approaches to knowledge about human affairs.

The first, foremost, and most despair-producing problem I see is that of getting across a solid appreciation of how difficult it is to get to know anything with any degree of assurance of its truth. Everywhere it is assumed that reliable knowledge is easy to come by. Even worse, it is everywhere assumed that systematic, reliable knowledge is easy to come by. The fact of the matter, of course, as we all know, is that such knowledge even about the most apparently simple dimensions or aspects of human behavior is painfully hard to come by. The question, then, is how can we get a wider appreciation of this fact.

I know of only one way that has a high degree of probability of success, and that is to require everyone concerned to try to answer any one single problem about human affairs by producing reliable, relevant data. This means, unavoidably, that all those for whom this appreciation of the difficulty of securing knowledge is important must themselves engage in research projects, no matter how small in conception, trivial in population size studied, or insignificant in the total bulk of human behavior.

There are many perplexing problems about how best to organize such research projects. There are numerous advantages and disadvantages to every method I have ever tried or know that others have tried. In any event, it would pay us all a good deal of profit to consider at some length how best to produce that indispensable appreciation of the difficulty of securing systematic, reliable knowledge about social affairs.

Apropos of this, one sure thing is that neither school children nor anyone else can get an appreciation of how difficult it is to get reliable information by turning to their encyclopedias for that information. To be sure one can get a lot of information from encyclopedias, and, if they are good encyclopedias, the information is often reliable. But one does not and cannot thereby begin to appreciate what has been required to establish that information as reliable. If it has proven possible in courses in physical science to have children perform simple experiments in order to come closer to understanding the method of science, I see no conceivable reason why this can't be done in social science. Even simple exercises in systematic social observation would do a lot more to bring home to children what is involved in social science than the more usual techniques currently practiced of sending them to the library to index the warehouse of codified information.

The actual involvement in a research project commends itself on grounds other than those stated but implied by them. I think principally of two such grounds. The first concerns the notion of objectivity. The second has to do with the idea of multiple causation.

The desideratum in science, of course, is perfect and total objectivity of the investigator. We all are familiar with a number of the ways in which we fail to achieve this blessed state. There is one path toward objectivity, however, that is open, and that is perhaps not used as often as it could be. This involves that state of mind implied in the words "critical doubt." The cultivation of this state of mind is, of course, indispensable for the general education of anyone in a free society. But it is also specifically relevant in the training in science which necessarily involves an unwillingness easily to accept anything as given until there are pretty good evidential grounds for doing so. The task of encouraging this approach in the classroom encounters two primary difficulties. The first is the fact that the schools are charged, as probably they should be, with the inculcation of basic values--at least some values--along with the training of minds and the transferring of skills. Values being what they are, it is extremely difficult to inculcate them and at the same time encourage systematic critical doubt as a general approach of mind. It is, of course, much easier simply to require children to accept things as given to them. With the great power the formal position of the teacher gives to her, it is no trick to have nominal verbal conformity to the teacher's expressed value preferences. It is quite a trick, however, to get a common value base established and, at the same time, communicate a genuine and sincere interest in the manifestation of the critical mind at work. But this is what must be done. And on this, then, we need a good deal of inquiry as to how best we can do it. For critical doubt is the better part of objectivity, just as, in turn, going around the circle, objectivity is the better part of critical doubt. Just how a teacher can maximize both her mandate to inculcate values regarding democracy and the like, and, at the same time, just as deeply institutionalize a critical turn of mind and a constant pressure toward objective dispassionate search for evidence is a very perplexing problem.

The second implied value of engaging in research projects referred to the idea of multiple causation. Earlier in this paper we noted how the untrained mind runs easily toward the simple-minded explanation, which turns out to be no explanation at all. Nor is it enough to shift attention off the biologistic causal thinking on to environmental influences. The further problem is present of getting an appreciation of how complex are the causal patterns connected with any simple behavior pattern. For instance, do boys and girls begin to differ radically in their behavior early in American life? In what ways? Why? And why are they similar in some respects, nevertheless? Since nearly every public school class has both boys and girls who are likely to differ in some patterned ways and resemble each other in other patterned ways, there is a natural matrix of experimental evidence to be researched right in the classroom--if the teacher is up to it. Even a rudimentary inquiry into the similarities and differences among boys and girls would involve the class from the very outset in appreciating that, in addition to the genetic factors that might be at work, there are a host of other cultural variables which make their contribution. This realization of 1) the multiple causation of this everyday fact, 2) the importance of cultural patterns, and 3) the unsatisfactoriness of the "hereditarian" explanation that says "that's the way boys and girls are by nature," might begin to open up a world of understanding that would be extremely valuable.

Two other important social science lessons could be developed out of the consideration of the differences and similarities in the behavior of boys and girls. First, the skillful teacher could go on to help the children discover that these patterned and learned differences have a mixed set of advantages and disadvantages for everyone concerned; neither the boys nor the girls enjoy all the results of the sharply different expectations regarding their behavior. From this realization, the teacher could move to the general lesson that is implicit, namely, that all events have multiple consequences, and that these are mixed--positive and negative--in their effects upon those who are involved.

Second, an analysis of boy-girl differences in the United States would call naturally for a look at these differences in other culture patterns. The relativity of our patterns, the fact that they represent but one of many ways in which male-female relationships can be organized, and the fact that each culture has its own intrinsic logic or illogic--these are crucial ingredients in the development of a genuinely intelligent and sound appreciation of the nature of human nature and of human society.

I have specified some of these examples at length in order to show what must be obvious to most but needs to be made obvious to all, namely, that we have some very basic scientific truths at our command and that these can serve as general guides to observation and thinking about human social affairs, and that, finally, these can be translated into workable, understandable and enjoyable features of the curriculum of our schools even at the most elementary levels.

Discussion Summary

Teaching Social Studies as Method

Hunt

> The suggestion was made that while there has been no major overhaul of the social studies curriculum since 1916, the major change which has occurred has been the introduction of ideas from the social sciences without supporting content. Even in history offerings, which dominate the curriculum, historical method has been seriously de-emphasized. While it is self-evident that we should employ those aspects of method which are appropriate, it is equally clear that the teaching of history, literature, and other subjects can

offer much of what we wish to accomplish. DeToqueville's History of the French Revolution, Beard's Economic Backgrounds of Jeffersonian Democracy, and studies of guilds in the middle ages may be effective documents in the explanation of human behavior, as may Thucydides' description of the plague and its effect upon the value structure of the community. Similarly, students might be led to examine the role of evidence in Ibsen's Enemy of the People, or Tolstoy's War and Peace.

Bailey

One of the responsibilities of the social scientist is to relate meaningfully to problems of public policy. Through the introduction of social science method increasingly the level of rationality can be brought to bear upon the society by the adoption of certain basic criteria of science in analyzing the reasons why human behavior is as it is.

The point of view was expressed by Tuman that there is not one but several methods of gathering relevant data on any problem, although on any given problem some methods may be more relevant than others. By leading students through the experiences on their own of searching for factual evidence, demonstrating connected truths, and examining the value of critical data, students may delight in the process of discovery, may read even encyclopedia articles with suspicion and may not accept what teachers or others may say at face value.

Standard procedures need to be developed for the evaluation of research experiments, especially in those cases where the experiment has to do with teaching social science as method where the common methods are especially inefficient. To this end it would be useful to define more precisely the attributes so that growth in these methods could be measured.

It was suggested that the present emphasis upon method of scientific analysis is not new, but continues a line of inquiry previously described under such labels as problem solving, propaganda analysis, and critical thinking.

Social Studies as Education for Citizenship

Professor Odegard aroused considerable discussion by reference to a report issued by the American Political Science Association under the title "Goals for Political Science" which he said rendered a disservice by suggesting that a major goal of political science was to develop good citizens. The discussion seemed to refute any tendency to claim any special priority for social studies in the teaching of citizens and to indicate that developing responsible citizenship was the task of the entire school. Concern was expressed that the social studies might be reduced to the role of propaganda.

Wilson

> In the decade of the 1930's educators in their concern about the role of the social studies in the schools lost the distinction between the good man and the good member of the body politic. The good man is the shared concern of the entire school. The good member of the body politic may have especial relationship to the social studies curriculum. A major concern of scholars from the social sciences including our colleagues in law should be to determine the particular contributions which may be made to the understanding of the citizen, such as a knowledge of, and commitment to, due process of law.

Priorities in Social Studies Education

Tumin

> I don't see any conceivable way in which anything we have been talking about as considered worthwhile can be achieved in schools if teachers have to teach as much as they now have to do. It is the most impossible job in the world.

In this manner, Tumin expressed his concern for the difficulty confronting the social studies teacher in keeping abreast of developments across a broad spectrum of the social sciences while teaching five classes each day in addition to numerous other duties. Research is called for not only in teaching loads and related teaching effectiveness, but such research should include the effect of the institutional setting as well.

It was also suggested that if we are to include such topics as the nature of social science, the nature of knowledge, and the nature of evidence, clearly some of the present curriculum material must be pruned away.

SENSITIZING STUDENTS TO POLICY ISSUES

Peter Odegard
University of California

If, as political scientists, we are to sensitize students to questions of public policy, we shall have to face up to a number of sticky problems that currently plague our profession and our discipline. Not the least of these are 1) specialization and the progressive narrowing of our field of vision, 2) the fact-value syndrome and its accompanying passion for a value-free posture in our research, and 3) the widespread retreat from politics and policy to an almost obsessive preoccupation with process, technique, and methodology.

Our overriding problem is to reconcile the demands of an objective and rigorous scientific method with the discovery and diagnosis of political problems.

Political science, like other disciplines, has been caught up in the trend toward specialization and fragmentation. Within each of the broad categories of classical political science, narrower specialties have developed until in my own institution, 58 undergraduate and 72 graduate courses are listed in the current catalogue--a total of 130 altogether.

It would be both hazardous and defeatist to deplore this trend toward specialization. To probe deeply into the nature of things requires concentration of attention upon smaller and smaller segments of reality. If one is not to waste time and resources on what is superficial and transitory, one must sacrifice breadth to depth in his universe of discourse. The tired old cliché that describes the specialist scornfully as a man who knows more and more about less and less is unwarranted and unjust. It is precisely because as specialists we know more and more about less and less that as citizens or as decision makers we can know vastly more about nearly everything.

But we have paid a price for this new knowledge. Communication both among the specialists themselves and between the specialist and the citizen has become increasingly difficult as it has become increasingly urgent: difficult because of the development of new and ever more elegant vocabularies, and urgent because since specialization spells interdependence, effective communication is an indispensable condition of scientific growth and development. In part because of the breakdown of communication and in part because of the preoccupation of specialists with smaller and smaller segments of reality, the expansion of knowledge through specialization and analysis has raised more insistently than ever before the question asked by Robert Lynd many years ago, "Knowledge for what?"

We are thus confronted in an acute form not only with the problem of scientific integration and communication but with the meaning and purpose of science and scholarship in our society. To say that we are concerned only with knowledge for its own sake may satisfy our own Utopian or aesthetic aspirations, but I'm not at all sure it will satisfy the society most of us are paid to serve. Nor will it explain the nature, scope, and purpose of most contemporary scientific endeavor. Some 70 percent of scientific research in this country is now provided for by government; and, of this, over 90 percent has a defense orientation or rationalization. As I have suggested elsewhere, we are even now in dire need of a moral equivalent for war to rationalize scientific research and development in this country.

But even where publicly supported scientific research lacks a defense orientation, it finds its raison d'être in goals less neutral than knowledge for its own sake. The public health, economic growth, the use, conservation and proper management of natural resources, crime and punishment, housing and urban redevelopment, are a few problem areas in which publicly supported research is carried on. Moreover, the mobilization and support of scientific research for limited policy goals has helped to improve communication and encourage cooperation among the scientific disciplines themselves and between those protagonists of C. P. Snow's two cultures, the scientist and the informed citizen. Nor should we overlook the side effects of policy-directed research in contributing to our knowledge of matters having only a tangential or accidental relation to the problem under central focus. In bestowing their favors, the Lords of Serendip do not distinguish policy from so-called pure or theoretical research. There is little evidence to show that pure science has been seriously hampered, by policy-directed research, at least since World War II. De Tocqueville quite properly noted the preference of Americans for the practical rather than the theoretical sciences; but I suspect he'd want to revise that chapter if he were to visit us now.

Finally, I believe that the notion of a pure science unalloyed by considerations of policy or purpose is pretty much of an illusion. I suspect that even scientists dedicated as they say to knowledge for its own sake, are concerned to create and maintain a society whose values, institutions, and procedures are not incompatible with scientific research. And this means a society in which there is a maximum degree of freedom not only to carry on research but to choose or to participate in the choice of the problems, areas, or segments of reality to which scientists give their attention.

The burden of all this is to suggest two comments on the sticky problems posed at the beginning. One comment is that policy-oriented research offers a more fruitful channel for breaking down intra- and interdisciplinary barriers and for diminishing if not closing the communications gap between scientists and citizens than research having a more esoteric or purely methodological orientation.

My second comment is that policy-oriented research is not incompatible with pure science or with the most rigorous demands of scientific method. There is no reason why a scientist should betray the strict canons of objectivity that characterize scientific research at its best because he is bent on finding a cure for cancer, alcoholism, dope addiction, delinquency and crime; and, although they involve the most complex kind of interdisciplinary research, even problems like economic growth, automation, and unemployment, resource use and management, racial and religious tension, national defense, even war and peace, can be approached with a decent respect for scientific method.

There are hazards, of course, in policy research not found, at least to the same extent, in research on problems more remote from the human condition. Unconscious motives, stereotypes, wishful thinking and rationalization are more likely to lurk in policy-oriented research than in so-called pure, theoretical, or purely methodological research.

Because political science represents policy science in its purest form these hazards are more numerous and dangerous and we need to be on guard against them. Moreover, because, as David Easton has said, politics involves the authoritative allocation of values in society, it must operate on problems or propositions not only more ambiguous, complex, and controversial than in other areas but that require a much greater measure of inter-disciplinary cooperation, integration and communication. It is for this reason, among others, that political science can not only play an integrative role among both scientific and humanistic disciplines but can help to give scientific meaning and direction to public policies which otherwise may be determined not by rational analysis of the problem posed but by rationalizations of special interests.

If political scientists are to play this critical role, it is imperative that they face frankly the fact-value problem which I believe has been an important factor in explaining a fairly widespread retreat from policy-oriented research in our discipline. The Kiplingesque aphorism that "East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet" has been revised to read, "Fact is Fact and Value is Value, and never the twain shall meet." No informed person today seriously believes the former aphorism--but scientific, quasi-scientific or pseudo-scientific literature is full of articles by social or behavioral scientists who profess to believe the revised version.

If the fact-value syndrome is necessary as a safeguard against the hazards of self-deception, sloppy, incompetent, or dishonest research, then by all means let it stand undisturbed as a monument to the weakness of those who need it. I doubt, however, that ritualistic repetition of slogans about is-ought of fact-value conflict will serve to prevent bias, either conscious or unconscious, willful or innocent. Only careful and rigorous training in scientific habits of thought can be proof against this sort of thing.

In any case no one can escape values, and least of all those engaged in the social or policy sciences. Nor can we escape values by treating them simply as research data rather than as guides or goals for research.

The very name of science implies the existence of norms or standards (i.e., values) in terms of which propositions about reality can be measured, tested, and evaluated. Scientific propositions are true or false, accurate or inaccurate, in the degree to which they correspond to these established norms or standards. And this applies as much to propositions about human nature and conduct as to propositions about the physical structure of the universe. If our standards or norms are defective then whatever research we do, whatever facts we find, when tested by such defective norms, will be defective.

One reason for the scope and intensity of the fact-value problem among policy scientists is the generally vague and unsatisfactory nature of the norms or standards by which policies are tested and/or evaluated. We speak, for example, of abnormal or deviant behavior, although the standards by which such behavior is measured are highly ambiguous. And how do we know, for example, that justice has been done in a particular case or in a thousand cases? What do we mean by justice? Lacking substantive norms or values, we take refuge in process or procedure, testing a particular case by the accepted standards of due process of law (i.e., legality, jurisdiction, due notice, fair hearing) although even these standards are by no means as precise as a positive science might require. What is true of justice is also true of many other standards of legislation and public policy. Equal Protection of the Laws; the Public Interest; Freedom and Equality; Human Dignity, and the National Interest are a few that come to mind. Even more limited policy goals lack the precise and objective qualities of standards or norms in physics and chemistry. Rates on public carriers must be "fair and reasonable," broadcast licenses are issued to T.V. and radio stations to serve the "public interest, convenience, and necessity." Small wonder that many political scientists prefer to avoid entanglement in such a wilderness and to confine their efforts to facts that can be counted, measured, tested, and explained in other terms.

Unfortunately, the price of such escape is too often the abdication of the policy scientist from participation in decision-making at policy levels. And if he is engaged in teaching and research, he inevitably moves away from any effort to sensitize his students to policy issues and drifts into an endless accumulation of data or the replication of "findings" that are trivial, transitory, repetitious or redundant. Sometimes he plays games and builds models in which prefabricated norms yield a spurious kind of certainty, having little or no relation to the world of reality. In his quest for certainty he joins in a headlong retreat from politics and politicians into some never, never land that is value-free. A vain endeavor.

For whatever else politics may be--the strife of interest masquerading as principle, an irrepressible quest for power, or as Brooks Adams said, the "systematic organization of hatred"--it requires a tough-minded and continuous preoccupation with the logic of ambiguity. The most common and basic aspirations of human beings--for response, recognition, security, and new experience, for freedom, justice, and equality--are highly ambiguous and intermediate values like health, deference, and safety are only slightly less so. As we move from these to more precise and measurable goals like income, a balanced budget, a navy second to none, a power dam on Peach Tree Creek, or a new post office at Kalamazoo, the political process moves from more to less ambiguity in the values men strive for and the terms in which these values are expressed. But wherever and whenever in this process a choice must be made either of ends or means, policy decisions are involved. That is to say, in the policy sciences ambiguity must be progressively refined and resolved and even when the final work is done, the budget balanced, the navy built, the power dam in place, policy doesn't vanish but moves forward on a different plane to ask how shall the navy be used and at what rates shall power be sold.

In the logic of science ambiguity is akin to original sin. Since politics is a continuous exercise in the logic of ambiguity, it is naturally suspect in scientific circles until it is reduced to administration, action, or behavior. These, it is said, do not suffer from the fatal malady of ambiguity. Every social process, said Mannheim, is

> . . . divided into a rationalized sphere consisting of settled and routinized procedures in dealing with situations that recur in orderly fashion and the irrational by which the rational is surrounded.

One of the chief characteristics of modern culture, he went on to say,

> . . . is the tendency to include as much as possible in the realm of the rational, and to bring it under administrative control. . . .

That is, the tendency of modern culture is to reduce the "irrational, the non-logical, the ambiguous to the vanishing point." When this occurs, of course, problems of choice approach the vanishing point, policy becomes administration, and politics as we have known it ends. It is no doubt toward this goal that political scientists look who strive to be value-free, who avoid policy problems and eschew politics and politicians. Unfortunately, it is only at the lowest level of administration, where all discretion (and all freedom to choose) has been eliminated, that problems of policy (i.e., value) disappear. When this point is reached, politics vanishes and administration may be left to robots operating data-processing machines.

In the meantime, however, policy decisions must be made, decision-makers must choose among competing goals and alternative means for their achievement, and people will continue to be sensitized to policy questions by somebody.

Short of the brave new world from which all fact-value problems have been banished, is it possible for political scientists, without betraying the basic canons of science to contribute significantly to policy oriented research and to decision-making on the highest policy levels? I believe they can and must, or leave policy decisions to the blind play of chance, private interest, or politicians lost in the foggy bottom of unresolved ambiguity. Our problem is not to indoctrinate students with values or policies as such--but to train them to reflect on the predictable consequences of certain acts, values or policies as against others (i.e., to test norms with evidence, theory with practice--verbal response with behavior).

We know that notwithstanding protestations to the contrary, most social or policy scientists are not value free. Nor do they keep their values and their facts in separate, hermetically sealed compartments of their minds.

> The psychologist [write Professors Ernest Hilgard and David Lerner] does not wish to provide tests that are used in support of school practices which he does not approve; the social anthropologist does not wish to improve factory morale so that workers can be exploited by management. . . . The scientist [they continue] likes to see himself playing a role at the point of which policy decisions are being made.
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> There is a school of economists [writes Kenneth Boulding] . . . which maintains that the economist as such is indifferent to ends and is concerned only with means. In practice, it seems

> to be impossible . . . to maintain this extreme position, and no economist of any reputation has managed to construct an economics so bloodless as to be utterly indifferent to the ends of the system which he describes. [The] mercantilists, the physiocrats, the classical economists, and the Keynesians have had definite views on the objectives of economic life and policy. . . .[1]

If the social sciences are to become policy sciences, and this is particularly true of political science, they will have to bring to bear upon policy decisions their best scientific skills. At the very least they can employ these skills in the discovery and analysis of prevailing value preferences among various segments of the population here and abroad. Herbert McClosky's study of policy preferences among leaders and followers of the Republican and Democratic parties is an example. Another is Philip Jacob's monograph on "Changing Values in College" (Hazen Foundation, February, 1956). Still another is the analysis of "Bases of Agreement and Disagreement [on] Fundamental Principles of Democracy," by Prothero and Gregg and the Purdue Opinion Poll of the knowledge and attitudes of 12,000 students covering civil liberties.

It ought to be disconcerting even to hard-nosed value-free scientists to learn, as the Purdue study disclosed, that a large majority of the 12,000 students interviewed were indifferent or even hostile to some of the most cherished principles of a free and open society. Only 24 percent had any objection to police censorship of books or movies, nearly 80 percent were in favor of municipal laws against the publication and sale of communist literature, over 80 percent would ban communist speakers from radio or T.V., and 37 percent had no objection to third-degree police practices, while 77 percent had no objection to censorship of the mails by the Post Office Department.

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[1] Kenneth Boulding, The Skills of the Economist (Cleveland: Howard Allen, Inc., 1958), p. 105.

> The outlook for free communication of ideas [said this Purdue report] is especially dark. Unless our homes, our schools and other educational media can effect changes in these attitudes, it would seem that censorship will become even more prevalent and accepted as today's teenagers gain adult influence in our society.[1]

If the free communication of ideas is, as I believe it is, indispensable to scientific research and development, then indifference or neutrality of scientists toward these trends amounts to a betrayal of science itself. It is therefore not enough to confine our research to the discovery, frequency, and distribution of values in the population. We must perforce, seek to find the manner and the extent to which such values affect actual behavior and what if anything can be done about them. If we may assume that science has a logical and legitimate concern in value-oriented research directly related to the viability of science itself, may we not also assume an equally legitimate concern in research whose essential purpose is to discover and serve the basic needs and goals of a free society? This could mean a massive empirical-behavioral study of such familiar but highly ambiguous norms as freedom and equality, majority rule and minority rights, representation and self-government.

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[1] Quoted in the American Civil Liberties Union News, September, 1963.

Many important policy decisions of the Supreme Court have been made without benefit of any significant knowledge or concern for the facts of life. One need only contrast the lawyers' briefs and the Court's opinion in the Lochner Case (Lochner v. New York, 108 U.S. 451 in 1905) with those in Muller v. Oregon (1908), or Bunting v. Oregon (1917). All involved legislation limiting hours of labor for certain types of employees. The difference lay in the kind of analysis to which the issues were subjected by counsel and Court alike. In his Muller brief, Louis Brandeis devoted

> . . . two pages to conventional legal arguments and over one hundred pages [to] factual data . . . all proving that long hours as a matter of fact [are] dangerous to women's health, safety, and morals. . . .

We have seen how policy-oriented research contributed to the resolution of another difficult problem in the briefs submitted in the case of Brown v. The Board of Education (1954). Extensive behavioral research demonstrated at least to the satisfaction of a unanimous Court that the classification and segregation of public school children by race was inherently incompatible with any reasonable standard of equal protection of the laws. May not policy scientists in similar fashion help to establish more rational standards of legislation and administration for dealing with the problems of crime and delinquency, communication and transportation, health and sanitation, education and recreation?

Political scientists have not always been indifferent or fearful of policy-oriented research. One recalls their participation in research on administrative organization and management from the U.S. Commission on Economy and Efficiency established by President Taft in 1910 to the latest Hoover Commissions. One thinks of the Missouri and the Cleveland Crime Surveys of the 1920's and early 1930's; the so-called Hoover Reports on Social Trends; the work of the old New York Bureau of Municipal Research and the Institute of Public Administration; the Wickersham Report on Law Observance and Enforcement. And one thinks of other policy-related research done by the Committee for Economic Development, the National Bureau of Economic Research, the Brookings Institution, the Twentieth Century Fund, and other such organizations. And one recalls the monumental studies of American racial policies by Gunnar Myrdahl, of war by Quincy Wright, and of the American Soldier by Sam Stouffer and his associates, of Elton Mayo's Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization, Roethlesberger's Management and Morale, and others which have found no basic conflict between respect for facts and concern for policy or value. All of these, incidentally, afford exciting and significant materials for sensitizing students to policy issues without resort to rationalization or indoctrination.

But we need to go beyond even these matters if we are to sensitize both ourselves and our students to policy issues. Since policies represent subordinate values among which men may choose, we need to learn a great deal more about the factors that "condition" these choices. And we need to go beyond the study of verbal responses to learn more about how and why people behave as they do when confronted with alternative courses of action. We cannot assume a one-to-one correspondence between verbal response and actual behavior. Many a person who gives the correct responses to the Christian catechism remains considerably less than a model of Christian virtue in his conduct. And we need to realize that value systems are quite as often a product of behavior patterns as behavior patterns are a product of value systems. Moreover, since facts are the raw materials of knowledge we ought to know more than we do about the relation between information and attitudes.

Behavioralists are quite right to focus attention on human nature and conduct and, to ask why we behave as we do and how that behavior may be altered or re-directed in ways deemed more desirable. All human beings, by constant and continuing reaction to one another and their environment, are forever being "conditioned" and "re-conditioned." But the process is not wholly blind, nor is it lacking in rationality and a considerable measure of freedom (i.e., of choice) among alternative means and ends. For rationality and freedom are themselves forms of behavior produced by "conditioning." At least one important function of formal education is to "condition" students to make rational choices among alternatives. Presumably teachers, and particularly teachers of the social sciences and the humanities, are themselves specially trained to do this; that is, to change those factors that interfere with rational reflection on the implications of various patterns of behavior. Such rationally-induced changes in the subject as well as his environment will require the conscious manipulation of value symbols quite as much as the conscious manipulation of the physical environment.

It is this aspect of modern behavioralism that has given rise to widespread criticism. Skillful and cunning men, it is said, versed in the mysteries of psychological conditioning and armed with modern methods of communication may use these techniques to control human behavior for predetermined selfish and ignoble ends. No one familiar with modern advertising and the content of modern mass media can be indifferent to this danger. Hidden Persuaders can carry on a massive, intensive, and incessant indoctrination of the multi-million audiences of T.V. and radio, with values that are maudlin, shabby, or downright antisocial. They can also, as they do on many occasions, encourage conscious and rational reflection on the human condition and alternative roads to freedom and dignity.[1]

It is well to remember that, because modern behavioralism assumes that environmental influences are paramount, it opens vast possibilities for the development of human character and personality--not through the selective breeding of some _Animal Farm_ or _Brave New World_, but through rationally-induced changes in the physical environment and in human behavior as well.

It is not true to say therefore that modern behavioral science must be indifferent to values and policies. Indeed, its own major premise is that human behavior is goal-directed or goal-oriented, and that men in striving for these basic goals choose among alternative modes of thought and behavior. It is in helping people to make these choices not as sheep but as men, not blindly in response to subliminal stimuli or visceral incitation but consciously and rationally that behavioral science can make its best contribution. To sensitize students to policy issues is therefore a major responsibility of teachers and educational administrators.

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[1] See Marya Mannes, "Let's Stop Exalting Jerks," _Saturday Evening Post_ (October 6, 1962).

Discussion Summary

Bailey

There are activities in the social science field which are capable of analysis and where the consequences of policy decisions are capable of a high degree of predictability. One of the needs of social science is to make students aware of the areas in which social science has matured to the point where this kind of analysis of predictability is possible.

Culture values or not in our society, there is a series of goals which constitute the basic aspirations of the society. It is also the function of the social sciences and the social studies to investigate those areas where we have recently reaffirmed the goals upon which society is agreed and to help with more careful delineation and definition of what we mean by these goals.

The reaffirmation of societal goals, the attempt to define these goals more precisely, and content analysis of social wants involving the consequences of policy decisions, are some of the things which we can do increasingly in public education to relate social science to public policy.

The Process of Decision Making

Hart

One of the functions of public education is to assist students in the making of rational choices among alternatives. Society is so complex, even when there is an amazing amount of data, that the average citizen, and in many cases the specialist, has to come to a conclusion knowing that he doesn't know all of the information on the issue. We must realistically confront students with the fact that most decisions in life must be made where there isn't sufficient information and that one may never have time to get all the information that is available.

Lonsdale

You cannot maximize all of the information you need for making decisions. In some situations the most the administration can hope for is a 'satisficing,' i.e., obtaining enough information to arrive at a satisfactory level to make a decision, but not arrive at the ideal or maximum level.

Odegard

We sometimes suffer from an academic illusion that life is an everlasting seminar. In physics the specialists at the radiation laboratory at Berkeley make decisions regularly that may cost the government hundreds of millions of dollars. Such decisions are made on the basis of information everyone indicates is not adequate but is the best available. Research scholars are willing to study the problems of the aging in California and to indicate sex composition, income level, and other factors. But when they are confronted with a decision as to whether we should have state-supported medical care for the aged, they avoid the policy decision on the basis of insufficient information. This need not be sc. There is a monograph on planning cities which presents a brilliant analysis of urban government problems in the State of California (done so high school students could read it) which no one need be ashamed of in terms of the scientific method that went into the writing of that report.

Tumin

As social scientists we often overplay our hands. At the end of each problem which the political scientist, or the sociologist, has to face, judgments are made on policy which have nothing to do with expertness in social science.

Should We Have a Value for Social Science?

Metcalf

I find it dangerous to bring values into social science. The value of a value-free science--as nearly as we can make it--is precisely in the fact that it is value free. Therefore, one can rest judgments upon it without feeling that he is simply approving someone's values rather than dealing with issues of fact.

Odegard

If what you mean by value-free is objective research in which you do not suppress data, do not deceive yourself, then all research should be value free in this sense. But if by value free you mean that you do not approach difficult complex problems of policy because they involve values then I object to this kind of value free science. I cannot conceive of any research in social science which does not bear upon values.

What of Societal Goals?

Bailey

There is need for reaffirming societal goals which are widely shared. We should also subject these goals to more precise definition.

Odegard

It is essential that we identify certain norms of our society such as equal protection of the law, the police power, etc. We can make a tremendous contribution to these norms by reducing their ambiguity. A starting point would be the report of the President's Commission on Goals for America.

Bailey

If we take such a norm as equality of opportunity and look at two schools in one of which 90 percent of students come from

> underprivileged homes and in the other of which 90 percent come from overprivileged homes, what happens to the concept of equality? Equality does not mean identity, nor sameness. A system that treats different individuals as though they were the same denies them equality. Individuals should have equal opportunity to achieve distinction.

NEEDED RESEARCH ON CULTURAL BACKGROUNDS, ATTITUDES, KNOWLEDGE, AND TRAINING OF SOCIAL STUDIES TEACHERS

Robert J. Havighurst
The University of Chicago

Teachers of social studies are probably a more diversified group than any other subject area group in the teaching profession. The job of being a social studies teacher is not hedged in by many rules regarding preparation, and the gates of entry into the job are many. The field of social studies is very broad, and a person with a college major in any one of five or six departments is generally regarded as fit for a teaching assignment in this field.

Thus, a first glance at social studies teachers gives a very indefinite impression, in contrast to the more definite impression given by a first glance at teachers of mathematics, or English, or vocational agriculture.

One of the needs is for systematic knowledge about teachers of social studies. Who are they? What kind of training do they have? What are their attitudes toward social change, the processes of local and state politics, the functions of government in the economy, and so on? What kinds of university training do they have? What is their conception of the appropriate roles of a teacher? What are their social class backgrounds? How many of them are upward mobile in terms of social status? What proportion of them have grown up in big cities?

There are two general kinds of research that may be carried on in order to gain knowledge about social studies teachers. The first has just been described--studies of the characteristics of teachers in service or preparing for service. The second kind is the study of teaching effectiveness or teaching competence.

Both kinds of research are interesting, and both kinds will probably prove useful during the next decade. To be useful, the research should be used in selecting, assigning and training teachers. In a period of teacher shortage there is not much practical value in the study of ways of selecting good teachers, since practically all people who apply for teaching jobs with appropriate credentials will be employed anyway. There is value in studies of the assignment and the training of teachers whether or not they are in short supply.

The shortage of school teachers which plagued the 1950's will probably disappear toward the end of the 1960's, leaving us with something of a surplus in the 1970's, and therefore allowing more selectivity in employing and assigning teachers. The cause of the probable disappearance of the teacher shortage is that the "baby boom" of the period since 1947 will be producing some 3.5 to 4 million 22-year-olds each year after 1969, whereas the annual number of new 22-year-olds in the 1950's was about 2 million, due to the low birth rates of the 1930's. Even if the proportion of the age group graduating from college should not increase during the 1960's, the absolute numbers of new young adults will be so much larger than they have been that they will probably meet the society's need for college trained people with something to spare.

Research on Teachers Now in Progress

The National Education Association has recently published a report of a study of a sample of public school teachers. It might be useful to analyze the NEA research data more fully with respect to social studies teachers. Furthermore, it might be useful for the NEA through its Research Division to study more intensively a national sample of teachers of social studies.

There are several other studies of teachers now in progress. For instance, the University of North Carolina is making a study of school teachers in that state. Through data from teachers now in service and from prospective teachers in college, this study is getting data on: 1) initial career orientations and occupational choice, 2) experiences of undergraduate education students, practice teachers, and beginning teachers, 3) on-the-job experiences of veteran teachers, 4) off-the-job factors, especially community roles, which might affect the professional self-images of teachers, and 5) values and beliefs pertinent to the teaching role, of undergraduate education students and of teachers. Probably the social studies teachers can be described as a sub-group in this type of study.

The National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago has been studying a sample of the college graduates of 1961. Already it is known who has gone to graduate school and who has gone to work in business, who has gone into the armed services, etc. If this group of young people is followed successfully for the next several years, we will learn what kinds of college graduates go into teaching as compared to those who go into other kinds of work; and we will know who goes into social studies teaching as compared with other fields of teaching.

A valuable resource of knowledge concerning prospective teachers is found in the four university studies of Mental Health in Teacher Education that have been carried out at the universities of Texas and Wisconsin, San Francisco State College, and Bank Street College in New York City. Some of the findings of these studies may be useful in selecting prospective teachers from candidates in teacher-training institutions, and also for the guidance and teaching of undergraduates who are likely to become teachers. Carson McGuire, reporting on the study at the University of Texas, says there are four "personality factors" which describe young people now preparing to become teachers.[1] People can be measured on these factors, which are:

1. Creatively-intelligent autonomy versus dull, unthinking dependence.
2. Emotional-judgmental restraint versus unprincipled impulsiveness.
3. Relaxed, outgoing optimism versus anxious, preoccupied pessimism.
4. Affectionate, warm feelings about self and others versus cold, hostile feelings.

In this study they have identified six areas of competence on which teachers can be measured or rated. They are:

1. Personal integrity--perceptiveness of self and others; adequacy, self-confidence, potency;

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[1] Carson McGuire, "A Model for Planning and Assessing Intervention Through Instruction," Paper presented at a Symposium of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Denver, December 30, 1961.

knowing "Who I am" and "Where I am going";

2. Pupil relationships--capacity to relate to young people easily, perceptively, while retaining one's integrity;
3. Classroom management--demonstrated ability to manage a classroom, to operate as an authoritative rather than as an authoritarian figure;
4. Academic competence--adequacy of subject-matter background (skills and knowledge), mastery of structure and principles and ability to use and communicate them in the classroom;
5. Teaching style--capacity to stimulate learning, to communicate knowledge and generate understanding, sensitivity to students, creativity of the teaching-guiding role that has been established;
6. Professional identification--factors which impel a person to become a teacher, ranging from "felt deficiencies" to intrinsic satisfactions which separate the "caretaker" from the dedicated teacher.

Such studies of teacher characteristics have been related to success in practice teaching, and in a more limited way, to success in actual classroom teaching. It must be admitted that there is a good deal of dissatisfaction among educational researchers with the state of current research on teacher characteristics in relation to teaching competence.[1] Some researchers prefer to study

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[1] N. L. Gage (ed.), Handbook of Research on Teaching (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1963), chaps. 6, 9, 11, 14.

"school climates" in relation to teaching success, on the ground that the kind of teaching situation as established by administrators and by the community goes a long way to make or break any teacher, no matter how strong or how weak he is in terms of teaching characteristics.

In the Handbook of Research on Teaching,[1] George Stern summarizes a number of research studies of teacher attitudes toward children, including those that reveal the effect of differences between the culture of lower-class pupils and the middle-class culture of the average teacher. In the same book, W. W. Charters, Jr., reports on research concerning the teacher's position in the American social structure, and the influence of this predominantly middle-class position on the teacher's values. Very little of this research has singled out teachers of social studies for special attention.

It might be useful to make a systematic plan for research on social studies teachers, drawing the most promising techniques from the reports in the Handbook. The time is ripe for research on teachers of social studies as distinguished from other teachers.

What the Social Studies Teacher Should Know

Of course the social studies teacher should know social science, and this is no easy task for a young person to acquire the breadth of knowledge as well as sufficient depth to be reasonably competent as a social scientist.

It has been said that much of social studies teaching is hortatory rather than scientific, and that therefore it fails to help boys and girls acquire the aptitude and the habit of inquiry in the social science field. This is a serious charge, and deserves to be investigated. While there is room for hortatory teaching in history and the social studies, this should certainly be subordinated to objective, scientific teaching as the pupil moves from the primary grades into the high school.

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[1] Ibid.

We need research, then, to explore not only the quantity or coverage of the teacher's knowledge of social science, but also the quality of his grasp of objective and scientific methods of inquiry in the field.

In addition to his knowledge of social science, the teacher should have a competent understanding of: the Learner, the School, the Society as related to the School, and the Teacher.

The Learner

The teacher should have a pretty good grasp of the principles of *personality development and of cognitive development* and of the interrelations of these processes. He should understand the *developmental tasks* of children and adolescents. He should know the research on the *peer culture* of middle childhood and adolescence.

The School

A substantial fund of knowledge now exists concerning the school as a social system. In this system are adult-adult relations and adult-child relations as well as child-child relations, and these systems of relations need to be understood by the teacher.

The Society as Related to the School

As a social scientist the teacher of social studies must know a good deal about society, but as a teacher of social studies he needs a specialized knowledge of the school-society relations. He needs to know how the educational system fits into the social class system of our society. He should know at least as much as the ordinary sociologist about social stratification and social mobility.

Another area of great importance for the teacher is that of urban sociology. Urbanization and the problems of urban renewal will occupy a growing amount of space in the curriculum, and will provide a basis for educational planning in the cities and schools of the country. The social studies teacher will often have to interpret the school-community nexus to the faculty of his school.

In his knowledge of the larger Society, the social studies teacher should understand the major social problems and forces that shape and will shape the energies and concerns of men for the next two decades. There is substantial agreement on the problems and the forces which should be studied by young people as part of their general education in school and college. This agreement defines the area in which the social studies teacher should be competent.

The Teacher

The teacher is essentially one who fills certain roles in school and community; and the social studies teacher should understand what these roles are, what role conflicts are sometimes involved, and how these conflicts may be resolved.

Also, the teacher should understand the profession of teaching; and should be able to act with other teachers to preserve and enhance their professional status.

This catalogue of the kinds of knowledge a social studies teacher should possess suggests the creation of a kind of survey diagnostic test which explores the teacher's knowledge in these areas. Use of such a test could point out the areas of relative ignorance and lack of competence, which then might be centers of attention in programs of in-service training and of pre-service education of teachers.

Research on Teacher Personality

A major reason for the importance of research on teacher personality lies in the following two propositions:

1. In general, the most effective teachers have certain identifiable and definable personality characteristics.
2. Social Studies teachers should have somewhat different personalities for work with different types or age levels of boys and girls.

The first proposition will not be discussed, beyond what has already been said about it. The second proposition will be discussed at this point in terms of a distinction between the needs of junior high school and of senior high school youth.

Social Studies Teaching for Social Fidelity and Individual Self-Confidence

It is a widely known fact that the post-war period has brought with its economic growth and prosperity and its urbanization and suburbanization a major youth problem that takes a variety of related forms: a sharply increased rate of juvenile delinquency, a sharply increased rate of unemployment among males aged 16-21, and a serious situation in grades 7-10 of schools serving working-class youth, where a substantial group of boys and girls impatiently serve their time while waiting for the legal school-leaving age to arrive. In some of these schools there are hostile and/or apathetic youth, frustrated teachers, and a general feeling that something *must* be done about the situation and the schools should do this something.

Various proposals have been made, such as work experience programs for youth, modified school programs to catch the interest and to suit the relatively low reading and arithmetic achievement of many of these boys and girls, increased guidance and counseling services. Some rather successful experimentation has been done with study units about the local community, about job possibilities, health, etc. Many of the curriculum materials useful for such pupils come from social studies areas, especially geography, history, and local community sociology and economics.

One thing seems clear--that a teacher must have certain personality characteristics to be successful with such pupils. It would be useful to do some systematic research on the personalities and on the conceptions of a teacher's role that are held by teachers who are successful with this group of alienated youth.

The Middle-Class Alienated Youth

The phrase *alienated youth* has been used of late to denote youth who lack feelings of loyalty or commitment

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to their society and its laws and rules. They may be hostile lawbreakers, or they may be apathetic non-supporters of a democratic society and its ways. They are likely to be self-centered, looking for private satisfactions that concern themselves only or a small group of like-minded friends.

There are two general categories of alienated youth--the delinquent or anti-social group, and the cynical, skeptical, asocial group. The delinquent anti-social group is mainly from lower working-class families, while the asocial group is mostly from middle-class families. The first group may number 10 to 15 percent of a cross section of American youth, while the second group is much smaller, with probably no more than 2 or 3 percent of youth.

However, the middle-class alienated group represents the extremes of a larger group of perhaps 10 to 15 percent of boys and girls who are causing their parents and their teachers a good deal of worry in the years when they are 12 to 16 years of age.

A characteristic of all alienated youth is lack of faith in the society combined with lack of faith in oneself. The latter characteristic is sometimes covered over by bravado in delinquent youth, but it is generally quite clear in the apathetic asocial group.

Certain conditions of modern urban society tend to increase the numbers of the middle-class alienated. They are increasingly exposed to experiences with unpleasant elements of modern life, at earlier and earlier ages, due to the tendency since 1920 to give young adolescent boys and girls more social and sexual freedom and more experience with "sophisticated" literature and art. Thus, for every one 15-year-old who read Thomas Wolfe's novels or Hughes' "Innocent Voyage" in the 1930's there are probably ten 15-year-olds today who read J. D. Salinger's _Catcher in the Rye_ or Fielding's _Lord of the Flies_. Although these are honest portrayals of human nature and human behavior, they represent a sampling of human behavior which is disturbing to a mature person and may be profoundly unsettling to an immature youth.

Sometime around the age of 15 or 16, the sensitive, intelligent American school boy or girl should commence to earn his own self-esteem, achieve his own sense of identity, and feel himself to be a citizen of a society which he can be proud of. That is, he must do these things if he is to go ahead with reasonable success to become a competent young adult. Not that he should never be critical of his society or see himself as a failure in one aspect of life or another. He should be a social critic, and he should recognize some of his own weaknesses, but he should combine these qualities with a basic foundation of self-esteem and social fidelity to enable him to meet such problems constructively.

This analysis suggests that the junior high school age may be a time when a boy or girl needs the support of teachers and club leaders and older friends who are themselves positive persons, with ample faith in themselves and in their society. He may profit especially from being with such people when he studies his society and its history, as well as when he takes stock of his own abilities and vocational interests in deciding whether to finish high school, whether to go to college, and what kind of vocational goal to aim for.

After the young person gets over the watershed of adolescence, which seems to come at 15 to 17 for many boys and girls today, after he has achieved his own self-esteem and a considerable amount of social fidelity, he may profit from teachers who are themselves more introverted, self-doubting, and skeptical about the society and its myths. That is, it may be better for teachers of history and social science to be a more analytical and critical group if they teach in senior high school and college. For the junior high school age, the best teachers may be outgoing, positive and confident people, no less intelligent but somewhat less critical than those who teach older students.

This analysis has not proved the truth of the propositions stated, but it suggests the possibility of studying social studies teachers who are working with youth under 16 and comparing them with others who are teaching youth over 16, to find out more about their influence on their students in relation to their own social personalities.

Conclusion

We propose a major job of stock-taking among the social studies teachers of today and tomorrow. This stock-taking should be worked out in relation to the importance of this section of the teaching profession.

Plans are under way for the same general reorganization and upgrading on the curricula in social studies that is already taking place in mathematics, natural sciences, and foreign language. The success of these plans depends heavily upon the training in service and before service and the recruiting and selection of the right people as teachers.

For a massive effort of this sort it is imperative to know much more than we now know about the people who are teaching or will teach the social studies.

Discussion Summary

The Importance of Personality Factors Among Teachers

Knapp

Investigation of personality and temperament differences in relation to occupational differences reveals certain people who like isolated varieties of occupations. Individuals react differently to characteristics of color, designs, candor, frankness.

Tumin

Professor Havighurst expressed concern about some of the literature read by members of the younger generation such as Catcher in the Rye. It seems to me that my generation read Thomas Wolfe, Dostoyevsky, and Nietzsche, and while the despair of this period may have a different quality, it does not necessarily have greater depth. Adolescents of earlier periods read pornography, invented escape, and, while they may not have been as sophisticated, they had dreams and dwelt in fancy.

The point is a question concerning what factors in investigation of students and teachers are validated against. In investigating the relation of personality factors to competence in teaching, the factors are not really correlated against effective teaching. We must go more slowly in picking out precisely those factors which we think are most relevant for successful adjustment of our students and successful performance of our teachers. Bailey has asked for realistic confrontation with the facts of life, but that is not in accord with building an optimistic outlook about society. If we recite the facts of life, kids will not have a very pretty picture about what can be done, and should be done, and what adults are like. On what basis or set of assumptions shall we select teachers?

Meadows

In research in industry and business in the last few years there has been a shift away from inventory of personality traits to analysis of the creative process itself, i.e., the interactional and organizational setting in industry which will encourage the emergent kind of product in the industrial setting.

To What Extent Do Cultural Factors Enter?

Odegard

Drop-outs, delinquency, maladjustment, and alienation among students are products of the social order in which we live. How far can we expect schools to resolve these problems? What kind of research is needed to get at these problems? Have we expected the schools to solve some of the major problems of the society? Should schools go along and uncritically accept this kind of responsibility? If we do, we may be forced to continually suffer a low achievement level, and teachers will be blamed for things for which they cannot realistically be held responsible.

(?)

The problem about which we are concerned seems to be characteristic of our industrialized society. The more industrialized it becomes the more prevalent the alienated personality is. Possibly in our homes and schools we are trying to teach a rural morality to an urban clientele. One response of students is to withdraw. Perhaps if we had some alienated middle-class people teaching in our schools, we might initiate some inquiry.

The School Environment

Feldmesser

The character of the total school environment is important in forming the kinds of attitudes Professor Havighurst spoke of. We must keep in mind a wider range of questions than the personality traits of the teacher; such questions as how are teachers selected, what are the relationships among the teachers and between the teachers and other personnel, what is the place of the school in the community. Research tends to show that what comes out of a situation is more a characteristic of the nature of the situation than of the personalities of the people participating. We should be more concerned with the kind of research problem that focuses on the kind of school setting which encourages the kinds of attitudes toward society that we seek.

Lonsdale

Professor Stern's research at the college level having to do with the organizational climate indicates factors of press, and needs, and differing intellectual climate as some of the most important variables that differentiate colleges. It may be that the total organizational climate is the significant factor.

NEEDED RESEARCH ON PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN LEARNING AS RELATED TO THE SOCIAL STUDIES

W. J. McKeachie[1]
University of Michigan

I should warn you that I speak to you as a novice. Most of what I know about social science education has been gained from you in the past day and a half.

One of the ironies of contemporary psychology is that despite thousands of psychological studies of learning, we know relatively little about the learning of psychology or of social science in general. In fact we know so little that it is even difficult to identify gaps in our knowledge--rather than gaps, there are wide open spaces.

Nevertheless, there is an important body of basic research on learning and memory. And despite the cynicism of psychologists newly aware of the problems of education, there is also a substantial body of teaching wisdom accumulated through hard-won experience in the classroom. Unfortunately, these two bodies of knowledge do not come together in many ways. To bring them together we need a great deal of middle-level research--research based on behavior theory but carried out on human subjects in natural educational settings or in laboratory settings permitting study of complex interacting variables.

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[1] In preparing this paper I have profited from discussion with many friends and colleagues. Among them were Joseph Adelson, Richard Atkinson, Richard Cutler, Robert Knapp, Melvin Manis, and Klaus Riegel.

Individual Differences

Basic research in learning and memory is designed to discover general principles--principles which operate without regard to the particular learner. But in education, differences between learners are of crucial importance, and thus one of our major research needs is to identify important individual differences affecting learning and to determine how these different kinds of individuals can most efficiently achieve educational objectives.

Maturation

In the public schools one of the major individual difference variables is age.

Piaget's classic studies of children's thinking suggest that there are discriminable stages in the development of children's thinking. American research suggests that the boundaries of these stages are not as definite as Piaget implies and that experience as well as maturation affects the child's cognitive functioning. Nevertheless, the sequences described by Piaget may represent general patterns of development.

What meaning do these have for the teaching of social science? For example, Piaget found that a young child did not understand that if he has a brother, his brother has a brother. The young child seems unable to think in terms of reciprocal, transitive relationships, but sees things only from a single viewpoint. The development of ability to conceptualize reciprocal relationships is of importance not only to the teaching of mathematics and science but also to the teaching of social science. Piaget's work suggests that ability to use such logical relationships in dealing with concrete objects appears before ability to use the same relationships in solving verbal problems. We need not only to study such natural development longitudinally but also to vary children's experience experimentally to determine what sorts of teaching affect this development. One might, for example, expect role playing and doll play to be useful techniques for reducing the egocentrism of thought involved in the lack of concepts of reciprocality.

Bruner (1960), who is now quoted so often in educational circles that he is known as St. Jerome, has popularized the hypothesis that any subject can be taught effectively in some intellectually honest form to any child at any stage of development. This is a challenging and potentially fruitful assertion, but if Piaget is right, the child simply cannot grasp certain concepts or ways of thinking in the early stages of development. Piaget's theory implies that new ways of thinking come only through slow experience and maturation. It is apparent that we need research to test whether Bruner or Piaget is right. While neither notion is precise enough to be completely discredited, there is a clear difference in emphasis.

We need to find out what modes of thinking in social science can be most easily grasped at what ages, and to test hypotheses about how best to introduce and accelerate more mature modes of thought. For example, what does "democracy" mean to a child? Abstract concepts of this sort normally become part of the child's vocabulary in later elementary school. Even in high school many students have only limited understanding of them. Adelson (1963) finds an almost qualitative break in development of political values and concepts at the beginning of high school years. Yet there are undoubtedly many evidences of the practice of democratic forms of behavior in groups of younger children. Can we teach some of the meaning of democracy before the child can define the word? I suspect that we can, but I should like to see research comparing differing techniques of developing such meanings. One would expect that for young children it would be important to provide a good deal of direct experience and to make a conscious effort to link this experience to language.

Intelligence

What is the proper interplay between experience and language? Research in the laboratory suggests that verbalization is efficient both in reducing the time required to learn a concept or principle and in facilitating use of the learning. In his book, The Process of Education (1960), however, Bruner worries that conscious verbalization may disrupt the intuitive processes which he believes to be fundamental to education. We need research to settle this question. I suspect that there will not be a single generalization. Rather it may well be that the appropriate balance of experience and verbalization depends both upon the age and upon the intelligence of the learner. What is necessary direct experience for one child may be a waste of time for another.

Bruner also stresses, as most psychologists would, the importance of learning the structure of a discipline rather than a mass of unrelated facts. Even if

Professor Tumin is right in asserting that there is no underlying structure in social science, it may be that any one of a number of possible structures may be pedagogically useful. But here again we almost certainly will encounter intelligence as a variable complicating any rules of thumb. One of the attributes of higher intelligence is the ability to see relationships. We need research with students of differing mental ages in which we compare different patterns of presentation of structure. Should facts be presented from which a structure might be derived? Or should a structure be taught directly in order that the basic facts may later be easily fitted in? Or does the optimal approach depend upon the learner? I would guess that the optimal amount of guidance would be less for more intelligent, older children.

Personality Characteristics

My own research has been concerned with the way in which different styles of teaching affect the learning of different types of college students. I would expect similar interactions to affect learning in elementary and secondary schools and I would expect the interactions to be somewhat different in the social sciences from those in the natural sciences. For example, anxious college students like a good deal of organization and structure in psychology classes (Rosenwein, 1963). If this is also true of anxious high school students, we might find the degree of teacher preparation and organization of materials to be a more important variable in a social studies course than in a course, such as mathematics, with a high degree of structure in the content itself. I would also expect the clarity of standards of achievement in a course to be more important in social studies courses than in other fields. Social science courses, both at public school and college levels, have the reputation of being soft--lacking in intellectual rigor. If Atkinson and McClelland's descriptions of students high in achievement motivation are correct, soft courses should be boring to such students (Atkinson, 1958). Differences between teachers in setting achievement standards should make an important difference in the performance of these students.

Motivation

In social science education, we are not only interested in motivation to learn the content of a particular course but also in motivation as an outcome of learning in a course. One of our major educational objectives is the nurturance of curiosity--in this case, of the motivation to learn more about society and the people who compose it. One of our most important research needs is to determine factors enhancing or reducing motivation for further learning.

Fortunately one of the major upheavals in present-day psychological theory has been the burgeoning interest in positive motives such as curiosity, need for understanding, and need for stimulation. A good deal of research suggests that organisms seek and enjoy stimuli which are different from those they are used to--but that these stimuli must not be too different. When stimuli are incongruous or very strange, the organism develops fear instead of curiosity.

How does this generalization apply to learning social science? It is tempting to answer this question in vague phrases like "varied teaching methods," "posing new, but soluble problems," or "setting realistic standards of achievement." But I believe we can go a little beyond this. One hint comes from studies by Berlyne (1954a,b). He found that asking students questions rather than presenting statements of fact not only improved learning but also increased interest in learning more about the topic. Questions were particularly effective in arousing curiosity about things which were already familiar. But the most successful questions were those that were most unexpected. This checks with the finding that National Merit Scholars describe the classes which influenced their choice of field as ones where they didn't know what to expect next (Thistlethwaite, 1960). The interplay between familiar and novel may thus be a very significant factor in the development of curiosity, and research on the effects of differing modes of producing conceptual novelty and conflict has great potential.

How do we bring students into contact with novelty? Meaningful laboratory experience may be one answer. For example, outstanding scientists report that their motivation for science resulted from early participation in research. This has implications for social science. Perhaps we offer too few opportunities for students to experience the thrill of discovery.

Another research study on educational motivation was that of Atkinson and O'Connor (1963). Atkinson has developed a theory of motivation from which he derived the hypothesis that students with high achievement motivation would be most highly motivated in situations in which they perceived their chances of success as about 50-50. Laboratory research supported the hypothesis. Atkinson and O'Connor then hypothesized that grouping by ability would be particularly effective for students high in the achievement motive, since the homogeneous class should provide an achievement situation in which the student's judgment of his own success as compared to his peers should be more likely to be intermediate. The Atkinson and O'Connor results not only showed that the high achievement-motive students made greater academic gains in homogeneous classes but that they also reported greater interest in school work.

The Atkinson and O'Connor results are relevant not only for the problem of ability grouping but also for the general problem of motivation for learning. From Berlyne we have the suggestion that motivation is highest in situations of moderate novelty; from Atkinson we learn that for students with basic motivation for success, motivation is highest when chances of success are moderate. Both of these findings point to the value of pacing learning so that each step offers some newness and a moderate risk of failure. One of the first steps may be to stimulate doubt about what has previously been taken for granted. We've never really studied the teaching role of the "devil's advocate." The theory I'm proposing is directly counter to the prevailing Skinnerian theory of programming for teaching machines, which tries to insure success at each step. We need research to determine whether Skinner or Atkinson is right about motivation for further learning.

One of the major sources of stimulation of motivation is the teacher. I presume that the teacher's own enthusiasm and values have much to do with his students' interest in the social sciences. We know very little about how the teacher communicates his attitudes. Probably non-verbal as well as verbal methods are used. Does the degree of verbalization make a difference in the amount of permanence of student learning? Does the teacher's non-verbal expressiveness influence learning? We have some evidence at the college level suggesting that such factors may be important, but the whole area of interpersonal relations in the classroom is just beginning to be studied. Our general social psychological theories of interpersonal influence need to be tested in educational settings.

Another source of motivation is the peer group. Schmuck (1962) has shown that achievement is related to the child's perception of his relationship to other members of his class. Status, influence and attraction vary with the situation. Since social studies teachers are particularly likely to use group discussion techniques in which inter-pupil influences can play an important role, we need to look specifically at student-to-student interaction in social science classes and the effect of differing patterns of interaction and differing group norms upon motivation. Flanders' (1962) work in this area is of much interest.

One unique method of involving students in learning has been explored by Ronald and Peggy Lippitt (1963). They have trained older children to teach psychology to younger children. The initial results indicate very promising results with both the younger and older children. Additional research on the optimal age and personality relationships between the learner and young tutor may open a new avenue to helping the student learn both the concepts of social science and their application in his own life.

The student's role in the general culture of his school and community is another variable whose impact upon motivation and learning is not known. How is participation in extracurricular groups related to interest in social science? According to a study of college students (Goldsen, 1960), the student well integrated into his community is likely to value education more than less well-adjusted students. Is this evidence of complacency or of further learning?

Finally, we need to examine motives for learning social science as a means to other goals. We know very little about what students see as the value of social science education. We know even less about how curricular emphasis upon particular kinds of motivational devices affects long-term motivation for learning. What, for example, is the impact of a heavy stress on the practical value of learning social science? What is the effect of emphasis upon the controversial? What is the impact of the use of anxiety or of other negative motivations, ranging from the threat of a failing grade to prophecies of the doom of our civilization if we fail to develop understanding of our society?

Conceptual Learning

Most social science education in the elementary school appears to be weighted heavily toward descriptive facts.

Perhaps educators are presently underrating the child's ability to conceptualize and generalize, but I believe that there is also real danger that, in turning over elementary curricula to well-meaning college professors, we may go much too far in the other direction. Children have many concepts, and can learn more. But we need a great deal of research to learn how we can hook into the conceptual system the child has, and use it as a framework for the development of new concepts or for the expansion and differentiation of relevant concepts he already has. We need to diagnose the nature of children's conceptual systems--their inclusiveness, their personal relevance, their ties to one another. Otherwise, we are likely to attempt to teach concepts rich with significance for the social scientist but empty of meaning for the child.

We need also to look at the way teachers structure the field. This is not necessarily the structure either of the expert or of the child, and a restructured curriculum may have little effect with unrestructured teaching.

I see much of the task of social science education as being that of developing new dimensions which the student can use in understanding society. The educated man can look at Man and Society from a number of perspectives. He can make discriminations as well as see similarities which are not perceptible to the naive layman. In developing such concepts we might do well to turn to animal research for a cue to effective teaching. (I have a general distrust of the direct application of animal learning principles to education so that this should be regarded only as a hypothesis to be tested.)

Lashley was interested in problems of discrimination learning. For example, what principles describe the process by which a rat learns to discriminate between two shades of gray? Lashley found that hundreds of trials might be required before the rat responded consistently to a particular discrimination between two shades of gray. But training time was short on training the rat to discriminate black from white. And when this discrimination had been made, it was carried over without further training to the task of discriminating two shades of grays. This suggests that when we wish to teach a concept or dimension, we can do this most easily by using examples at the extremes rather than the examples which may be those most relevant for actual use.

In social science education this may, as Professor Frankel suggested earlier, point to the use of historical rather than contemporary studies. I would suggest that we might also wish to use studies of other cultures and of other species for the same reason.

Starting with the remote and extreme case has another important advantage. Social science differs from the "hard" sciences in the relevance of our concepts for the individual's image of his own self and his place in society. This means that our efforts to develop new concepts may not only run into the naive misconceptions which interfere with learning in all fields but that we also encounter beliefs with strong emotional loadings. Here again a frontal attack may be much less effective for learning than an approach through the study of societies and species more remote from one's own personal security.

This advocacy of an emphasis upon primitive and historical societies runs counter to the equally sound principle that one learns meaningful, familiar things more easily than the strange and unfamiliar. It is clear that research is needed to determine what are the consequences of studying "Our town" versus studying the Australian Bushman or the civilization of ancient Greece. Perhaps we need to look at ways of linking all three.

My earlier discussion of maturation is directly relevant to this and a number of the other research problems in this area of conceptual learning. Essentially the problem I posed was: To what extent is the development of social science concepts paced by maturational factors and to what extent is the development influenced by previous learning? In the sciences, laboratory experiences, even for young children, hold much promise as methods of developing scientific concepts. It is possible that actual experience may be even more important in the development of social science concepts. There are many simple behavioral studies which can easily be carried out by elementary and high school students. And there is also evidence that special training in interpersonal relations can increase understanding of the "whys" of behavior (Schmuck and Chesler, 1963).

Teachers have long recognized the value of direct experience in the widespread use of the field trip as an educational method in social science education. We know very little about how laboratory or field experience affect conceptual or attitudinal development. My reason for suggesting that such experience is more important in social than in physical science is that the concepts of social science are less logically and hierarchically ordered than in mathematics and physical science.

In the physical sciences it is possible to build the meaning of a new concept out of lower order concepts; in the social sciences this is less feasible and it is thus possible that the more abstract concepts of social science develop late simply because the young child lacks sufficient direct experience with people and institutions to build up the desired meanings. What is the impact of living in another culture upon a youth's interest in and awareness of social institutions and behavior? What is the effect of moving from one community to another upon children's learning in social science? With growing interest in early foreign language and science instruction we need to look at the effects of these learnings upon learning of concepts, attitudes, and methodology of social science.

In addition to experiments in which different experiences in school and laboratory are independent variables, it would be useful to relate individual differences in social science concepts to such variables as type of family organization, experience in formal and informal peer groups, role in family, and cultural background. For example, does the degree of authoritarianism in the family affect learning of social science? How much of the effect of cultural deprivation in learning social science is a lack of language, books, intellectual stimulation and family support for education, and how much is due to differences in family organization, and experiences with facets of our major social institutions quite different from those of the teacher and other students? In some ways our culturally deprived groups have more experience with major social institutions than do their middle-class peers. The middle-class child is unlikely to know a policeman, the lower class child knows the policeman's role from direct experience. The middle-class child has never heard of social workers, the lower class child may have had contact with several social agencies. The lower class child is not lacking in social experience; he simply has a different perspective. Social science learning builds upon this existing structure and we need to understand such different degrees and types of structure if we are to devise methods of improving learning.

We want to help our students learn how to learn. What does "learning to learn" mean? It means learning the rules of the games--the relevant dimension--what questions to ask--the methods of fitting information into a structure and using it to expand and shape the structure into a more comprehensive and differentiated system. Can we teach children how to learn? I think we can do a better job than we have. We probably don't do it by a heavy dosage of facts; we probably don't do it by teaching only concepts and principles. But we don't at present know the most effective mix of facts, concepts, and organizing principles. As I noted earlier, the ideal mix is probably different at different stages of learning and for different students.

Teaching Analysis, Synthesis, and Evaluation

More than in other fields, the social sciences must take seriously the objectives of developing skill in analysis, synthesis, and evaluation of verbal materials. As Tumin said, we must develop respect for evidence. We know very little about how to develop such skills, and we may need to begin research in this area by case studies and critical incidents collected from successful teachers. Some comparative studies might be possible even without such preparation. For example, we might compare the effectiveness in reaching these goals of classes taught from a single textbook with classes in which a variety of sources was used. We might compare group discussion techniques with independent study or project methods. We might look at such a straight-forward question as the effect of focusing teaching on these higher level objectives in teaching. Dressel and Mayhew and their students (1954) have shown that critical thinking is significantly increased when this is taken as a primary objective.

Teaching Methods

This discussion of methods of teaching higher level intellectual skills leads to a more general discussion of experimental comparisons of teaching methods. Recently it has become fashionable to sneer at "method" studies. Most of this criticism seems to come from advocates of new teaching devices which turn out not to be as effective as claimed when their value is experimentally compared with conventional methods.

It is quite true that comparisons of teaching methods require a good deal of ingenuity and sophistication. I've indicated some of the possible pitfalls in my chapter in the Handbook of Research on Teaching (Gage, 1963), and our groups tonight and tomorrow will no doubt suggest others. But when we look at differential types of outcomes for different methods, at differing effects upon different types of students, and at differing teacher skills and satisfactions, we usually obtain a good deal of worthwhile information from comparisons of teaching methods.

In social science education we have a number of alternative approaches to teaching--unit methods, multiple-test method, the case-study approach, discussion methods, independent study, the project method, role playing, the use of original sources, and others. These methods overlap in many ways, and we need to define the essential elements in order to carry out research determining their relative effectiveness for achieving different objectives. In carrying out such research in the elementary and high schools, we need to pay attention to developmental variables. It may be that certain methods are particularly effective in tempting a child from one stage of development to the next but less effective in consolidating gains during a stage of development.

Evaluation

Basic to many of these studies are good measuring instruments.

The area of evaluation has been shortchanged in the value system of psychologists. It requires technical competence, but it also requires as much or more creativity than almost any other area of specialization. We need good measures of classroom processes, of student characteristics, of teaching characteristics, and of many other independent variables. But we especially need good measures of our dependent variables. We not only need to measure students' knowledge of facts and concepts and students' intellectual skills, but we also need to devise methods of getting at the child's own ideas as he looks at events in his own world--methods which will be less restricted by the child's reading and verbal skills than are our conventional tests. Similarly we need methods of measuring attitudinal and value changes which, as compared to current tests, are less susceptible to the students' motivation to give the "right" answers. One of the objectives of education is to open the students' eyes to new dimensions of experience. Research with the technique developed by Runkel (1956) might give us indications of changes in the dimensions which the student uses in evaluating social science phenomena. Systematic use of the Taxonomy of Objectives developed by Bloom, Krathwohl, and others (1956) might also carry us forward more rapidly than in the past.

Conclusion

Obviously a wide range of types of research is needed if we are to gain a better understanding of learning in the social studies. Basic research in learning is progressing rapidly. Fortunately, many topnotch experimental psychologists are now also interested in learning in the classroom. We can bridge the gap between laboratory and classroom; the task of social science is so compelling that we must bridge it!

Discussion Summary

Gardner

1. It is obvious to those concerned with effective teaching of the social studies that research is needed on how pupils learn it, how teachers teach it, and what are the implications of the reactions between the teacher and the learner.
2. There is extensive literature on how learning takes place, where both animals and humans are reduced to subjects. Much research knowledge now available has not been applied to the classroom situation and some does not seem to have direct or immediate application. As McKeachie pointed out, much research is needed to bridge this gap and a considerable amount is going on at the present time. It is encouraging to note that top psychologists are concerning themselves with what takes place within the classroom setting.
3. McKeachie has touched upon a number of areas where much research has been done and where much more is needed, especially with social science context. He has included reference to research in individual differences, personality, intelligence, motivation, conceptual learning, teaching of analysis, and synthesis of teaching methods and evaluation.

Are There Stages of Maturation Which Should be Incorporated into Curriculum Design?

Metcalf

There appears to be disagreement between the theories of Piaget and Bruner, certainly in terms of stages of development. At Illinois recently a group of colleagues constituted a faculty seminar to consider the writings of Piaget and what they might mean for curriculum and method. Piaget has pointed out that around age thirteen or fourteen the child becomes capable of propositional thinking, and there is evidence to suggest that this differs with different kinds of materials.

The important question is what kind of experiences should the student have in social studies that would foster the capacity to state experience and state propositions. Are we in the elementary school implanting some values which later makes propositional thinking impossible in some areas? In the first grade some children are becoming soldiers in the cold war and not knowing why. They are acquiring attitudes which they cannot examine propositionally.

Levels of Concept Information

Metcalf

If Bruner means by concept a definition rather than a law or generalization we may have types of social studies classes in which imperialism, for example, is precisely defined, but no one would have ever read much about its causes or the effects. Concepts may be so trivial as some of the facts we now teach. It is essential that we provide a kind of social studies instruction that is conceptionally significant.

James

When we use the term concept we have in mind a mental image, not a definition. There is a hierarchy of concepts which cannot be related to precepts and which have to do with things which are too general to be observed directly. It is essential that we guard against too narrow a view of concepts, and it is equally essential that we carefully define terms. There is evidence that we can apply perfectly good conceptual theory of the most abstract sort at the ninth grade level.

Meadows

We should differentiate between different kinds of concepts and also different levels of concept formation. For example, I have the feeling that normative concept formation is much easier than cognitive concept formation. Normative concept formation may actually interfere with cognitive at a later time.

Possibly in social science we have to identify the areas of concept formation which seem to be most attractive to us as compared to social science information. Possibly the type of cognitive formation that one acquired in physics and mathematics may have to be postponed in order to get to the normative, the evaluative and perhaps the perceptual concept formation about which there is much less emotion and other kinds of difficulties.

Relation of Academic Success and Creativity

Tumin

I would suggest the hypothesis that the relationship between academic success as measured by ordinary standards such as grades achieved and universities entered bears no relationship to development of curiosity and creativity and may be even negatively correlated.

McKeachie

I am inclined to believe that there is some correlation. It is probably low but we are not as damaging as some people who are on this creativity kick think we are. You cannot be creative unless you have something with which to work. It is true that certain ways of obtaining knowledge will get into the way of seeing in different contexts, but a teacher who is good as a teacher, generally, and a student who is good at learning probably also more often than not develops some creativity. We do need to look at this, however.

What of Curriculum Scope and Sequence?

Hanna

None of the proposed curriculum designs for social studies and sequence can be justified wholly on psychological grounds. We need to subject them to intensive experimentation and teaching. I am inclined to believe that emergence of any of these capacities is as much related to the experiences which a child has had as it is to any innate or inborn capacity or rate of maturation.

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NEEDED RESEARCH ON SELECTION AND ORGANIZATION OF CONTENT FOR TEACHING PURPOSES

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Whatever the shortcomings and limitations of comic strips and comic cartoons may be, it is my experience that, from time to time, a cartoonist with a few pen strokes and a few words focuses on some educational problem with devastating clarity. I came across one such a few years ago. It depicted a very young and very attractive elementary social studies teacher trying to get some help from the curriculum director. And it bore this caption, "Oh, I can teach them the world is round all right, but how do I explain the shape it's in?"

I thought repeatedly of this cartoon as I worked on the comments I am to make at this conference. The more of the literature I read, the more clear it became that while I could depict the form of the social studies curriculum, how in Heaven's name could I explain the shape it's in? And even if I managed in some way to do that, I would still not be fulfilling my assignment, for I have the far more difficult task of attempting to delineate the "Needed Research on Selection and Organization of Content for Teaching Purposes."

I have always had compassion for the anchor man on any relay team, so I spent more time than I had any right to wallowing in self-pity that it should fall to my lot to serve as anchor man for the relay team at this conference. For the anchor man at a conference runs the risk of being merely a repeater or a "me-tooer" or else talking about things which are really unrelated to what has gone before. But I found cold comfort at last. "Quit feeling sorry for yourself," I said, "and start feeling sorry for us. All you have to do is dream up needed research. We've still got to figure out how to do it. Just be glad you aren't saddled with the topic "Problems of Research Design." With that bit of philosophy I returned to work.

What seemed at first glance to be a nicely defined and fairly manageable topic proved to be anything but that. The longer I wrestled with it, the more difficult it became to pin it down or even to get a good hold. I finally decided that I had first to get my own mental furniture relating to content selection and curriculum organization in some kind of order. So you must bear with me briefly while I go through a kind of oral "pick-up-the-living-room-before-the-guests-arrive" process.

I found it quite impossible to think coherently about content selection and organization until I had reviewed the elements which have entered into making the curriculum what it is today. First, of course, it is apparent that content selection is impossible unless you know what you are selecting it for. The traditional way to put this is to ask "What are the goals and purposes of social studies instruction?" But I found it more useful to put it in a comparable but different form: "What expectations do people have about the outcomes of social studies instruction?" Expectations, in this context, seems to me to be a word which might facilitate research more than the term "goals and purposes."

It is no news to any of us that these expectations vary widely between different individuals. Perhaps one of our first research tasks is to ascertain more precisely just what these expectations are. It would be helpful, in this connection, if we could classify these varied expectations into broad categories on the basis of present knowledge. For example, one such possible list is suggested by Herrick and Tyler (1950) in a monograph and I am taking it out of context merely to use it as illustrative material.

First, there is the expectation that social studies instruction will cultivate the intellect. It will hone the mind, subordinate emotion to reason, and develop useful intellectual abilities.

Second, there is the expectation that instruction in social studies will lead the learner toward self-improvement, indeed almost self-perfection. The individual will find the social studies useful in different ways--they will aid him in becoming a more humane person, they will make it possible for him to understand the world in which he lives, they will help him find his place in the confusing world of which he is a part, and thus to improve his relations to it.

The development of responsible human beings and citizens is a third expectation, with emphasis on that knowledge and those characteristics most conducive to self-government.

Fourth, some expect of the social studies that they will serve as an impetus toward, and tools for, the reconstruction of society.

Finally, there are many whose expectations for social studies instruction centers around the inculcation and indoctrination of specific knowledge, attitudes, values, and beliefs.

What such a list, never intended to be definitive, suggests to me is that we do not know nearly enough about what the various expectations of different groups may be, nor do we have any clear ideas to what extent they may be inconsistent, contradictory, incompatible, or even mutually exclusive. If they are, then their usefulness as guides to the selection and organization of social studies content is reduced or even nullified. The list suggests further (and this is particularly true of item 5) that the expectations educators have for social studies instruction may differ significantly from the expectations held by other groups. This raises the problem whose expectations are to prevail. Finally, such a list suggests the problem of how many of these purposes social studies instruction can achieve and how many it should attempt to implement.

Whatever term is used, such broad statements of goals and purposes are not concrete enough to solve the problem of content selection or to develop a course of study. Curriculum development over the years, I believe, indicates that we have been seeking, and experimenting with, "cohesive principles" which might bring some kind of order and sequence to the diverse subject matter of the social sciences, and which might serve in selecting content for instruction in social studies in the schools. These cohesive principles did not themselves develop in any orderly fashion. Some are old and established; others are new and largely unexplored. Some are quite concrete, others are quite abstract. All have in common, I think, that they are intended to implement one or more of the expectations people have about social studies instruction. Again, purely for purposes of illustration, let me borrow a list of such cohesive principles from Professors Herrick and Tyler (1950).

1. The principle of chronological development. The development of time and space relationships is a dominant emphasis here. The order in which events occurred or ideas developed furnishes the basic framework.
2. The principle of logical development. Here the emphasis is on the demands of structure in the various disciplines, or the logical development of significant topics. More recently, emphasis on the ability to solve problems and to carry on reflective thought seem to me to be an aspect of this principle, though perhaps these should be placed in a separate category.
3. The principle of conceptual difficulty, with the emphasis on proceeding from the concrete to the abstract.
4. The principle of the geographical expansion of the learner's experiences. Here special attention is given to the orderly progression from the near and the known to the remote and the unknown.
5. The principle of the behavioral development of the learner, with emphasis on how the individual develops and on tailoring the content to the

needs and interests which the individual learner exhibits.

In my view, cohesive principles such as these reflect our efforts, somewhat random and hit-or-miss, to be sure, to discover a cement that would bind instruction in social studies together and that would be useful in selecting and organizing the content to be taught.

Out of the amalgamation of these diverse expectations and cohesive principles, recognizable patterns of curricular organization have emerged. Although described in the literature in terms more often confusing than clarifying, these five broad curricular forms appear to be in use: separate subjects, broad fields, areas of living, core organization, and a needs or experience-centered curriculum.

My justification in taking your time to review these matters lies in my conviction that the lack of knowledge about, and a certain lack of concern for, the role of expectations and cohesive principles has been a major handicap to our research efforts in the past.

No group knows better than this one that vast quantities have been written on the selection of content and curricular organization. I was about to say that voluminous research has been carried on, but this would be somewhat imprecise. As I reviewed only a small portion of it, another comic strip came to mind, this time Amy and her friends. Amy is walking home from school with Benny, just after the report cards have been distributed. "How did you do in arithmetic?" asks Amy.

"Not too bad," says Benny. "What was your score?" "Fifty," replies Benny. "Fifty! Why, that's awful." "Oh, I don't know," replies Benny. "My standards aren't very high." There is a surprising amount of literature which is labeled as research but consists primarily of untested assumptions and unproved hypotheses. There is also a good deal of research which is statistically sound but largely useless.

There is little time and less justification on this occasion for a detailed review of the literature dealing with content selection and curricular organization. But there are some generalizations which are highly germane to our topic which the literature supports, though the validity of individual studies may be open to question.

The expectations regarding social studies instruction and the cohesive principles have received relatively little research attention in comparison with research devoted to patterns of curricular organization. The literature reveals a marked lack of agreement on goals and purposes of instruction among educators and specialists (Kinsman, 1949). One study, for example, demonstrated that on a specific subject such as content and instruction in American history, disagreement among American historians was high (Jones, 1955). As reflected in courses of study, goals and purposes are stated in exceedingly abstract terms, and teachers are seemingly unaware of the role of objectives in curricular planning, and view them as having only a general guidance function (Nerhovig, 1956; Sand, 1949). A study of state courses of study, for example, convinced the writer that no curricular pattern was suggested by the statement of objectives contained in them (Samford, 1954). Still another researcher concluded that the term citizenship, almost universally posited as an expected outcome of instruction, was employed in such various ways that it could be useful only if it were limited to denote political participation (Lewenstein, 1953). In another study the author found that only 5 percent of the social studies concepts understood by first graders came from the school, while 95 percent came from environmental influences (Huck, 1955). Here the significance lies not in the findings or the question of the quality of the single study as much as in its implications for our lack of knowledge about what the social studies may reasonably be expected to contribute.

It appears that during the past decade, particularly, researchers have demonstrated much greater interest in exploring various aspects of what I termed the cohesive principles of content selection. A few illustrative findings will again suffice. Schools putting one or more of these principles into practice usually failed to define their philosophy, or even the terms used, with any degree of clarity. Furthermore, school people did not seem concerned with relating conceptual difficulty with maturity level, and while they paid lip-service to the principle of geographical expansion, they paid little attention to the implications of moving from the concrete to the abstract, or to other aspects of conceptual difficulty (Sand, 1951).

It is striking to note how little work appears to have been done on the chronological principle. One study, for example, reports that results indicate time relationships should begin in the sixth grade, with systematic training in chronology starting after the seventh grade (Spiro, 1948). The prevalence of this principle in practice suggests that a great deal of additional information is needed.

Aspects of the logical principle are currently receiving well-deserved attention. A study at Syracuse (Nash, 1962) and a cluster of studies at Stanford (Andrews, 1957; Douglass, 1954; Peck, 1958; Rambeau, 1957; Runge, 1958; Rusteika, 1958; Stratton, 1957), are representative of some efforts to identify basic concepts from the various social science disciplines. Problem solving and reflective thinking, as aspects of the logical principle, are receiving greater attention. Several studies demonstrate, with less contradiction in results than is typical in other areas, that when instruction is focused on specific abilities involved in problem solving and reflective thinking, students gain significantly in their ability to use these reflective abilities without reducing their command of factual knowledge in comparison with the control groups (Kight and Mickelson, 1948; McGarry, 1961; Metcalf, 1948; Fersh, 1949).

It becomes apparent that while the greatest research effort to date has gone into studying aspects of curricular organization, much of it has been concentrated on one pattern, namely the core curriculum. Indeed, separate subject matter organization is rarely studied per se, but is most often cast in the role of "bad guy" in relation to other curricular patterns. Many, if not most, of the existing studies on the core curriculum report amazingly contradictory findings (Capehart et al., 1954; Cruikshank, 1957; Davis, 1956; Fair, 1954; Faunce, 1947; Gale, 1955;

Mennes, 1954; Phillips, 1961; Plesure, 1955; Risinger, 1956; Schwartz, 1958), and studies of the experience curriculum suggest similar inconsistencies (Davis, 1961; VanTil, 1946; Wrightstone and Fodano, 1948).

These comments on recent research are intended merely to make the point that, in my judgment, too much of our research effort has been placed on curricular organization instead of in the more fundamental areas of the expectations and cohesive principles of social studies instruction. At the same time, the past five or ten years have seen the beginnings of research which is more basic and of greater long-run significance. At the present moment, however, it is still sporadic and somewhat helter-skelter, lacking sharp focus and coherence, and it varies greatly in soundness of approach, adequacy of research design, and quality of conclusions.

And so, at long last, we are ready to ask, "Where do we go from here? What is the needed research in content selection and organization for teaching purposes?" I should like to raise a series of questions regarding expectations or goals, the cohesive principles of content selection, and the patterns of curricular organization. I hope some of them, at least, are the "right" questions and that, at our meetings tonight and tomorrow we can make a start on translating them into research design.

Questions Relating to Expectations Regarding the Outcomes of Social Studies Instruction

1. Can we identify more concretely and with more precision the "rising expectations" of various groups regarding the desired outcomes of social

studies instruction? (E.g., groups such as scholars, administrators, teachers, special interest groups, students, parents, and the like.)

2. Can we identify which, if any, of these expectations are contradictory, mutually exclusive, or incompatible? (E.g., incompatible with other goals of social studies instruction, or with other goals of education.)

3. Can we refine these expectations in such a way that they are: a) amenable to measurement and evaluation; and b) useful, in practice, as criteria for content selection?

4. On the unstated premise that we cannot do all things equally well, can priorities be established for social studies instruction regarding: a) intellectual development and grasp of existing knowledge in the social sciences; b) development of needed skills and abilities--both intellectual and "action" skills; and c) the inculcation of traits and characteristics, including basic values and beliefs, attitudes, and habits?

5. Can we develop more valid and reliable instruments and techniques for dealing with such intangibles as attitudes, beliefs, convictions, and the like?

6. What promise, if any, do new techniques (e.g., programmed learning) hold for freeing additional teaching time? (E.g., structure of government

via programming to free more time for discussion and study of issues in government.)

Questions Relating to the Cohesive Principles Needed for Content Selection

1. Can we explore each of the cohesive principles objectively, systematically, and in depth with the hope of accumulating reliable evidence concerning their validity and effectiveness? (Representative sub-questions might be: Can historical methodology be taught in history classes as they are presently organized? What makes ideas in social science hard to teach or hard to learn? What levels of abstraction, for example in government, are appropriate to a given age or grade? Can the cognitive abilities serve as a basis for selecting content?)

2. Can we discover a rank order for these principles in terms of their suitability and usefulness in the selection of content and the organization of the curriculum? Are all equally applicable to history and the social sciences? Which, if any, are contradictory, mutually exclusive, or incompatible with each other, or with the expectations for social studies instruction? Which one or ones reveal the greatest efficacy in achieving a balance of intellectual development, ability development, and attitudinal development of learners?

3. Are there inherent relationships between one or more of the cohesive principles and one or more

of the patterns of curricular organization? If so, what are they and which combination affords the greatest hope for improved learning?

4. Can we ascertain which one (or which combination) of the principles hold greatest promise for selection and organization of content in the elementary grades, the junior high school, and the senior high school?

5. Can we devise research techniques to eliminate, discount, or cancel out the teacher variable in assessing the results of using different cohesive principles in the selection of content and in instruction?

6. Would it be useful to bring together in "research centers" the people who have demonstrated the greatest concern, knowledge, conviction, or predilection for one or more of these principles and set them the task of dis-proving or dis-crediting the principle for which they have the greatest affinity?

Questions Relating to Patterns of Curricular Organization

1. Since patterns of curricular organization seem to fall on a continuum from separate subjects to varying degrees of combining subject matter from the various disciplines, can we identify more precisely the nature of the mental and intellectual processes involved in "integrating" subject matter and concepts? Is it something

that can be taught? Or is it strictly an individual and personal function that "occurs" within the individual? If it can be taught, can it be taught at an elementary level if it has not been achieved at more sophisticated levels?

2. Does it make any difference to learning in what order historical, political, social, or economic concepts are taught?
3. Assuming the continued existence of separate subject organization, does it make any difference whether for example, world history precedes American history, whether government follows American history, or whether economics or sociology follow or precede any of the others?

Perhaps our most immediate and pressing task is to train ourselves to ask the "right" questions and to develop the research techniques and instruments we need to get the answers. I'm sure my personal petticoat of prejudices has been embarrassingly visible throughout my remarks, but I trust you will forgive me for feeling strongly that a genuine breakthrough for better social studies instruction demands our cooperative and concerted research efforts. And these efforts, in my view, should be concentrated on our expectations for the outcomes of social studies instruction, and on the alternative cohesive principles useful for selecting content and organizing the curriculum.

I'm delighted to have been asked to participate in this conference, primarily because my sentiments echo those of my students who drop in for a visit after one year of teaching experience: "I learned an awful lot more than the students did."

Discussion Summary

What Kinds of Curriculum Research Are Needed?

Discussion following Haefner's paper was lively and prolonged. In substance, the group discussion seemed to indicate that we need much more (and more carefully designed) research, but that curriculum decisions are essentially policy decisions. Wilson expressed doubt that fruitful research on the curriculum is possible, perhaps because we have never defined what we mean by curriculum. Thirty years ago curriculum was conceived as a body of subject matter, whereas today we are concerned with the total body of experience. In this sense the variables of kinds of classrooms, teachers, and pupils are so numerous that controlled experimental research becomes almost impossible.

Fundamentally the task of decision making as to outcomes and sequence of courses rests upon expectations from the social studies. We do not have adequate information as to what the American public wants from its schools. Do we as a nation place high priority upon academic performance and upon training for responsibility and involvement in public affairs? Public expectations will provide one guide to the organization and selection of content.

West and Wilson both pointed to the need for research on specifics, particularly from the behavioral sciences to answer such questions as:

> Does the cyclical organization of history in the elementary, junior high and senior high schools add to understanding?
>
> What is the implication of repetition for learning?
>
> If social studies materials are organized into units of learning, how long a period of time should be devoted to these units at different grade levels?
>
> What does research in psychology offer as to the utility proceeding from the known to the unknown in the organization of subject matter?
>
> Is there evidence that we should start with the study of the whole culture and proceed to the study of parts or that we should begin with the parts and proceed to the whole?

Is a National Commission Needed?

Odegard

> In England one device used is that of a royal commission to take a look at the whole system of education. How feasible would it be if we in the United States were to have a presidential commission to study the whole problem of the school curriculum?

Haefner

> We desperately need a national commission. I am convinced that the present system of curricular change is wholly inadequate to the needs of our times. However, the whole idea is fraught with risks. Safeguards are needed to maintain the rights of local authorities.

Hanna

> We need a nationwide commission representing the scholarly community, the lay community, and the professional education community. This commission should be composed of men of integrity,

intelligence, and prestige who would give their full and undivided attention to curricular problems. They would continuously assess national goals in a world setting, translate them into educational techniques with priorities of content and with due consideration of method and technique. Out of such a commission should come a continuous flow of curriculum proposals, providing alternatives from which the states and localities might choose. The commission must be kept independent of the federal government, and care must be exercised to keep it from becoming a federal agency.

Hunnicutt

There should be more than one such agency. Just as I would not want General Motors to be the only manufacturer of automobiles in this country, I would want competitive ideas in education continually being presented so that choice would remain with diverse groups who now have responsibility for decision making as to what goes into educational programs. Unfortunately curricular decisions are now generally made on marginal time. A commission, or commissions, would provide specific budgeting of large blocks of time for consideration and deliberation.

Education and National Planning

Bailey

There is something upsetting about the idea that what is needed most now is to find out what is expected of the social studies program by the American public. This question is too important to leave to the scholars from the social science disciplines themselves, or to the professional educators themselves, or to the man in the street who may not have the foggiest idea of what he expects. Whatever research goes on there must be some extraordinary imaginative leaps in the dark. The most able men we can enlist using their talents as wise, civilized, imaginative, and creative men must reach judgments as to what is needed, and then, through group process, reach decisions as to what we should do. There must be continuing research, but to fulfill the agenda of needed research would take fifty years, and by then the data and conclusions would be irrelevant.

What is not irrelevant is placing education in this country in far more of the context of society. Possibly a commission such as has been suggested, removed from the political system, would help. What we really have to begin to talk about in this country is something bigger, broader, and more imaginative than this, and there is need to return to the concept of national planning. We must adjust to change with projected needs of the society as they begin to come over the horizon. Certain things we now begin to understand:

> Something about the forseeable need for military manpower and quality.
>
> Something about the forseeable need for industrial manpower and changes necessary to adjust to automation with all its implications.
>
> Something about the growing shortages of medical practitioners.
>
> Something about the whole series of things happening in our economy and our society which have massive implications for the educational program of our schools.
>
> Something about the need for retraining of citizens at all ages.

We must go outside education in order to understand it and in order to begin to think about all kinds of leaps into the future. We must think about ways of organizing our thinking about what we think the world is going to be like twenty years from now and see what part education can play in adapting to the world.

Do We Need a Central Depository for a Research on Education?

Odegard

Should we think of a central depository of research on education to facilitate retrieval of information, in view of the fact that even the

experts are not familiar with what has been done
and is being done in research?

Continuing Research is Needed

While no attempt was made to establish consensus, it seemed clear that the group felt a need for much more research and for research more rigorous and more significant than that which is going on at present. The years 1955-1970 may be thought as a period of great creativity in American education. In any open society such as ours, where a great variety of approaches is possible, research does not determine priority in allocating priority to developmental projects. It is essential, however, that after the ideas are promulgated, they be carefully researched to discover what happened, what results were obtained.

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PART III

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS OF RESEARCH DESIGN

PANEL CHAIRED BY RAYMOND O. COLLIER, JR.

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The remarks which follow constitute the author's synthesis of the various points of view emanating from one of three discussion groups on problems of research design which followed the major presentations of this conference. The points are either direct or implied outcomes of the discussion group or the conference itself.

Reactions of the Discussion Group

General Reactions

One reaction noted early in the discussion session was that the general ideas dealing with needed research presented in the conference were critically necessary in an area where much invigorating research is now beginning to be done. Another general reaction observed was the feeling that previous to specific research activity in the social studies must come the establishment of a system of research priorities and a framework for actually doing research. It was generally agreed that in future conferences of the present type, after certain preliminary issues were considered, a much more specific look at needed research was imperative.

Perhaps, both for readers and for the conference participants, a major value of the total conference report will be in directing attention to the need for designation of specific research areas and of defining the elements of these areas so that revealing research can be implemented.

Reactions of a More Specific Type

Following these general reactions, the group noted that although researchers interested in certain areas would necessarily form separate research activities, the over-all research effort should be guided by a priority system and a framework for research.

The following points were judged to be relevant to a research framework:

1. A specification of information, competencies, values and generalizations which are necessary to be imparted or developed in young people for purposes of cultural continuity and social development.
2. The specification of various alternative programs and approaches for directing the teaching-learning process in a desired fashion.
3. The development of media, procedures and materials by which alternative curricular designs may be implemented.
4. The design of research--survey and experimental--to apply to 1 and 2 through which answers to sequentially arising questions will become possible.

It was recognized that any consideration of research priority or framework would, because of the nature of the social studies, become involved with public policy and sentiment.

Finally, the group defined several sample questions which could serve as sources of specific researches:

1. What are the relationships between the beliefs, values and attitudes of social studies teachers and these variables as developed in their students?
2. What are the differential effects on certain outcome variables of various plans of study? Examples of plans are a cyclical plan in grades 5, 8 and 12 as compared to a sequential study plan for grades 11 and 12; plans based on different sequential placement of course components.
3. What are the differential effects on specified variables between the depth and breadth approach to curriculum specifications?
4. What are the effects of various different laboratory devices used in conjunction with regular class work?

Some Reactions to the Group Reactions

The author and the group in reacting to the previous items agreed that priorities are difficult entities to specify let alone on which to find agreement. The research framework previously specified will in general terms be useful, but it is by no means new nor unique, for many people in and out of the social studies have presented similar frames.

It is true that the previous research questions are to a heavy degree concerned with curriculum matters--different approaches to the teaching-learning process.

Although in none of the questions is there an explicit query into the basic causitive processes involved in the teaching and the learning of the social studies, in each of these questions is implicit the possibility for research in basic underlying processes. It is not at all true that other fields, such as psychology, will have more interest in or liability for these basic processes than researchers in the social studies. On the contrary, research in the social studies will need to be motivated and monitored by both personnel in and without the social studies field per se.

Participants in the group were quick to point out that an obviously basic factor in any research is the measuring device. In the previous questions where various approaches to the intellectual development of students are being compared, we will be eminently concerned with primary and concomitant development of certain beliefs, attitudes and values as obtained outcome variables, as well as measures of skills and knowledge. Because of the dynamic nature of the social studies, we will also be confronted with unique variables such as degree of value conflict between the child and family or community. Whether there are instruments available to obtain good measures on these variables is of crucial concern to research in the social studies. If worthwhile measuring instruments do not exist, and this is probably the case, more work is indicated in the building of measuring devices. Even if measuring instruments are available it is unlikely they will be completely usable in the comparisons desired, but will have to be supplemented by instruments singularly suited for research as it is developed.

Moreover, it is quite desirable that in almost any research area in the social studies the variables obtained for study and comparison will be multi-component variables. In addition, they will be observed sequentially over a period of time so that problems associated with the building of such scales and multi-variates become complex, indeed.

It would be helpful in the total research enterprise if survey and basic experimental research could precede the work of research on the teaching of the social studies. This, of course, will doubtless not be possible since answers are needed soon. It would be desirable, in the author's view, to obtain survey and experimental results during the time that other activities are being developed. For example, in the construction of curricular materials and procedures it would be useful, if it were possible, to obtain simple feasibility tryouts on materials, simultaneously to obtain comparative information on the various sets of material which would aid in revision and to attempt to form assessment procedures at the same time.

Particularly in the early stages of curriculum development, it is usually difficult to run comparative experimentation on the materials for purposes of direction in changing materials. Many research people in this area feel that no tightly conceived experimental research should be started until construction of materials is well nigh finished. A contrasting point of view is that as soon as is possible an information-producing vehicle should be inaugurated. If true experimentation is not reasonable at this stage, at least some sort of information feedback process should be invoked. Some researchers in curriculum development have found it valuable to proceed from the start as if they were immersed in an experimental situation. Thus, when experimental tryouts are possible they have already spent considerable time "tooling up" for the activity. In any event, the development procedure must be a sequential one of organize and try out. To add to these difficulties, most investigators regard the yield function as a changing quantity over time and want information on how time affects yield.

Now, in order to research in this complicated area, one can attempt to simplify the research domain so as to obtain answers under more narrow conditions and lose situation or condition generality, or one can attempt to investigate over a larger class of conditions and obtain wider generalizability as regards conditions. In the latter approach the problems of obtaining designs and analyses which will provide valid research results are particularly fierce--interpretational problems are rampant. However, the goal is one which will finally be agreed on by most serious participants in and consumers of the research. For the simpler approach, it will be easier to obtain designs, analyses, interpretations and limitations. It will be a matter of capability which will be a suitable approach for a given research person. The author personally favors the simpler approach initially in the research sequence until certain knowledge is built up, always with the view to the more complicated approach as the ultimate.

The design of research in the teaching of social studies will constantly be concerned with randomization and sampling problems. The physical constrictions of teacher, class, school, district and the potential differential impact of these items on educative yield require that randomization and sampling be accomplished skillfully and carefully with a great deal of a priori planning. For example, if randomization of students in a school to two curricular methods happened to be desirable, contacts must be established with the school to insure the outcome.

We have, thus far, emphasized the type of research connected with the comparative evaluation of different approaches to teaching the social studies. Clearly, other types of research (e.g., status quo research), will be needed in a proper inspection of the total picture. Ultimately, an incisive study must be made of differential teaching procedures which maximize a "yield" of some sort under given conditions. The question arises naturally as to the specific nature of this "yield." In agronomy, yield can be defined as "bushels per acre"--perhaps corrected for costs in fertilizer and soil depreciation. In the educative process such simple definition is not at all possible. One will be forced to define yield as a complex variable involving, 1) student characteristics such as change in knowledge, skills, etc.--corrected, say, by change in personality variables, and 2) teacher characteristics such as change in knowledge, skills, etc.--again corrected by change in personality variables. And one can bring in community and family characteristics as a portion of the yield function. All of this suggests that these are various components of the "yield" variable which should be considered in research of this sort. It is further suggested that since portions of the stimulus variable (e.g., in the present case the teacher), will possibly be affected, this change will need to be investigated and assessed.

In many types of educational research venture, the question must be answered, "Under what conditions is it possible to maximize educative yield?" We are in a similar situation here and it is a binding one. Suppose it were possible to define yield as simply change in student performance on a certain test. It would still be necessary to specify those conditions--teacher, pupil, school, and community characteristics--under which yield is maximized. To discover the nature of involved interactions which are present among the various conditions and the yield, runs us into deep problems, indeed.

Other specific problems which almost always show up in any experimental research in the classroom are the carry-over effects of teacher in cases where the teacher teaches under two or more methodologies. However, if teacher-method interaction is to be assessed, a teacher must teach by two or more methods. Perhaps teacher carry-over can be controlled through careful checks by observers or co-investigators. Another confounding influence is the effect of "new" curricular systems. Control, although time consuming, may be exerted on this variable by continuing the comparisons through several years. Finally, the practice of assigning different methods to different teacher-classes at random may be a possible device although expensive of resources.

All of the previous remarks may be viewed as failing to conform to a demand for specificity. Generality in the present context is much easier to come by. Specific designs and analyses, it appears, must await specific proposals for research. However, a final note can be made.

It is heartening to observe the proposed activity in research in social studies teaching. The hope will be that a tremendous number of persons in this and associated areas will contribute original, fruitful, researchable ideas and that this viewpoint will continue and pervade the area.

PANEL[1] CHAIRED BY DAVID R. KRATHWOHL

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The group discussed the following topics:

1. The matter of the expectancies being created with respect to research.
2. The problem of who will do social studies research.
3. Which of the various steps in the research process should be given special attention in social studies research.
4. Can we establish standards for research in social studies?

First, let us consider the matter of expectancies with respect to research. As the conference progressed, it seemed clear that there was a great deal of confidence that research would provide the answers needed to solve a whole range of questions which have been raised with respect to social studies teaching. We have become used to expecting research to provide the cues and clues to problem solutions of all kinds. If we will only provide sufficient funds to mount a sizable research effort, we will solve nearly any problem in sight. Is this also a route to the solution of the problems of the social studies curriculum? Indeed, hopefully it is one. But we do ourselves and the field of educational research a disservice if we believe that it can pull any rabbits out of the hat that will solve all the immediate problems. It takes time to mount a research effort and rarely do we derive immediate benefit from it.

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[1] Any discussion stimulates the participants in ways that a report on it cannot convey. This report is no exception. The discussion here summarized was not built around an integrated organizational structure, but covered a number of facets of prior sessions. Hopefully, the attempt to organize it has added to its communicability.

Helpful suggestions by my colleague, Dr. Stanley Wronski, a participant in the discussion, are gratefully acknowledged.

For one thing, the kinds of problems with which we deal in the social studies, like many of the problems of education, are tremendously complex. Take for instance the matter of who is the best social studies teacher. Havighurst indicated in his speech that there were different proper roles for a teacher. At the junior high school level the proper role may be different from that at the senior high school level. For the latter, the proper role may be that of an academician, perhaps in one of the social sciences from which the social studies are derived. For the former, the teacher is a transmitter of the culture with qualities different from the academician if she is to properly fulfill her role. McKeachie noted the differences in individuals which require consideration in determining the best teacher. Thus, the best teacher for the anxious child may be different from one for the bright child, who in turn may differ in the characteristics needed by the dull child, the child who needs loving and so on. This makes the picture still more complex so that one must not only consider the role of a good teacher with respect to school level, but also to the kind of a role which best fits different children. One can make matters still more complex by considering the way a teacher fits into the milieu in which she finds herself. Some schools have a highly supportive climate, others a questioning climate, others an authoritarian climate, and so on. How a teacher's personal characteristics and how the role orientation of the teacher fits the particular situational characteristics in which she finds herself also bears on the matter of whether she will be perceived as a good teacher in that situation. We could extend this survey of the complexities, but this is enough to indicate the extent of the difficulties of the problem.

Clearly, then, if we wish to understand adequately the way that different variables are involved in an educational situation, the simple single variable designs with which we are used to dealing are not adequate for the complex problems with which we are faced. This suggests that we must look to multi-dimensional models of various kinds which will permit us to handle and to control the complex variables which enter our problems.

A second point with respect to our expectations of research has to do with our understanding of the way in which the research process progresses. Research progresses by a process of accretion. Any single research study is unlikely to be accepted as providing all of the needed confirmation for a principle, rule, or procedure. Only as research is repeated and the same result is found in several situations do we feel confident in accepting particular research findings. In part, this stems from the already noted complexity of the problems with which we deal; in part, this comes from an understanding of the way in which knowledge is added to what we already know. Each research study seeks to add to our knowledge by building an argument which satisfies, at least, the investigator. It is as tight an argument as he can make it. But each study is a compromise between an ideal control of all of the variables that are involved in that study, and the best control that can be obtained under the circumstances in which the particular piece of research was carried on. This compromise may not be satisfactory to any particular person as a consumer of that research. Only as a series of research studies, each of which may have individual flaws, but which as a whole tend to confirm a particular point of view, principle or law are added together do they make a convincing case. Thus, despite the fact that our "textbook" examples of research rarely appear in the literature, anymore than the "perfect ball game" appears on Saturday afternoons on the football field, nonetheless research gradually does build knowledge as each study, seeking evidence with respect to a particular hypothesis, contributes some information about it.

A third and fundamental problem of social studies research is that the curricular goals of the social studies arise out of a reflective examination of not only the societal values of the society in which the instruction is to occur, but also the role of the school with respect to these values. Only as these reflective examinations have been completed satisfactorily can research in the social studies indicate the extent to which our curricular practices are abetting or hindering the attainment of these goals. But different techniques of examining our society as well as varied emphases and biases of the analyzers combine with whatever lack of unanimity of orientation exists within our society as it is reflected in these examinations. The result is to provide many different bases on which to construct a curriculum and a lack of agreement on the proper goals which the curricula should attain. This makes it difficult to perceive a steady forward movement in social studies research as it advances unevenly along a broken front.

All of the above is not to deprecate the research approach of adding to our knowledge. It is probably the best approach that we have to the building of a science of education, and to the accretion of the kind of knowledge which in the long run will permit us to efficiently and effectively build an education enterprise. It is an attempt to give some perspective on the research enterprise so we can have more realistic expectations of its output and so that we can view it properly with respect to the tasks which we seek to complete.

Further, as Peter Odegard indicated in his presentation to the Conference, we cannot wait for all of the answers to be in before we make decisions with respect to the contents of a given curriculum and to the teaching methods designed for that curriculum.

There is the additional question of who will do the research and who will solve the problems. For many years most of the people in social studies education have more or less assumed that researchers in the basic social sciences will provide them with the basic knowledge they will need; but the social science researcher has provided very little in the way of knowledge about curricular organization, content selection, or teaching procedures. If, for instance, we turn to the field of psychology for such help, however, we find that while there is a great deal of research going on with respect to the problem solving processes of human beings, we find too much of this inadequate for our purposes, or not directly enough related to the kinds of questions which need answering for the teaching of the social studies. Each professional works on problems to win the acclaim of his colleagues in his own department. One can hardly expect him to leave the problems that gain him prestige in his own field to work on ours.

For an analogous situation one may turn to the medical schools which for many years also perceived that their needs could be taken care of by the basic researchers in the biological fields upon which their fields rest. They believed that the anatomist and the physicist would provide the information they would need for progress in the medical field. But they have been gradually disabused at this notion and they have finally begun to hire their own physiologists and their own anatomists in the medical schools. Thus, it seems likely that colleges of education and specifically those working on social studies curricula are going to have to obtain their own social science researchers to develop research directly attacking the problems with which they are concerned. In this way we can obtain personnel free of the academic professional pressures of their field to work on education's problems. As such personnel share the pressures for the finding of solutions to education's problems as well as the acclaim which comes from their attainment, we can expect to make greater progress on the problems we are considering.

We should not ignore the possibility of training more social studies people themselves to be researchers. Although to some extent this has always been a part of the training of people who intend to work at the college level in a social studies area, if we can accentuate and accelerate this kind of training, we will add to the pool of people suitably trained.

In addition to discussing the matter of who shall do research, the group also turned to the nature of the research process itself. Having already noted that it is basically a chain of argument which each experimenter attempts to forge as tightly as possible in order to determine whether his data fit a particular point of view, hypothesis, or aspect of theory, the group gave particular attention to three of the steps or links in the chain. Some of the characteristics of social studies research of special concern with respect to these steps were noted. The first step examined was the translation of the terms in the hypothesis into operational definitions which would be useful to research. It was noted that in the social studies there is a great deal of difficulty with respect to terminology. Many terms used in the social studies, critical thinking for instance, mean different things to each teacher who uses them. There is ample evidence with respect to this one example since there are many "critical thinking" tests on the market, no one of which seems to have a very sizable following.

The terminology problems became dramatically evident in recent work extending the taxonomy of educational objectives into the affective domain. An examination was made of the way in which such terms as "interest," "appreciation," "attitude," "value," and "adjustment" are used in the statement of educational objectives, many of them drawn from the social studies. It was found that

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each of these terms is used in a wide variety of meanings, so wide in fact that hardly any of the terms had a precise enough meaning to be useful in defining the levels of the affective domain. The continuum found for the affective domain was used to study the range of meanings for these terms with respect to this taxonomy "yardstick." It was found that each of such terms of "interest," "attitude," and "appreciation" overlapped heavily in their meaning, and extended over a very wide portion of the domain. To some extent, it seemed that the more commonly the terms were used the greater the variety of meanings in which the terms seemed to be used. Since these objectives dealing with attitude and values are common to the social studies, it is clear that the definitional problem is a first problem which must be solved in the study of hypotheses about social studies teaching. Hopefully, the affective domain taxonomy will contribute to a solution.

Once the definitional problem is conquered so that a term is tied to a specific set of behaviors, the measurement problem becomes much easier. It was noted, however, that many of the measures available for the evaluation of the outcomes of social studies instruction are far from adequate. If social studies research is to progress, there will have to be a great deal of pioneering work to improve those measures which will be used to evaluate the outcomes of new curricula.

The sampling step in an experimenter's chain of argument was also examined. It was noted that more often than not experimenters in education used what might be called "grab" samples. They use the students and classes that are available to them in their immediate vicinity, rather then doing a careful job of building a sampling plan and obtaining the necessary cases to fit it. It was noted that often a sampling plan would call for considerably more work than a "grab" sample. But to counter this, it was noted that perhaps for the first time adequate funds are available to carry out such sampling plans in social studies research. Funding agencies would typically prefer that their funds be used to carry out a study that will generalize. Thus, studies using "grab" samples of a peculiar nature need no longer be tolerated.

The matter of generalizable findings raised the question of whether one might establish some kind of standards for research work which might lead to better and more generalizable work. Certainly, there is much that could be done to improve the work now being done, but it is difficult to set absolute standards. The material reported for Stanley's discussion group indicates some of the faults which are to be avoided in various experimental designs. Similarly, the American Psychological Association has established standards in terms of the kinds of measurement data which should be reported to the consumer. But treatises on research avoid setting standards, for example, minimum levels of certain statistics that must be reached, minimum sizes of samples to be gathered, minimum validity coefficients for tests. They strive for an understanding of the way each of these aspects is involved in the research process and other interrelationships of these aspects. The nature of the decision the hypothesis calls for, the magnitude of the phenomena to be observed, combined with other factors help carve the particular compromise which each investigator makes in designing a study. This compromise is still more evident in situations where the investigator chooses among the variables being worked with. For example, a careful equalizing of time between treatments prevents one from being effective in the amount of time allowed it. Allowing more time results in boredom and fatigue in other treatments. He either foregoes equalizing time, or prevents a real test of one of the treatments. The important thing is that each study be made with as full an understanding as possible of the exact nature of the compromise involved.

Thus, absolute standards as one might apply them to the measurement of certain physical tolerances are probably not currently feasible in social studies research, but continued careful study of the research can highlight the research aspect that must be considered, and the way they are properly so considered.

PANEL CHAIRED BY JULIAN C. STANLEY

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of the Laboratory of Experimental Design
University of Wisconsin

There are various types of research, from simple fact-finding to controlled, variable-manipulating, "true" experimentation. True experiments require the assigning of independent-variable combinations to the experimental units in some random fashion--or, one may prefer to say, the assigning of the experimental units to the experimental combinations probabilistically.

True Experiments

The simplest type of true experiment is the two-group design where N/2 of the experimental units are assigned at random to one "treatment" group and the remaining N/2 units to the other group (either another "treatment" or a control group). Randomization equates the groups initially, within the limits of random fluctuations, so the comparison of the means of the groups at the end of the experiment is unbiased, even though no "pretest" (i.e., measure of an antecedent variable) was administered. If an antecedent variable well correlated with the dependent (i.e., the outcome) variable is available, it may be used as a covariate or for "blocking." This antecedent variable is not needed to remove bias, which is neutralized by the random assignment of experimental units to experimental conditions, but it is helpful for increasing the power of the comparison of the means on the dependent (i.e., the outcome) variable.

The importance of randomization in true experimentation can hardly be overstated. Such randomization does not have to be "simple"--that is, without restriction. As in blocking or Latinizing to form Latin squares, it can be modified random; but judgmental assignment is not random allocation and thereby invalidates the usual analytical procedures for experiments.

Furthermore, the experimental unit may be an individual such as a pupil, or it may be a cluster of individuals such as a classroom or school.

Quasi-Experiments

Campbell and Stanley (1963) devote much of their 76-page chapter to quasi-experiments, studies that resemble true experiments somewhat, but in which full internal randomization is either impossible or impracticable. For example, attempts to determine whether taking Latin improves knowledge of English grammar usually involve comparisons of students who voluntarily took Latin with students who chose not to do so. In a true experiment one would assign students randomly to the Latin and non-Latin groups. Seldom could this be done, nor would it usually be desirable, anyway, because a considerable number of students who do not elect to take Latin would find the usual Latin class too difficult. Therefore, we capitalize on the "natural experiment," consisting of the extant Latin versus non-Latin groups, and try to adjust for initial differences that almost invariably favor the Latin takers. Our intent is experimental, but because the experimental units (students) were not assigned at random to the experimental conditions (taking Latin versus not taking Latin), we have a quasi-experiment. (Here "quasi-" means "resembling" or "seemingly," not "pseudo-.")

In true experiments we rule out, by randomization and careful experimental controls, explanations of results other than the effect of the independent (i.e., experimental) variable(s). When interpreting results of quasi-experiments, however, we must refute plausible alternative hypotheses so that our assertion that the experimental variable is the causative factor will be credible. This is not easy to do in the Latin study, for example, but Campbell and Stanley discuss certain quasi-experimental designs that improve internal validity (i.e., freedom from bias) greatly.

Pseudo-Experiments

Just as the publishing industry bombards us with non-books, so does advertising inflict numerous non-experiments on our eyes and ears. When a manufacturer asserts that his product is better than "Brand X," without specifying the quality of the competing brand or the conditions of the experiments on which his claim presumably is based, we may well suspect that--if anything--only a pseudo-experiment, biased in favor of his product, was conducted. Such loading of the dice is not unheard of in educational research, either, as when teaching teams are given the best teachers and the most aids, such as instructional secretaries, and then compared with results achieved by routine teachers. Pseudo-experiments are conducted to support the experimenter's preconceived notions, not to ascertain the truth scientifically.

Distortion may vary from complete deception all the way to unconscious favoring of one's preferred group, as in the attempts by well-meaning researchers to increase the IQ's of mentally retarded youngsters by giving them glutamic acid and then administering the somewhat subjectively scored

Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale to an experimental group and a control group (no glutamic acid). Until this type of experiment was done in double-blind fashion, with neither the youngsters nor the testers knowing who was getting the treatment, the glutamic acid seemed to be effective.

Associational Studies

Associational or co-relational studies should be distinguished carefully from true experiments and quasi-experiments. It is incorrect and misleading to say that one is studying "the influence of class size on school achievement" or "the effect of anxiety on test scores," if all that one is doing is correlating class size with measures of academic achievement, or anxiety-test scores with other test scores. The words "influence . . . on" and "effect . . . on" imply "causation," with a stimulus (an independent, experimental variable) causing a response (the dependent, outcome variable). True experiments and well-designed, well-analyzed quasi-experiments enable us to infer "causation," using that term in the stimulus→response sense, but associational findings in themselves permit only response<->response statements. Campbell and Stanley discuss the difference between experiments and associational studies at some length. Also see Stanley (1963b).

Experientation

If a teacher "tries out" a new approach to see whether or not he likes the results, without any explicit control group or similar comparative base (such as the measured achievement of last year's class), he is conducting what Campbell and Stanley call a "one-shot case study," or what we might dignify a bit more as "experientation" because of its susceptibility to bias. Most experimental effects in education are not large, so it is all too easy for the teacher to conclude that a procedure he liked enough to use produced the desired results, when in fact it was no better than previous methods, or perhaps even worse.

Also, it is difficult to allow for the conflicting effects of the novelty of the new technique and the "chaos" caused by changing from the former plan. In a few weeks, months, or years--depending on the extent of the change--both novelty and chaos will be dissipated, but by that time the teacher may not have a good enough remembrance of results he obtained with the former method to make a valid comparison. Experientation is no general substitute for experimentation, but it can be strengthened considerably by thorough measurement and evaluation.

Fact-Finding

Much research consists of gathering facts, self-reports, and reports by others, without immediate intent to compare them with similar facts for other groups. The construction of tests, rating scales, and inventories falls into this category. [See Stanley (1964b, chap. 9, "Self-Reports and Reports by Others."] For example, "How many teachers of 'Problems of Democracy' courses are there in Michigan, and what were their college majors?" "What, in your opinion, are the five reforms most urgently needed for the social-studies curriculum?" "Should the social-studies curriculum be revamped over-all from kindergarten through the twelfth grade, or should curriculum reorganization be confined at first to some smaller group of grades, such as the junior or senior high school?" "What are the ten most important goals of social-studies courses in public schools?"

Almost anything can be called "research," even looking up a telephone number in order to call the local pizza delivery service. In nearly any gathering where the word "research" is mentioned, someone will immediately ask, "What is research? Is assigning priorities to goals 'research'? Can we do research into what ought to be?" If by "research" we mean seeking facts and opinions, then of course we can ask any questions that we are ingenious enough to phrase and get any answers our research resources, including respondents, are capable of providing.

Miscellaneous Topics Discussed

It was felt by some that the prevailing talk about starting from the ground (i.e., kindergarten) up in revising the social-studies curriculum completely put most experimentation far into the future; perhaps social-studies specialists should note that the sciences (physics, biology, and chemistry) and mathematics have proceeded rather differently, a grade or course at a time. Is the kindergarten-through-twelfth-grade approach to unwieldy, expensive, and time-consuming, being more comprehensive than desirable?

We talked about what Campbell and Stanley call "reactivity" in experiments, particularly the difficulty of conducting all aspects of an experiment within a given school because pupils and teachers using one treatment might be influenced unduly by pupils and teachers using another, thereby weakening the potency of the comparison of treatment effects.

One participant pointed out that typically the teacher is trying to find better ways to work with his own future classes, and that he is not trying to generalize to classes taught by any other teachers. In this sense, the teacher is trying to learn about himself alone.

Another panel member suggested liking school as one criterion (i.e., dependent, outcome variable) for experimentation and felt that using certain films might contribute to attaining that goal, even though the films did not enhance cognitive learning.

Another participant related an illustrative instance of a doctoral student's finding no significant difference between experimental and control groups on any of her outcome variables, but nevertheless arguing with the dissertation committee that there must be hidden gains favoring her preferred method, because it freed the teacher from some of the classroom routine and allowed her to work individually with students (even though the individual assistance did not produce expected changes in the dependent variables employed).[1] This was taken as an example of either poor experimental design (the researcher should have included in the experiment the relevant outcome measures) or of question-begging.

Mohamed Afify (1964) found that the residual effects of a large physics-film experiment were negligible after five years, even though teachers who used the films had stated at the end of the experiment that they were excellent and that they planned to use the films selectively henceforth. This seemed to point up the inability of experiments imposed on school systems from the outside, even with substantial support of the teachers, to affect school practice, and the consequent desirability of having the research ideas themselves originate within the schools. See Stanley (1963a, 1964a).

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[1] Despite objections from most members of her doctoral committee, the final version of the dissertation carries the following statement as the second of its four "recommendations": "Although the difference in achievement was insignificant [the expensive mechanical technique used] should be considered a valuable tool to relieve the teacher of the task of providing [a certain routine service] and to permit her to use her time for more creative work."

A by-product of the panel's discussion was the observation that some of the schools that had used the physics films soon changed to another curricular approach without giving the films further tryout under modified conditions. Some of the panel members suspected fadism, rather than careful adoption of appropriate techniques on the basis of enough experience with them.

Concluding Remark

This brief report cannot contain most of the more general discussion, much of which was concerned with the preparation of social-studies teachers, philosophical aspects of the teaching of social studies, curricular revision, and goals of instruction. Of course, such topics are highly important and integrally related to researching, including experimentation, in the social studies.

References

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APPENDIX

CONFERENCE PROGRAM

CONFERENCE PROGRAM

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 3

Opening Session	
The Purposes of the Conference	Dean Stephen K. Bailey Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University
Project Social Studies	U.S. Office of Education
(I) Needed Research on Social Attitudes, Beliefs, Values	Dr. Charles Frankel, Columbia University
Reactors	
Discussion	
Afternoon Session	
(II) Needed Research on Teaching Social Science as Method	Dr. Melvin Tumin, Princeton University
Reactors	
Discussion	
Evening Session	
(III) Needed Research on Sensitizing Students to Questions of Public Policy	Dr. Peter Odegard, University of California
Reactors	
Discussion	

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 4

Morning Session	
(IV) Needed Research on Cultural Backgrounds, Attitudes, Knowledge, and Training of Social Studies Teachers	Dr. Robert J. Havighurst, University of Chicago
Reactors	
Discussion	
(V) Needed Research on Psychological Factors in Learning as Related to the Social Studies	Dr. Wilbert McKeachie, University of Michigan
Reactors	
Discussion	

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 4

Afternoon Session

(VI) Needed Research on Selection and Organization of Content for Teaching Purposes	Dr. John H. Haefner, State University of Iowa

Reactors
Discussion

Evening Session

Problems of Research Design Groups A,B,C.	Dr. Julian Stanley, University of Wisconsin Dr. David Krathwohl, Michigan State University Dr. Raymond O. Collier, Jr., University of Minnesota

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 5

Morning Session
Problems of Research Design (continued)

Final Session
Conference Summary
Discussion
Adjournment